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Summary
Evaluative conditioning (EC) describes a change in preference towards a formerly
neutral stimulus (Conditioned Stimulus; CS) after this stimulus is paired with a valent
stimulus (Unconditioned Stimulus; US), in the direction of the valence of the US.
Evaluative conditioning is proposed as a mechanism of automatic preference acquisition
in dual-process theories of attitudes (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). An automatic
route to preference acquisition entails that people do not need to be aware of the
CS-US contingency in order for EC effects to develop. To experimentally investigate
whether EC effects persist without peoples’ awareness, stimuli (e.g., the CS) are
presented subliminally (i.e., too briefly to be consciously perceived). When the CS
is presented subliminally, contingency awareness between CS and US can be ruled
out. Hence, EC effects with subliminal CSs would support theories claiming that
contingency awareness is not necessary for EC effects to occur. Studies demonstrating
an EC effect with subliminally presented stimuli are reviewed and the stability of
the described subliminal EC effect is evaluated. A series of replication studies and
additional experiments were conducted to investigate possible boundary conditions
for EC effects to occur with subliminally presented stimuli. Specifically, it was tested
whether the following features would be beneficial for EC effects with subliminally
presented stimuli: (I) goal-relevance during the learning procedure and a relation
between CS and US (II) subliminal US presentation with additional counter-attitudinal
information (III) choice between CSs after the learning phase as a potentially more
sensitive measure of conditioning effects and (IV) a simultaneous presentation of
CS and US. Across the experiments, indications for the absence of EC effects with
subliminal stimuli were discovered. Additional findings hint to the possibility that
subliminal EC effects that were previously found, might have been based on briefly
presented—but visible—stimulus presentations. The findings lead to the conclusion
that EC does not form automatically. Theoretical implications about the nature of
EC are discussed.

Zusammenfassung
Evaluatives Konditionieren (EC) beschreibt die Veränderung in der Evaluation
eines ursprünglich neutralen Objekts (CS, engl. Conditioned Stimulus) nachdem das
Objekt zusammen mit einem valenten Stimulus (US, engl. Unconditioned Stimulus)
gezeigt wurde, in Richtung der Valenz des valenten Stimulus. Evaluatives Kondi-
tionieren wird—in 2 Prozess Theorien der Präferenzentwicklung—als ein Mechanis-
mus der automatischen Präferenzentwicklung angesehen (Gawronski & Bodenhausen,
2006). Wenn Präferenzen automatisch entstehen könnten, hätte dies zur Folge, dass
Personen kein CS-US Kontingenzbewusstsein besitzen müssen damit evaluative Kon-
ditionierungseffekte entstehen können. Um experimentell zu testen ob evaluative
Konditionierungseffekte ohne Kontingenzbewusstsein entstehen können kann einer
der beiden Stimuli (z.B. der CS) subliminal dargeboten werden. Bei der subliminalen
Präsentation wird der CS so kurz dargeboten, dass er nicht bewusst wahrgenommen
wird, aber unbewusst verarbeitet werden sollte. Wenn bei solch einer Präsentation ein
evaluativer Konditionierungseffekt entsteht, kann angenommen werden, dass evalua-
tives Konditionieren ohne Kontingenzbewusstsein möglich ist. Dieser Befund würde
Theorien der automatischen Präferenzentwicklung unterstützen. In dieser Arbeit
wurden Studien die einen subliminalen EC Effekt gefunden haben untersucht und
methodische Probleme dieser Arbeiten wurden herausgestellt. Um diese potentiellen
Probleme empirisch zu evaluieren, wurden mehrere Studien durchgeführt und folgende,
potentiell nutzbringende, Situationen geschaffen um die Möglichkeit eines subliminalen
EC Effektes zu erforschen:
(I) Ziel-Relevanz während der Lernphase, sowie eine inhaltliche Beziehung zwischen
CS und US (II) subliminale Präsentation des USs mit zusätzlicher, gegenläufiger, ex-
pliziter Information während der Lernphase (III) eine Auswahl zwischen CSen nach der
Lernphase als potentiell sensiblere Messung des Effektes, sowie (IV) eine gleichzeitige
Präsentation des CSs und des USs. Über mehrere Studien hinweg wurden statistische
Beweise für die Abwesenheit eines Konditionierungseffektes gefunden, wenn die Stimuli
tatsächlich subliminal präsentiert wurden. Ein zusätzlicher Befund der Studien könnte
als Indiz angesehen werden, dass vorherige Studien einen Effekt gefunden haben weil
Stimuli überzufällig sichtbar waren. Die Ergebnisse der empirischen Studien deuten
darauf hin, dass EC Effekte nicht automatische entstehen und die Auswirkung dieser
Befunde auf Theorien der Präferenzentwicklung wird diskutiert.
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Chapter 1: General Introduction
“Alle unsere Erkenntnis hebt von den Sinnen an, geht von da zum Ver-
stande, und endigt bei der Vernunft, über welche nichts Höheres in uns
angetroffen wird, [. . . ]”
“All our knowledge begins with sense, proceeds thence to understanding,
and ends with reason, beyond which nothing higher can be discovered in
the human mind, [. . . ]”
(Kant, 1787, p. 228)
Imagine you are in a new country and you want to buy bottled water. You do
not know any of the brands, the prices are equal, and they look similar. How do
you choose? How could your preferences for a specific water bottle be influenced?
Preferences are generally considered an important determinant of behavior (Allport,
1935; Martin & Levey, 1978). Therefore, understanding how preferences are formed
could have important implications for consumer science and important life choices
(Petty & Wegener, 1998) and might give insights into learning theories in general
(De Houwer, Baeyens, & Field, 2005). Of course, it should be noted that preferences
are not the only influential factor in determining behavior (Kruglanski et al., 2015).
Factors such as the strength of the preference (Krosnick & Petty, 1995) and a desire
to act upon the preference (i.e., “wanting”) need to be present (Berridge, 2009).
Additionally, a behavioral outcome should appear attainable and all factors need to
be translated into a goal (for a comprehensive review see Kruglanski et al., 2015).
One way in which a preference towards an object, for example, one of the water bottle
brands, might be changed is through evaluative conditioning. In the example above,
one might have a positive evaluation of one specific brand because we previously saw
a commercial poster showing the brand together with cute puppies, while we might
have a negative evaluation of another brand because we saw this brand in a dirty trash
can before we entered the store. Evaluative conditioning effects describe a change of
evaluation of a stimulus (for example a water brand) due to its co-occurrence with
a valent stimulus (for example the puppies or a dirty trash can; De Houwer, 2007).
Research on evaluative conditioning might give insight into the processes that underlie
learning and memory and could help understand phenomena in social psychology and
consumer science (De Houwer et al., 2005).
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Evaluative conditioning
In an article from 1957, Staats and Staats describe an experimental procedure
in which meaning was established by means of classical conditioning. Participants
saw neutral nonsense syllables and the experimenter read out valent words, which
had to be repeated by the participants. Each syllable was presented 16 times and a
different word with the same valence for each syllable was read out by the experimenter.
When the nonsense syllables were rated after this learning phase, syllables that were
presented together with words of positive valence were evaluated as more positive than
syllables presented together with words of negative valence (C. Staats & Staats, 1957).
This effect, later coined evaluative conditioning (EC), can be defined as a change in
the valence of a neutral stimulus (conditioned stimulus, CS) that results from pairing
the stimulus with another valent stimulus (unconditioned stimulus, US; De Houwer,
2007) and can therefore be considered to be a subclass of Pavlovian conditioning
(Pavlov, 1927). As in Pavlovian conditioning, stimuli are paired, but in EC the focus
is primarily on changes in valence compared to other changes in (physical) responses
in Pavlovian conditioning (De Houwer, 2007). The definition of EC by De Houwer
(2007) is explicitly agnostic to the processes underlying EC and defining EC as an
effect—instead of a process—therefore does not exclude any possible explanations.
The effect of evaluative conditioning was replicated numerous times since the
publication of Staats and Staats: Levey and Martin (1975) introduced the term
evaluative conditioning with a study pairing postcards of neutral and positive/negative
valence. In the past decades, many other studies showed EC effects with images and
words (e.g., Baeyens, Eelen, & Van den Bergh, 1990; Baeyens, Eelen, Crombez, & Van
den Bergh, 1992; Hammerl & Grabitz, 1993). Other studies extended these findings,
showing EC effects with smells (Baeyens, Wrzesniewski, De Houwer, & Eelen, 1996;
Todrank, Byrnes, Wrzesniewski, & Rozin, 1995), flavors (Baeyens, Eelen, Van den
Bergh, & Crombez, 1990; Dickinson & Brown, 2007) and sounds (Gast, Langer, &
Sengewald, 2016; Gorn, 1982; Schemer, Matthes, Wirth, & Textor, 2008). However,
until recently researchers were not uniformly convinced that evaluative conditioning is
a real phenomenon, as some researchers argued that the EC effect might be due to a
stimulus assignment artifact and a lack of control groups (Field & Davey, 1997; Shanks
& Dickinson, 1990). Studies addressing these methodological critiques, however, still
reported EC effects (Díaz, Ruiz, & Baeyens, 2005; Field & Moore, 2005) which led De
Houwer et al. (2005) to state that “this should eliminate all doubts about whether
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genuine EC effects do exist” (p. 163). Furthermore, in a large scale meta-analysis
using 253 independent studies from 145 publications, Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini,
Baeyens, and Crombez (2010) found a mean effect size of d = 0.524 and concluded
that “beyond any doubt [. . . ] EC is a genuine phenomenon” (Hofmann et al., 2010, p.
410).
Two phenomena were—and still are—central in the discussion whether EC should
be considered a distinct form of Pavlovian conditioning: extinction and contingency
awareness (Davey, 1994). Extinction is the phenomenon that an EC effect is reduced
after the CS is shown alone—without the US—after the initial learning trials. Many
studies reported that no extinction could be found in EC (e.g., Baeyens, Crombez,
Van den Bergh, & Eelen, 1988; Díaz et al., 2005). However, the debate whether
EC is resistant to extinction is ongoing with the meta-analysis by Hofmann et al.
(2010) showing that a reduced EC effect could be found after an extinction phase (cf.
Gawronski, Gast, & De Houwer, 2014). Other studies support the notion that EC is
not resistant to extinction (Aust, Haaf, & Stahl, 2017; Lipp, Oughton, & LeLievre,
2003). The discussion on the absence or presence of extinction effects in EC is therefore
still ongoing.
In the previously mentioned research by Staats and Staats (1957) the authors
found that the EC effect was still present when excluding participants who reported
to be aware of a relationship between the syllables (CSs) and valent words (USs). The
authors therefore concluded that the “present results indicate that the meaning of
stimuli may be learned without awareness” (C. Staats & Staats, 1957, p. 79). This
exact conclusion is still debated 60 years later (e.g., Sweldens, Corneille, & Yzerbyt,
2014). The awareness of the CS-US contingency during encoding, or put differently
the “knowledge that a specific CS predicts a specific US”, is called contingency
awareness in the context of evaluative conditioning (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002, p.
4). Evaluative conditioning is just one of two learning mechanisms where indications
for unaware conditioning has been reported (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002). The other
learning mechanism is the effect discovered by Perruchet (1985), in which a dissociation
between the expectancy of an airpuff and the physical response (i.e., eyeblinking)
was shown. The findings by Staats and Staats (1957) and others who reported EC
without contingency awareness (e.g., Baeyens et al., 1990, 1992; De Houwer, Baeyens,
& Eelen, 1994) supported the view that EC is based on a purely associative, automatic,
bottom-up, and low-level process (De Houwer, 2007). However, the meta-analysis by
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Hofmann et al. (2010) clearly showed that the most important statistical predictor
of EC effects is contingency awareness. While this result does not imply that EC
effects cannot be produced by associative processes, it is unlikely that they can only be
caused by these processes and not by propositional, higher-order processes. Therefore,
ideas and theories proposing that EC is a purely associative and automatic process
have not received much attention since this finding (Gast, Gawronski, & De Houwer,
2012).
As preferences are important determinants of behavior, it is vital to understand
how they are formed (Hofmann et al., 2010). It is therefore important to understand
the mechanisms that underlie EC and theories explaining these should be validated.
The central goal of the work presented in the next chapters will be the investigation of
theories of EC by addressing the question whether contingency awareness is necessary
in EC. In the next paragraph, current models explaining the underlying processes of
EC effects are therefore discussed.
Current theories in evaluative conditioning
A scientific theory summarizes single effects found through empirical work and
creates something novel that goes beyond single effects and phenomena (Fiedler,
2004) and might, therefore, help to uncover new predictions (De Houwer, 2014b).
Specific predictions of boundary conditions of EC effects by scientific theories are
especially important as EC might be useful for consumer science and learning theories.
Generally, a lack of specific theories might delay the scientific progress in a given
field as alternative explanations for an effect can be constructed, leading to possibly
unnecessary discussions (Fiedler, 2004). As one will see in the next paragraph,
currently discussed theories in evaluative conditioning have different predictions on
the circumstances necessary for an EC effect to occur. Considering the possible
implications for learning theories, consumer science (De Houwer et al., 2005), and
psychological therapies (Lipp & Purkis, 2005) it is of particular interest to test these
divergent predictions. Currently two different—and partially opposing—views on
possible working mechanisms underlying evaluative conditioning are discussed: the
propositional single-process view and the dual-process view.
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Propositional single-process models
Even before Hofmann and colleagues (2010) found that contingency awareness
is the most important statistical predictor of EC effects, propositional single-process
models have been proposed to explain EC effects (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002). Multiple
other publications have contributed to describe characteristics of a propositional
single-process view1 which will be discussed in the next paragraph (De Houwer, 2009,
2014b, 2014c, 2014a; Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009).
Propositions can be understood as mental links that qualify how two events
are related (Mitchell et al., 2009) and they can therefore specify the strength and
structure of relations in the world (De Houwer, 2009). Mitchell et al. (2009) give the
following example when describing a propositional account of the classical Pavlovian
experiment where a bell and food were presented to dogs: “There is no mental link
between the bell and food, but a proposition of the form: When I hear a bell, I
will receive food” (p. 186; colon added). From this description, it can be seen that
propositions are part of a controlled reasoning process which leads to a belief about
the relationship of events (Mitchell et al., 2009). One possible mechanism that could
underlie these propositional processes is an episodic memory account in which the
CS-US pairs are stored in memory during the learning phase (see Stahl & Heycke,
2016). When asked for an evaluation of the CS a person might use the memory traces
of the learning phase (i.e., the CS-US pairs) and an evaluation is constructed on the
spot (Schwarz, 2007; Schwarz & Bohner, 2001; Stahl & Heycke, 2016). Of course,
other mechanisms, such as a storing of attitudes (e.g., Fazio, Chen, McDonel, &
Sherman, 1982), are also plausible under a propositional process assumption. From
the definition of propositions three characteristics can be derived: (1) the relationship
between events is important, (2) propositions depend on a truth evaluation, and (3)
propositions depend on contingency awareness.
(1) Propositions can contain information about the type of relation between events
and therefore might qualify a relation between a CS and US in an EC paradigm
(De Houwer, 2014c). If, for example, a health product (CS) prevents a negative
1As no publication describes a specific theory or model for the propositional single-process view,
researchers have suggested referring to the ideas surrounding single propositional working mechanisms
in EC as “propositional single-process views”. However, as some researchers have argued that the
predictions of dual-process models are similarly (un-)specific as those of propositional single-process
views (Corneille & Stahl, 2018) I will treat them as equal theories competing in describing the
underlying processes in evaluative conditioning (see also Chapter 8).
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health outcome (US) it should be evaluated positively according to the proposi-
tional account (Hu, Gawronski, & Balas, 2017). Even though the CS is paired
with a negative outcome it is evaluated as more positive (for example compared
to a CS causing a negative health outcome), which demonstrates that the CS-US
pair relies on relational qualifiers.
(2) One additional aspect of propositions is that they are dependent on a truth
evaluation (De Houwer, 2009). While the truth evaluation might not be conscious,
a proposition will be accepted and acted upon only if it is in line with other
propositions (De Houwer, 2014c). We could imagine a situation where a person
sees a health product which is liked by this person (for example because it helped
this person previously) but the product is shown together with a negative image,
which could imply that the product and the negative image are related. It is
likely that the possible proposition “the product causes something negative” is
evaluated as false due to existing opposing propositions and therefore ignored.
(3) A third central claim by the propositional approach is that evaluative learning
always “requires controlled processes” and that “it is not possible to have learned
about a relationship between two events in the environment without being, or
having been, aware of that relationship” (Mitchell et al., 2009, p. 187). Put
differently, only when a participant possesses CS-US contingency awareness an
EC effect can be obtained. As awareness of the CS-US relation is necessary
for EC effects to arise—according to the propositional single-process view—the
process itself can be considered effortful and therefore depends on cognitive
resources (De Houwer, 2014c; Mitchell et al., 2009). Under a propositional single-
process view, an EC effect can only be found if CS, US, and their co-occurrence
are processed consciously. Therefore finding EC effects without knowledge of
the relationship between CS and US during the learning phase would contradict
the predictions made by the propositional single-process view. This prediction
will be investigated in detail in the next chapters. It is important to note that
the requirement of awareness discussed above is limited to the acquisition of
the proposition and the propositional single-process view does not entail that
a person is aware of all steps involved in the acquisition of preferences (i.e.,
people might be unaware of the process itself or the effect of the process on their
behavior; De Houwer, 2009, 2014c).
Lovibond and Shanks (2002) propose two different propositional single-process
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models: the strong single-process model and the weak single-process model. Contin-
gency awareness also plays a central role in the difference between these postulated
models: In the strong single-process model a propositional learning process leads to
contingency awareness, which in turn leads to an EC effect. In the weak single-process
model the propositional learning process leads to both contingency awareness and an
EC effect. Awareness therefore plays no causal role in the weak model, however, it
is still an important part in both single-process models proposed by Lovibond and
Shanks (2002). It is important to note that in both the strong and the weak model
a time delay between the learning phase and a CS-US memory test could result in
a decrease in CS-US memory. Finding a difference between a CS evaluation and
reported CS-US contingency awareness might therefore be the result of forgetting
processes and not evidence for learning in the absence of contingency awareness. A
person might, for example, have a positive evaluation for a CS but forgot that the
CS was shown with a US of positive valence. In this framework, one additional factor
might explain differences between contingency awareness and an evaluation: When
asking a participant to evaluate a CS after the learning phase, the task cannot be
answered incorrectly and any evaluation is “correct”. However, when asking which US
(valence) was presented with a given CS, participants are aware that there is a correct
answer. Especially, when participants can answer “don’t know” in the contingency
awareness test, a participant using a conservative decision criterion might reply that
he is unaware of the CS-US contingency but might still use the information in an
evaluation.
Summarizing the propositional single-process view, a proposition is formed
provided that the CS-US contingency is consciously perceived, that sufficient cognitive
resources are available, and a proposition is used provided that it is evaluated as
truthful.
Dual-process models
As discussed previously, the meta-analysis by Hoffman and colleagues (2010)
showed that contingency awareness of the CS-US pairs was the most important
predictor, which strongly indicates that EC is based (at least partially) on propositional
processes. However, as will be discussed in the following segments, a second process—
next to the propositional process described above—might be necessary to explain
all instances of evaluative conditioning effects (e.g., Gawronski, Balas, & Creighton,
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2014; Hütter, Sweldens, Stahl, Unkelbach, & Klauer, 2012; Sweldens, Van Osselaer, &
Janiszewski, 2010).
A variety of dual-process models have been introduced in the past decades
explaining processes underlying preferences (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006;
Rydell & McConnell, 2006). While all models differ, they generally have in common
that they consist of explicit (controlled) and implicit (automatic) processes. One
dual-process model, which could be considered the most prominent representative of
dual-process models explaining preferences, is the associative-propositional evaluation
model, or APE model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011, 2014a). In the next
paragraph, I will outline the APE model, its assumptions, and its predictions that
can be derived from it.
As mentioned above, and as can be deduced from the name, the associative-
propositional evaluation model proposes two distinct learning processes: propositional
and associative processes. The propositional process described in the APE model
is highly similar to the propositional process described in the single-process view
(Mitchell et al., 2009). The second process, the associative process, can be defined
in the context of evaluative conditioning in that “observed co-occurrences between
objects and events result in a co-activation of their corresponding mental concepts,
which in turn creates an associative link between the two” (Gawronski & Bodenhausen,
2014b, p. 191). The associations, therefore, are understood as mental links that
grow stronger when activated (e.g., by a repeated visual presentation of a CS-US
pair; Gawronski, Brannon, & Bodenhausen, 2017). One important characteristic
of the APE model is that it proposes that associations are generally captured by
implicit measures, while propositional processes are generally captured by explicit
measures (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 2014a). The associative reaction is also
described as a spontaneous gut reaction, based on the valence of a given association
that is activated automatically when a relevant stimulus is encountered (Gawronski &
Bodenhausen, 2006, 2014b).
The APE model differs from other dual-process models (e.g., Rydell, McConnell,
& Mackie, 2008) as it allows for a causal influence of associative on propositional
processes and vice versa. It is therefore possible that an EC effect is acquired through
an associative process which subsequently has a direct influence on the propositional
process. The learned EC effect might therefore be found in implicit as well as explicit
measures (Case 1, Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). All other interactions between
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the processes are also possible according to the APE model (for a detailed overview
see case 1 to case 8; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). The interaction between the
two processes in the APE model can therefore have the effect that implicit and explicit
measures can be influenced by both associative or propositional processes respectively
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006).
From the description of associative processes given above, the following char-
acteristics of EC in the APE model are deduced by Gawronski and Bodenhausen
(2006): As associations are defined as automatic activations when a CS-US pair is
presented, a repeated pairing of CS and US should strengthen the link between them
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014b). Additionally, contrary to propositions, associa-
tions are independent of truth evaluations and associative reactions therefore do not
depend on previous beliefs or previous propositions (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006).
Additionally, associative processes “may indeed have some features of automaticity”
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2007, p. 969), which is of particular interest as the
concept of automaticity entails a series of characteristics. Four characteristics of
automaticity are described by Bargh (1994) and related to EC can be summarized as:
“efficient”, “goal-independent”, “uncontrollable”, “absence of CS-US awareness” (for
a detailed overview on automaticity in EC see Corneille & Stahl, 2018). Gawronski
and Bodenhausen (2014b) argue that there is no one to one mapping of the proposed
associative process in the APE model and the concept of automaticity and argues
that both the associative and the propositional process have controlled and automatic
aspects. However, the APE model specifies that the associative process can be efficient
and resource independent, goal-independent, and associations in memory can indeed
occur unintentionally (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014b). Additionally, the APE
model clearly states that EC effects can be formed independently of CS-US awareness
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014b, Table 13.1) and states that “associative learning
is commonly assumed to be independent of people’s awareness of the relevant con-
tiguities that are responsible for the formation of new associative links. The APE
model generally agrees with this contention.” (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014b, p.
194). It is also explicitly stated that “associative learning may occur in the absence of
conscious awareness to the extent that the relevant CS-US pairings are in the focus of
attention” (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014b, p. 200).
The APE model therefore predicts that an EC effect is possible when participants
are not aware of the CS-US contingency during the learning phase. This prediction is
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in direct contrast to the previously discussed propositional single-process view which
predicts that no EC effect is possible without contingency awareness (Mitchell et al.,
2009).
Contingency awareness in EC
While multiple phenomena might be important to differentiate between the two
views on EC (e.g., relational information as a qualifier of CS-US information), this
work will focus on one specific phenomenon: contingency awareness of the CS-US pair.
As discussed earlier, contingency awareness has been an important part of research on
EC since the first publications on EC (C. Staats & Staats, 1957) and, as outlined above,
contingency awareness is one of the central testable differences between propositional
single-process views and dual-process models. Mitchell et al. (2009) also allocate a
central role to contingency awareness and state: “If all learning is aware, there is less
to be gained from postulating an automatic link-formation mechanism in addition
to a propositional reasoning mechanism” (p. 189). The prediction of propositional
single-process views that contingency awareness is necessary for EC effects to form
allows for a clear falsification of the propositional single-process view proposed by
Mitchell et al. (2009). It is therefore the main question of this dissertation whether
evaluative conditioning requires contingency awareness, or whether EC effects can be
found in the absence of contingency awareness. In the next paragraph, I will therefore
give an overview of recent studies published on the questions whether contingency
awareness is necessary for EC effects to form.
One way to investigate whether EC effects might arise without contingency
awareness is to see whether an EC effect exists in people who report no contingency
awareness. In multiple studies, EC effects were found for participants who could not
identify whether a given CS was presented with a given US (Olson & Fazio, 2001).
Other studies reported that participants who could not select a given US that was
paired with a CS displayed EC effects for these CSs nonetheless (Baeyens et al., 1990;
Walther & Nagengast, 2006). Another set of studies found that EC effects were found
even though participants could not name the US valence for a given CS (Baeyens
et al., 1990; Dickinson & Brown, 2007). Contrasting these findings, in a series of
experiments an EC effect was observed only for participants who could report the
US valence for a given CS but not for participants who were unable to report the
US valence for a given CS (Stahl & Unkelbach, 2009; Stahl, Unkelbach, & Corneille,
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2009). The authors argue that previous studies showing EC effects in the absence of
contingency awareness might have been due to the fact that participants were aware
of the US valence a CS was paired with (and therefore contingency aware) but not
aware of the identity of the US. In another study, Pleyers, Corneille, Luminet, and
Yzerbyt (2007) argue that contingency awareness should not be measured on a person
level but instead on an item (CS) level. This argument seems plausible as one could
consider that an EC effect is driven by the contingency awareness of merely one or
two CS-US pairs. This person might be classified as “unaware” but the actual EC
effects is driven by only a few (remembered) pairs. Indeed, Pleyers et al. (2007) found
EC effects only for remembered CS-US pairs, but not for CS-US pairs that were not
remembered, when running an item based statistical analysis.
However, studies showing EC effects only for remembered CS-US pairs might
have overestimated contingency awareness in participants. Specifically, participants
might have used their affective reaction towards the CS to inform their decision
whether a CS was paired with a positive or negative US and did not possess actual
contingency awareness (Hütter et al., 2012). This “affect-as-information” explanation
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983) could result in an overestimation of actual knowledge of the
CS-US valence pairings and would bias any analysis against EC without contingency
awareness (Gawronski & Walther, 2012; but see Hütter & De Houwer, 2017 for
empirical indications against this explanation).
The most promising attempt to detect EC effects in the absence of contingency
awareness stems from Hütter et al. (2012) who used a process-dissociation (PD)
approach to tackle the “affect-as-information” problem. PD procedures have previously
been used to disentangle explicit and automatic memory (Jacoby, 1991). In the
experiment by Hütter et al. (2012), after an EC learning phase, participants were
asked to indicate whether a given CS was paired with a positive or negative US
and instructed to guess based on their affective reaction when they did not know.
Participants were assigned to two different conditions, inclusion or exclusion. In
the inclusion condition participants were asked to respond “pleasant” when they
remembered that a CS had been paired with a pleasant US, or if they had a pleasant
evaluation of the CS. Participants were asked to respond “unpleasant” when they
remembered that a CS had been paired with an unpleasant US, or if they had an
unpleasant evaluation of the CS. The other half of participants were assigned to an
exclusion condition. Here participants were asked to reverse their responses in the task
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(e.g., participants had to respond “unpleasant” when they remembered that the CS
had been shown with a pleasant US or when they evaluated the CS as pleasant). Using
a multinomial processing tree model (Batchelder & Riefer, 1999) this experimental
design now allowed for a calculation of three parameters: a memory parameter which
captured the memory for the CS-US valence contingency, a guessing parameter which
showed bias towards “pleasant” or “unpleasant” responses and most importantly an
attitude parameter which captured the attitude towards the CS. As the attitude
parameter is contingent on the absence of the memory parameter (see Figure 2 - 4,
Hütter et al., 2012) an attitude parameter larger than 0 would indicate that EC effects
can exist in the absence of CS-US valence memory. In four experiments Hütter et al.
(2012) repetitively showed a significant deviation from 0 of the attitude parameter.
While some studies were able to replicate the finding of an attitude effect without
memory with the PD procedure (Hütter & De Houwer, 2017; Hütter & Sweldens,
2013), other studies were not able to replicate the finding (Mierop, Hütter, & Corneille,
2017; Mierop, Hütter, Stahl, & Corneille, 2018). Nevertheless, a small meta-analysis
of the previously mentioned studies containing 12 experiments indicated the presence
of a small effect (Mierop et al., 2018). The fact that the attitude effect discovered by
the PD procedure appears to be unstable—even though in most studies the original
material and experimental script were used—should call for additional research to
ensure that the effect can be reproduced by independent research groups.
One additional study using the PD procedure is of particular interest as it
demonstrated that an attitude EC parameter was found in the PD procedure, when
participants were given only an instruction of CS-US pairs (i.e., participants were told
that they would see a specific CS being presented with a US) and were not actually
shown the CS-US pairs (Hütter & De Houwer, 2017). The results of the PD procedure
indicated that an attitude EC effect without memory was present, even though we
can be certain that the CS-US pair was consciously processed when it was instructed.
These results indicate that the attitude parameter of the PD procedure should be
interpreted with caution and might not reflect EC without contingency awareness.
Given the discussed studies on EC and contingency awareness, the evidence for
EC effects in the absence of contingency awareness is mixed. The PD procedure, while
appearing promising, does not deliver the final answer on the question of EC in the
absence of contingency awareness. One large problem is that memory of CS-US or
CS-valence pairs is used to investigate a property (contingency awareness) that is said
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to be important during the encoding of the CS-US pair. Memory can only serve as a
proxy for contingency awareness during the encoding of the CS-US pair as it is prone to
additional influences such as forgetting and false memory (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002).
Additionally, all procedures discussed above make use of a correlational approach
as contingency awareness is measured individually and correlated with an EC effect.
This approach drastically limits possible causal explanations between EC effects and
contingency awareness and researchers should therefore shift to manipulate contingency
awareness experimentally (Gawronski & Walther, 2012). There has been broad
agreement that progress in investigations on the necessity of contingency awareness in
EC can only be made when experimentally manipulating CS-US contingency awareness
during the learning phase (Corneille & Stahl, 2018; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014b).
In the next paragraph, the literature that attempted to experimentally manipulate
contingency awareness in EC will therefore be discussed.
Subliminal EC. When investigating the neuronal processing of stimulus
perception two factors appear to be important: stimulus strength and attention
towards the stimulus (Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, & Sergent, 2006). When
the stimulus strength and attention are high a stimulus can be processed consciously
and can therefore be reported. When both factors are low, only very weak neuronal
activations can be observed and no effect on behavior can be expected. The other
two combinations of the factors are of greater interest for the research at hand: When
stimulus strength is high but attention is low a stimulus will be processed preconsciously
(i.e., while the stimulus is processed it cannot be reported consciously as long as the
attention is elsewhere). When stimulus strength is low but attention is high the
stimulus will be processed subliminally (i.e., below the threshold of consciousness).
One study that implemented a presentation schedule of CSs and USs that
assembles the conditions for preconscious conditioning is the “surveillance paradigm”
by Olson and Fazio (2001). In this paradigm, participants are asked to react to one
specific stimulus item while being presented with a stream of images. Within this
stream of images, CS-US pairs are “hidden” by additionally showing pairs of two USs,
pairs of two CSs, or single images. In this paradigm, EC effects are found even though
participants appear to be unaware of the CS-US contingencies (Olson & Fazio, 2001).
The implicit misattribution model (IMM, Jones, Fazio, & Olson, 2009; Jones, Olson,
& Fazio, 2010) gives an extensive explanation for the effects found in the surveillance
paradigm and argues that the explanation might be suited for other methods as well.
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The IMM postulates that the affective reaction towards the US is misattributed to the
CS without participants’ awareness (Jones et al., 2010). The optimal circumstances
for implicit attribution—according to Jones et al. (2010)—are when (1) CS and US
are presented simultaneously (which is considered the most important factor in the
IMM) (2) CS and US have a spatial proximity and (3) the CS is salient relative to
the US. As these factors might be important for automatic effects with subliminal
presentations as well, we will pick up these arguments again in the following chapters.
Coming back to the model proposed by Dehaene et al. (2006), subliminal
processing of stimuli is possible when the attention is high but the stimulus strength
is low (e.g., by presenting the stimulus very briefly). While the presentation time it
too short to consciously see the stimulus and experience it, the stimulus should be
processed neuronally (Dehaene et al., 2006). As no higher-order thoughts about the
stimulus can be formulated when it is presented subliminally, contingency awareness
between the stimulus and another supraliminally presented stimulus can be ruled out.
A brief presentation of stimuli does not automatically guarantee that a stimulus is
indeed presented subliminally, as the stimulus might still be perceived consciously.
I thus define a stimulus to be presented truly subliminally if it cannot be identified
above chance after the presentation. Therefore showing an EC effect when one of the
two stimuli is presented truly subliminally in an EC learning phase would show that
EC does not depend on contingency awareness, which is not in line with propositional
single-process views (Mitchell et al., 2009). The subliminal presentation of one stimulus
is therefore one way to experimentally manipulate contingency awareness in an EC
paradigm.
While some researchers have serious doubt whether the current empirical evidence
is supportive of EC effects in the absence of contingency awareness (Corneille & Stahl,
2018; Stahl, Haaf, & Corneille, 2016; Sweldens et al., 2014), other researchers have
already concluded that the question has been resolved by empirical evidence showing
that EC can occur in the absence of awareness (Jones et al., 2010). Specifically, the
basis for this statement stems from studies showing an EC effect with a subliminal
presentation schedule. To evaluate the persuasiveness of these studies I will now review
the current corpus of literature on evaluative conditioning with subliminal stimulus
presentation to evaluate the strength of the literature reporting EC effects with
subliminally presented stimuli (for an overview of the literature search see Appendix
A).
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Three methodological factors might be important when reviewing the current
literature reporting EC effects with subliminally presented stimuli: (1) whether the
CS or US had been presented subliminally, (2) whether US valence was manipulated
within or between participants, and (3) whether the visibility of the subliminally
presented stimuli was controlled for. All points will be discussed when reviewing
the corresponding literature. I will first review studies that used a subliminal US,
starting with studies manipulating US valence between participants followed by studies
manipulating US valence within participants. Afterward, I will review the literature
that showed EC effects with a subliminally presented CS.
Subliminal US - US valence between participants.
In a study by Niedenthal (1990) images of people looking disgusted or joyful
(or disgusted/joyful/neutral in Experiment 2) were used as USs that were presented
for 2 ms. Afterward, a comic figure was presented as the CS. In a visibility test after
the learning phase, the CSs were shown again, this time preceded by a US in half
of the trials. Participants were asked to indicate after every trial whether a US had
been shown or not and results showed that they were not able to indicate US presence
above chance. In Experiment 1 an affective priming effect was found (indicating a
preference for CSs paired with a joyful face over CSs paired with a disgusted face),
while explicit ratings yielded mixed results in Experiment 2: When asked to judge
whether positive/negative traits were characteristic of CSs, a difference was found
when positive USs were paired with the CS (i.e., the CS was judged to have more
positive than negative traits). This effect was also found for CSs paired with a neutral
US and no difference in the judgment was found for CSs paired with negative USs. In
another dependent variable of the same experiment, it was found that CSs that were
paired with negative USs were judged to be more similar to negative than positive
unrelated stimuli. Interestingly, CSs paired with neutral stimuli were also judged to
be more similar to negative than to positive unrelated stimuli and no difference was
observed for CSs paired with positive USs. While the visibility test is well designed
and simulated to look very similar to the learning phase, it is possible that a (small)
subset of participants saw the valence of the USs in one trial and acted upon this
knowledge. Two potential problems can be identified as US valence was manipulated
between participants. First, a conditioning effect could be explained if participants
recognized the valence of a US in a single trial and evaluated all stimuli accordingly
after the learning phase. Second, even if valent stimuli were processed subliminally,
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we do not know whether an EC effect caused a difference in evaluations or a change
in evaluations was due to a difference in mood between the groups (Sweldens et al.,
2014). Considering that the results are mixed, showing effects in one measure but not
another and showing diverging effects for neutral USs on different dependent variables,
the results should be interpreted with caution.
In two experiments by Krosnick, Betz, Jussim, and Lynn (1992) an EC effect was
observed with briefly presented valent images as USs (presented for 13 ms) and visible
CSs depicting a person. Again, US valence was manipulated between participants.
While the first experiment had an apparent weakness (the researcher in the room
was not blind to the US valence condition; see Gilder & Heerey, 2018), in the second
experiment this problem was eliminated by a double-blind design. In Experiment
2 a visibility test after the learning phase was administered that was similar to the
learning phase. However, participants were shown words and images (compared to
only images) presented prior to the target person and were not asked about the US
valence, but instead had to indicate whether they saw a word or a picture. While this
visibility test is not highly indicative for the question whether participants perceived
the US valence during the learning phase, it gives an indication that the USs were
not easy to perceive as participants were not able to differentiate between words and
images. The results of Experiment 2 indicate that the USs influenced the attitude
towards the target person and the perceived personality of the target person in line
with the valence of the USs. The effect was only found when participants had to
judge the target person (CS) on an attitude and personality index, but not on an
attractiveness scale. A MANOVA with all three dependent variables indicated that
there was no effect of the briefly presented USs on the different ratings. The results
should additionally be interpreted with caution as the individual test statistics for the
three dependent variables in Experiment 2 report different degrees of freedom which is
not explained in the article and some items were left out when computing the scores
for the dependent variables (Krosnick et al., 1992, p. 160, Footnote 4).
Subliminal US - US valence within participants.
One study claimed to have found that unconscious processes are more sensitive
to facial expressions than to verbal information. Specifically, faces with either a happy
or angry expression (CS) were paired with the words “happy” or “angry” as USs (N.
Kawakami, Miura, & Yoshida, 2015). The happy face was paired with the word “angry”
and the angry face with the word “happy” either for 10 ms or 500 ms (manipulated
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between participants). In the subliminal condition, both CS and US were presented
subliminally. After the learning phase participants had to rate how happy/angry
the person in the photo (which looked happy or angry) appeared. There appeared
to be no difference between the evaluations of the faces when the photo/word pairs
were presented for 500 ms. When both words and images were presented subliminally
the face looking angry was rated as more angry/less happy than happy faces. The
results merely show that when participants received information contradicting the
facial expression supraliminally the evaluation of the face is mixed and the happy face
is not evaluated more positively than the angry face (N = 23 in this group, so a null
effect should not be over-interpreted). In the subliminal condition the participants
likely did not see or process the words or faces and therefore evaluations are in line
with the facial expression participants see when rating the image. As the study does
not allow to test for the influence of the subliminal presentation on an EC effect, the
study will be ignored in all further analyses and discussions.
Rydell and colleagues published multiple studies showing subliminal EC effects
on implicit measures of attitudes (Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Rydell et al., 2008;
Rydell, McConnell, Mackie, & Strain, 2006). One main difference to the previously
discussed literature was that participants explicitly learned information about a target
character, of whom an image was shown, while also being presented with briefly
presented valent words of the opposite valence shown before the image of the target
character (for a detailed description see Chapter 2). In attitude measures after the
learning phase, the explicit attitude reflected the learned valence from the explicitly
learned information about the target character, while the implicit attitude measures
reflected the valence of the briefly presented valent words. A memory check after the
learning phase served as a proxy for the visibility of the briefly presented words during
the learning phase and indicated that they were not remembered above chance. As the
explicitly learned behavior had always the opposite valence to the briefly presented
words (Rydell et al., 2008, 2006) mood effects can be ruled out as an alternative
explanation for differences in the IAT effects. The results by Rydell and colleagues are
considered to be one of the most convincing demonstrations of subliminal EC effects
(Sweldens et al., 2014).
In another study, Field and Moore (2005) presented a visible image CS, followed
by a subliminal valent image as US (17 ms) and a backward pixel mask to participants.
In an explicit evaluation, an EC effect was found, but only when participants were
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not distracted by a cognitively demanding task during the learning phase. The same
pattern was found for subliminally and supraliminally presented USs. Notably, valence
was manipulated within participants and a relatively thorough debriefing tested for the
visibility of the briefly presented USs: In the subliminal awareness test participants
were presented with one of the four different pixel masks and had to respond whether
they noticed an image being presented before the mask (and if yes what valence it
had). This test, however, does not test whether participants remembered the CS-US
contingency, but the US-mask contingency and it neither measures the visibility of
the USs during the learning phase. In an additional contingency awareness test,
participants were shown learned and new CS-US pairs and had to indicate whether
these pairs had been shown during the learning phase. However, the new CS-US
pair always had the same valence as the actual CS-US pair. If participants therefore
remembered the US valence that was shown with a given CS (but not the identity
of the US), participants might be classified as unaware even though they might have
been aware of the US valence during the learning phase.
In an experiment by De Houwer et al. (1994) a neutral word as CS was followed
by a valenced word as US, which was shown for a brief moment (29 ms). The valence
was manipulated within participants and mood effects can therefore be ruled out as
an alternative explanation. The awareness check consisted of the questions whether
the participant had “noticed anything strange during the experiment” and a more
explicit question asking whether participants had seen something between the neutral
word and the backward mask. Only one participant reported having seen something
and was excluded from the analysis. In an explicit evaluation measure at the end of
the experiment words paired with positive USs were evaluated as more positive than
words presented with negative USs.
Importantly, De Houwer, Hendrickx, & Baeyens (1997) ran four replication
studies of the experiment, adding a strict visibility test in three of the studies. At the
end of each experiment, participants were told that a word with positive or negative
valence would be briefly presented during each trial and participants were presented
with the same trials as in the learning phase. After every trial participants were then
asked to guess whether the trial included a positive or negative word. Participants
were classified as aware of the US valence when they correctly named the valence in 16
out of 24 trials. While it is still possible that participants saw one of the stimuli in the
learning phase (but did not report this during the additional debriefing when asked
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whether they saw something) the study indeed shows a better visibility test than the
previously discussed studies. In two of the four experiments, no EC effect was found
(with one study being a direct replication of De Houwer et al., 1994). The authors
also note in the discussion of the second experiment, showing an EC effect with briefly
presented USs, that “the observed evaluative learning effect was once again weak [. . . ]
despite the fact that various aspects of the procedure [. . . ] were optimized” (p. 99).
Taken together the studies by De Houwer et al. (1997) show the most robust method
and intensive tests for the visibility of briefly presented USs compared to the previously
discussed literature, but the results are mixed. Nevertheless, specific characteristics
of this set of studies should be taken into account in future studies testing EC with
briefly presented stimuli: an extensive visibility test, explicit evaluations, and within
subjects manipulation of US valence.
In an experiment by Fulcher and Hammerl (2001) visible Japanese characters
served as CSs and different smiling/frowning faces were used as USs, which were
presented for a variety of presentation times (12.5 ms, 25 ms, 50 ms, 125 ms). US
valence was manipulated within participants and a visibility check was employed
during the learning phase. Participants were told that they would see frowning or
smiling faces and had to press a corresponding key in every trial to judge whether the
face was frowning or smiling. No EC effect was found when the USs were presented for
12.5 ms, nor when the USs were presented for 50 or 125 ms. An EC effect was found
when USs were presented for 25 ms, but the results of the visibility check show that
the facial expressions were correctly identified above chance in the 25 ms condition,
therefore indicating that the found effect cannot be considered to be a subliminal EC
effect. Interestingly, an EC effect in the 12.5 ms condition was found, when analyzing
the data only for participants who scored low on reactance measures (i.e., participants
who do not mind being controlled or regulated by others). Based on a number of
characteristics of the study by Fulcher and Hammerl (2001), the results should be
interpreted with caution. First, as discussed above, even though trial by trial visibility
data was available, an analysis of visibility was only done over participants for each
presentation time (i.e., classified a participant as either aware or unaware) and not
on an item level (see Pleyers et al., 2007). Therefore a participant might be aware of
one or two USs—especially as participants knew which kind of USs to expect—but
classified as unaware. This subset of participants might show an EC effect which
results in an overall EC effect for participants classified as unaware. Second, no EC
effect was observed for clearly visible stimuli (i.e., in the 125 ms condition) which
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could be considered a failed manipulation check, as EC effects with visible stimuli
have consistently been found (Hofmann et al., 2010). Third, the authors admit that
the used reactance measure is generally used to measure conscious reactions towards
control (one item of the scale is for example: “Regulations trigger a sense of resistance
in me”) and it is therefore difficult to explain why results in the subliminal—but
not supraliminal—presentation condition were moderated by a reactance measure.
While the results should be interpreted with caution, the experimental paradigm
used by Fulcher and Hammerl (2001) seems promising as valence was manipulated
within participants and visibility was measured during the learning phase. The latter
point is especially interesting, as contingency awareness is only necessary during the
acquisition of the CS-US pair according to propositional single-process views (Mitchell
et al., 2009). A visibility check during the learning phase is therefore a better proxy
for contingency awareness than a CS-US memory check at the end of the experiment.
These procedural characteristics should be taken into consideration when running
additional experiments.
While the studies that present a subliminal US and manipulate US valence
within participants show a higher methodological quality (e.g., better visibility checks
and US valence manipulated within participants making sure that mood effects can
be ruled out), the results are mixed. On the one hand, some studies appear to show
a reliable EC effect (Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Rydell et al., 2008, 2006) but do
not use a visibility check. On the other hand, studies that implemented a better
visibility check do not show reliable EC effects (De Houwer et al., 1997; Fulcher
& Hammerl, 2001). One additional possibly important problem of studies using a
subliminal US could be that affective stimuli appear not to evoke an affective response
in participants when participants are unaware of the stimuli (Lähteenmäki, Hyönä,
Koivisto, & Nummenmaa, 2015). If it turns out to be true that US valence can only
evoke affective reactions in participants once the US identity has been processed, EC
paradigms claiming to have found an EC effect with truly subliminally presented USs
should be interpreted with caution. I will therefore discuss studies that presented the
CS subliminally in the next section.
Subliminal CS.
The only study showing subliminal EC effects with a subliminally presented CS
was obtained by Gawronski and LeBel (2008) who presented the CSs “Europe” or
“Asia” for 17 ms which were followed by either a supraliminally presented positive or a
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negative US word. Valence was manipulated within participants and the combination
of the CS and US valence was counterbalanced over participants (i.e., half of the
participants saw “Europe” and positive USs and “Asia” and negative USs and vice
versa for the other half of participants). Participants were instructed to “take a
moment to think about their feelings about Europe and Asia” or to “take a moment
to think about what they know about Europe and Asia”. The results indicated an
EC effect for implicit measures regardless of the introspection condition but an EC
effect for explicit measures only when people were instructed to introspect about their
feelings. While the result appears intriguing the study does not report any visibility
test and one should therefore be cautious interpreting the results as the presentation
might not have been truly subliminally.
Studies similar to EC.
As there are very few studies with a briefly presented CS in an EC learning
phase, I will also discuss a few other studies that presented a CS subliminally but
might not be considered evaluative conditioning, as they either do not use valent
USs or do not use evaluative measures. These studies might nevertheless give an
insight into automatic association formation as the procedure is highly similar to the
procedures in the previously discussed literature and might even be considered to be
EC by some (e.g., some studies were included in the meta-analysis on EC by Hofmann
et al., 2010).
Dijksterhuis (2004) published a six study article in which he demonstrated that
an evaluative conditioning procedure can raise (implicit) self-esteem. Participants
were presented with the Dutch word for “I” and positively valenced (or neutral)
words, which were always presented for 17 ms. The word for “I” was either presented
supraliminally (study 1 and 2) or subliminally (all other experiments). In all studies,
a raised self-esteem was observed with a variety of implicit measures (IAT, name letter
effect, better mood). The results of the study should be interpreted with caution for a
variety of reasons. First, some sample sizes were very small making it surprising that
an EC effect was found (e.g., in Experiment 3, 16 participants were divided into two
groups and a difference in IAT scores was found, see Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn,
2011). Second, in five of the six experiments, the valence was manipulated between
participants, therefore allowing a mood effect to be an alternative explanation for
any observed differences between groups. Third and most importantly, no actual
visibility test was conducted, but participants were asked whether they “had seen
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anything unusual” and whether they “had seen words flashing on the screen” during
the debriefing. No participant in any of the studies reported having seen flashes. While
it is possible that the valent words were truly subliminal, the task seems inadequate
to test for stimulus visibility, as participants might just reply “no” in the debriefing to
finish the task quickly.
Two publications reported three experiments (Grumm, Nestler, & von Collani,
2009; Jraidi & Frasson, 2010) replicating the findings by Dijksterhuis (2004). Im-
portantly, effects were generally found on implicit measures of self-esteem (IAT and
name letter effect) but only for explicit measures when participants were instructed
to introspect on their feelings (Grumm et al., 2009, Exp. 3). As in the studies of
Dijksterhuis (2004), no visibility check was conducted in any of the three experiments,
leaving open the question whether the found effect was due to truly subliminally
presented CSs and USs. In a recent study by Versluis, Verkuil, and Brosschot (2017),
the experiment of Dijksterhuis (2004) was replicated. However, no effects of the
learning phase on explicit nor implicit measures of self-esteem nor on physiological
measures associated with self-esteem were found. In these experiments, a visibility
test was employed (which was not described in detail in the article) and the authors
conclude that the CS-US presentation was indeed subliminal.
Another set of studies closely related to the experiments by Dijksterhuis were
published by Riketta and Dauenheimer (2003; for a successful replication see Svaldi,
Zimmermann, & Naumann, 2012). In four experiments “I” and positive/negative
words were presented subliminally, but again, no visibility check was conducted.
In contrast to the previously mentioned studies changes on explicit (and implicit)
measures of self-esteem were found. Riketta and Dauenheimer (2003) also investigated
whether the found effect might be caused by EC processes or priming processes. They
therefore presented a first name (“Leo”) paired with negative/positive adjectives to a
subset of participants. In an evaluation of “Leo” no effect of the pairing condition
(positive/negative adjective) was found and the authors conclude that the effect might
be due to “selective activation of evaluative self-knowledge rather than from changes
in self-valence associations” (Riketta & Dauenheimer, 2003, p. 689). Evidence for
subliminal EC in relation to self-esteem is mixed: While some studies show support
for explicit self-esteem changes, others show only support for implicit changes of self-
esteem, while another set of experiments shows no influence of the procedure on any
measures. The latter study was also the only study who reported to have measured the
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actual visibility of the subliminally presented CS-US pair. It is additionally important
to consider the results of Riketta and Dauenheimer (2003) who did not find an effect
when using a first name as a CS and valent words as USs, which indicates that these
studies might not have investigated EC effects.
In a series of studies by Custers and Aarts (2005), a CS describing a behavior
(e.g., “studying”) was briefly presented (23 ms) before a supraliminally presented
US (adjectives with positive/negative valence). Afterward, participants showed that
they wanted to act more upon the behavior that was paired with positive words than
the behavior paired with negative words (Exp. 1, 2a, 2c, 3) and also evaluated the
behavior as more positive (Exp. 2b). However, in four out of six studies the US valence
was manipulated between participants, allowing for the alternative explanation that
the result was caused by mood effects. Importantly, no concrete measures to detect
whether the briefly presented CSs were indeed perceived subliminally are discussed
in the article. It is merely mentioned that “participants were thoroughly debriefed
and checked for awareness of the subliminally presented behavioral states” (p. 132).
Considering the lack of a visibility test and that valence was manipulated between
groups in four out of the six studies the results should be interpreted cautiously.
Galli and Gorn (2011) tested whether semantic meaning can transfer subliminally.
The words “black” and “white” were presented as primes for 26 ms before the letters
“I” or “G” were shown (the letters were Chinese characters as the study took place in
China). In a semantic priming task an increased reaction time was observed when the
letters were incongruent to the color of a shown word (e.g., when “I” was shown with
“black” in the learning phase, an increase in reaction time was shown when “I” was
presented before “rice” compared to “soy sauce”). Similar, in a second experiment
products that were named either “I” or “G” were evaluated as more positive when the
name and the color of the product (Soy milk vs. Cola) matched (i.e., a cola named
with a letter paired with “black” was evaluated as more positive than a cola named
with a letter paired with “white”). To test whether the words “black” and “white”
were indeed presented subliminally a visibility test was employed at the end of the
study. Participants saw 30 trials taken from the learning phase but this time were
instructed that something might be shown before the words “black” and “white”. After
every trial participants were asked whether they saw something and if yes what they
saw. About one third of the participants reported at least one correct letter (“I” or
“G”) in this test phase. While Galli and Gorn argue that visibility might be higher
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in the test phase than during the actual learning phase—because participants were
made aware of a possible subliminal presentation—it is remarkable that one third of
the participants named the correct letter indicating that they consciously perceived
the letter. One can therefore speculate whether the effect observed in the evaluation
and priming task might be driven by the subset of participants who saw the briefly
presented words.
In a setup more related to Pavlovian than evaluative conditioning, Both et al.
(2008) showed sexually arousing images for 30 ms as CSs and administered genital
vibrotactile stimulation as USs. Another sexually arousing image was not paired with
anything during the learning phase but also shown for 30 ms. As no other images
were displayed, participants were therefore supposed to only consciously perceive the
backward masks during the learning phase. To check for the visibility, participants were
shown additional learning trials with both CSs presented after every trial. Participants
were on average no better than chance to select the correct CS, indicating that the
images were shown subliminally. An evaluation (at the very end of the study) did not
show any differences between the CSs. Yet, when only analyzing the first trial of a
post-conditioning extinction procedure, a higher vaginal pulse reaction (i.e., sexual
arousal) towards the CS paired with the stimulation was found compared to the
CS without the stimulation. The data should be interpreted with caution, as the
researchers found no evidence for a difference in skin conductance, differences in
evaluation and only a difference on sexual arousal when running a one-sided t test on
the first trial of the extinction phase. Additionally, both images were already sexually
arousing before the conditioning, making it difficult to find a difference caused by the
learning phase between the CSs with only 18 participants.
Subliminal EC effects.
What can be learned from the corpus of studies showing EC effects and effects
highly similar to EC with subliminal stimulus presentation? One question would be
whether a specific presentation schedule (e.g., subliminal US vs. subliminal CS) and
measurement (e.g., implicit versus explicit) appears to be dominant in the literature
which could indicate that it is easier to find subliminal EC effects with this setup. As
can be seen in Table 1, there appears to be no combination of methods that stand out.
One observation that appears remarkable is that 15 out of the discussed 18
publications reporting subliminal EC were published by different authors. One could
hypothesize that if a researcher would have found a reproducible effect it would be
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Table 1
Experiments reporting subliminal EC effects split by pre-
sentation schedule of CS/US and their measurement
Implicit Measures Explicit Measures
Subliminal US 9 10
Subliminal CS 12 7
Note. Single Experiments might be counted twice if using
both implicit and explicit measures (e.g., Gawronski &
LeBel, 2008) or presenting both CS and US subliminally
(e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004).
used for a series of different studies testing for boundary conditions. The only two
researchers who published multiple papers on EC are De Houwer and Rydell. The
second set of studies by De Houwer and colleagues (1997) show mixed effects, but the
effect in the papers by Rydell and colleagues (2006, 2006, 2008) seem to be stable. It
seems to be promising to replicate the findings by Rydell and colleagues (2006, 2006,
2008) to investigate the boundary conditions of EC with briefly presented stimuli (see
Chapter 2).
Another observation is the heterogeneity of visibility checks testing whether the
“subliminally” presented stimuli were not consciously perceived. Some studies even
show that the presentation was not subliminal (e.g., Galli & Gorn, 2011), while other
studies did not employ any procedures testing whether the briefly presented stimuli
were consciously perceived (e.g., Gawronski & LeBel, 2008). An additional problem in
research using subliminal presentation is that subliminality checks appear to have less
statistical power than the test of the dependent variable. It is therefore possible that
statistical tests yield that stimuli were not visible above chance even though they were,
while statistical analyses testing for a difference in the evaluation yield significant
differences (Vadillo, Konstantinidis, & Shanks, 2015). As most theorists supporting a
propositional single-process view would agree that EC effects with visible—but briefly
presented—stimuli would be in accordance with a propositional single-process view,
many of the previously discussed studies might not be suited to differentiate between
single- and dual-process views because they cannot claim that stimuli were presented
truly subliminally.
This problem has been previously discussed by researchers who argue that poor
contingency awareness reported in EC studies could be the result of procedural rather
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than theoretical factors (Davey, 1994). In a similar vein, De Houwer states: “I do not
exclude the possibility that evaluative conditioning effects are based exclusively on the
operation of propositional processes. In that case, evidence for evaluative conditioning
effects that are resistant to extinction and independent of contingency awareness might
indeed result from methodological problems” (De Houwer, 2007, p. 238).
To further analyze the reviewed literature, a p-curve analysis and a meta-analysis
were conducted to evaluate the evidential value and estimate a mean effect size of the
reviewed literature.
A p-curve analysis. One aspect of the reviewed literature that seemed worthy
to further investigate was the proportion of reported p values close to 0.05. The
distribution of p values can give insights into the evidential value of the published
literature because p values are distributed differently when a true or a null effect is
investigated. Specifically, p values over many studies investigating a true effect should
be right-skewed (i.e., more p values should be between .01 and .02 than between .04
and .05). If however, a series of studies report on a null effect, p values should be
evenly distributed. As statistically significant results are more likely to be published
(Greenwald, 1975; Sterling, Rosenbaum, & Weinkam, 1995) it would be possible
that all reported significant results actually report on an effect that does not exist
(i.e., an α-error occurred). A significant right-skewed distribution of p values can
therefore indicate that the reviewed studies carry evidential value (Simonsohn, Nelson,
& Simmons, 2014). There are two different ways the right-skewness is calculated in
the p-curve method proposed by Simonsohn, Simmons, and Nelson (2015). First, all
values are taken (“full”) and skewness is tested and second, only p values smaller than
.025 are used (“half”). The “half” method is said to be less affected by (ambitious)
p-hacking (i.e., using researchers’ degrees of freedom to re-analyze the data until a
significant effect is found).
To calculate the p-curve, one statistical test reporting a significant result per
study per measure showing the presence of a subliminal EC effect was selected from
the above-discussed literature. In total 43 statistical tests from 32 experiments were
selected and p values were re-computed using the reported F and t values. One-sided
p values were calculated if this was mentioned in the corresponding article. Four
statistical test values were excluded as the corresponding p value was larger than .05,
resulting in 39 significant tests. The p-curve was calculated using the R code of the
p-curve app 4.06 (Simonsohn et al., 2015).
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Results show that the p-curve is right-skewed, indicating that the studies carry
evidential value (full: z = −2.22; p = .0131, half: z = −3.18; p = .0007, see Figure 1).
Additionally, Simonsohn et al. (2014) suggest comparing the observed p-curve to a
theoretical p-curve that would be expected when running studies with 33 % power on
average (and both analyses are reported per default by the p-curve app; Simonsohn
et al., 2015 ). The observed p-curve was significantly flatter (i.e., significantly less
right-skewed) than the expected p-curve with 33 % power (full: z = −3.63; p = .0001,
see Figure 1), which—contrary to the skewness test—indicates the absence of evidential
value by the reviewed studies (Simmons & Simonsohn, 2017). The analyses of the
p-curve mirror the results of the review above: Some studies show clear evidence
for EC (leaving the question of visibility aside), while other studies do not show
convincing evidence. The results of the p-curve analysis can therefore be understood
as a clear sign that more research is needed to test the possibility of EC effects without
contingency awareness by means of subliminal presentation.
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Figure 1 . A p-curve with all 39 statistically significant p values observed in the
literature review, of which 21 are p < .025.
Previous investigations have shown that the conclusion drawn from the p-curve
can be influenced strongly by a single publication (Simonsohn et al., 2015). As
the results by Rydell and colleagues appear important, because they are the only
studies replicated systematically by the same lab, I tested the influence of the results
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reported by Rydell and colleagues on the p-curve. Therefore, the same p-curve
analysis was conducted again, without the statistical values of the three publications
by Rydell and colleagues. Testing the right skew of the p values the half p-curve is
still significantly right-skewed (but less convincing than when the results of Rydell
are included) while the full p-curve test does not indicate that the p-curve is skewed2:
(full: z = −1.01; p = .1551, half: z = −2.08; p = .0187, see Figure 2). The observed
p-curve is still significantly flatter than the theoretical p-curve with a power of 33
% (full: z = −4.61; p < .0001, see Figure 2). The results are again mixed and even
weaker than the results of the analyses including all p values. The additional p-curve
analysis demonstrates the importance of the research of Rydell and colleagues when
assessing the evidential value of all studies published on subliminal EC. Note that the
analyses do not allow any conclusions about the question whether the results of Rydell
and colleagues are correct; they merely demonstrate that the results are important in
the cumulative analysis of studies reporting subliminal EC. The study by Rydell et al.
(2006) will therefore be central in the empirical investigation discussed in Chapter 2.
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Figure 2 . A p-curve leaving out the p values of the three experiments by Rydell and
colleagues, resulting in a total of 33 significant p values, of which 16 are p < .025.
2The results of the p-curve analysis can still be interpreted as carrying evidential value, as the
significance value of the half p-curve analysis is smaller than 5 % (Simonsohn et al., 2015). The
result of the full p-curve analysis can therefore be ignored.
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A meta-analysis. The data of the publications discussed above were also
used to run a meta-analysis (k = 37). Note that the analysis here constitutes only as a
first analysis quantifying the effects of the articles reviewed above and further analyses
should take into account publication bias, the quality of the studies, and possible
moderators (Hilgard, Engelhardt, & Rouder, 2017). Additional analyses should also
attempt to acquire the data of the studies underlying the test statistics to get better
predictors of effect size and variability. In a number of publications the degrees of
freedom reported and the number of participants did not fit for example. The results
of this analysis should therefore not be taken as a definitive answer for or against the
absence/presence of an EC effect with briefly presented stimuli. Nevertheless, the
analysis will give a quantified overview of the discussed literature and can be used to
assess the added contribution of the studies conducted in the next chapters and other
studies conducted in our lab to the corpus of literature on EC with briefly presented
stimuli (see Chapter 8). Test statistics were only used in the meta-analysis when
two mean values were compared in a statistical test to investigate whether an EC
effect was present in a subliminal condition. The F and t statistics were taken and a
correlation coefficient was calculated which was then transformed to Fisher’s Z. For
an overview of all undertaken steps to transform the values see Appendix B.
A random effects analysis revealed a mean effect size of d = 0.45 (Z = 0.22) with
a 95% confidence interval from d = 0.34 to d = 0.57, see Figure 3. The analysis also
yielded that the group was homogeneous Q = 50.50, df = 36, p = .055. All analyses
were performed with R (Version 3.4.4; R Core Team, 2016) and the R-packages MAd
(Version 0.8.2; Del Re & Hoyt, 2014), metafor (Version 2.0.0; Viechtbauer, 2010),
papaja (Version 0.1.0.9735; Aust & Barth, 2016), and psych (Version 1.8.3.3; Revelle,
2017).
In the meta-analysis by Hofmann et al. (2010) no significant meta-analytic
effect was found for studies using a subliminal US (k = 15; note that the studies by
Rydell were not included in this meta-analysis). The effect size found by Hofmann
and colleagues for an EC effect with subliminally presented CSs was d = .49 (k = 8),
which is almost identical to the overall mean effect size found by the analysis above
using all subliminal EC studies. Concluding, there appears to be an average effect
that differs from zero, but the evidential value of the presented studies is weak (see
p-curve analysis) and therefore further studies need to be conducted.
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Figure 3 . A forest plot showing the effect sizes (Fisher’s Z) and 95% confidence
intervals for each study included in the analysis based on a random effects model.
Studies showing no EC effect. Along with the two experiments reported
by De Houwer et al. (1997) and the replications of Versluis et al. (2017), a series of
six experiments by Stahl et al. (2016), testing for subliminal EC effects in a series
of (potentially beneficial) conditions, are the only published subliminal EC studies
showing a null effect for EC with briefly presented stimuli. In the studies by Stahl et
al. (2016) the CSs were always presented briefly and the US was shown for a longer
period, for the reasons discussed above. Importantly, in each study visibility of briefly
presented CSs was checked during the learning phase by asking participants after
every trial to select the presented CS from an array of stimuli. While the results from
the visibility test showed that the CSs were recognized (slightly) above chance, no EC
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effect was found within each experiment for briefly presented CSs. A meta-analysis of
the six experiments also revealed no EC effect for briefly presented stimuli.
In another study continuous flash suppression was used to experimentally ma-
nipulate CS-US contingency awareness: Specifically, Högden, Hütter, and Unkelbach
(2018) used continuous flash suppression to suppress the conscious processing of CSs.
Using a stereoscope, participants were presented with a CS to one eye and a high
contrast dynamic pattern (e.g., flashing pixel masks) to the other eye. Using this
technique the suppressed image (the CS in this case) can be presented for a prolonged
period (e.g., 1800 ms) without being consciously perceived because a participant’s
attention is captured by the flashing pixels. The USs were shown in between the
flashing pixel images and US valence was manipulated within participants. Therefore
ideal circumstances for automatic EC effects should be met, as participants do not
perceive the stimulus consciously, yet it is presented for an increased period compared
to subliminal EC studies. An EC effect was found when CSs were not suppressed, but
in all four studies no EC effect was found when the CSs were suppressed.
In another study, parafoveal stimulus presentation was used to experimentally
manipulate the conscious awareness of the CS (Dedonder, Corneille, Bertinchamps,
& Yzerbyt, 2014). Specifically, a US (valence manipulated within participants) was
presented in the center of the screen and a CS was presented either 2.5° from the center
(foveal condition) or 11.5° from the center (parafoveal condition). The parafoveal
presentation allowed for a longer CS presentation than in the subliminal studies
(i.e., 60 ms) and contingency awareness appeared to be absent for CS-US pairs in
the parafoveal—but not the foveal—condition. EC effects on implicit and explicit
measures were only found for CSs in the foveal, but not for CSs in the parafoveal
condition.
These three studies contradict previous findings showing EC effects in the absence
of awareness, by means of a subliminal presentation. Studies showing subliminal EC
effects have been frequently used to demonstrate support for dual-process models such
as the APE model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011). However, the evidence for
EC effects in the absence of contingency awareness is mixed and additional studies did
not find evidence for automatic EC effects under optimal conditions for automatic EC
effects. It therefore appears necessary to further investigate EC effects with a subliminal
presentation schedule to test the central prediction deviating between propositional
single-process views and dual-process models: the necessity of contingency awareness in
48
EC. In the next section, I will discuss recent findings on beneficial factors of automatic
EC effects, which will be considered in the empirical studies discussed in the next
chapters.
Other beneficial factors for automatic EC effects
In recent publications on contingency awareness in EC, a set of factors has
received some attention which will be considered in the series of studies presented in
the next chapters. A first point concerns the presentation schedule of the CS-US pair.
A second point is the relevance between CS and US in the learning phase and a third
point is related to the optimal measurement of automatic EC effects. All three factors
will be discussed in the following sections.
CS-US presentation schedule. A first characteristic that might play an
important role for EC effects without contingency awareness acquired through asso-
ciative processes is the presentation schedule of CS and US. One central characteristic
in the implicit misattribution model (IMM, Jones et al., 2009, 2010) is that CS
and US need to be presented simultaneously for a misattribution effect to occur.
Recent studies have investigated the effect of sequential versus simultaneous CS-US
presentation on (automatic) EC effects. A study by Sweldens et al. (2010) has shown
that automatic EC effects seem to depend on a simultaneous presentation of the CS
and US. Also, the previously discussed PD procedure showed that EC by way of an
automatic process required simultaneous pairing of stimuli, whereas an EC effect by
a propositional process was also found with sequential pairings (Hütter & Sweldens,
2013). Additionally, Stahl and Heycke (2016) showed that EC effects independent
of US identity memory were only found with a simultaneous presentation schedule
but not with a sequential presentation schedule (but in both conditions, EC effects
were only found when participants had US valence memory). Taken together there
are clear indications that a simultaneous CS-US presentation might be beneficial for
EC produced by associative processes. In the studies presented in Chapter 6 and 7,
we therefore paid careful attention to present the CS and US simultaneously.
Relevance. A second characteristic which might be beneficial for automatic
EC effects is described in the research by Verwijmeren, Karremans, Stroebe, and
Wigboldus (2012). In their study participants were presented with either water bottles
or airline brands as CSs for a brief moment (17 ms). The CSs were followed by
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a US showing a face with a disgusted or fearful expression. As both USs have a
similar negative valence the study should not be considered EC, however, the results
are intriguing. Thirsty participants showed a preference for water bottles presented
with fear compared to water bottles paired with disgust, suggesting that CS and US
relevance enhances EC effects, but only when the pairing was (goal-) relevant to the
participant, as the effect was only observed in thirsty participants. Another study also
demonstrated that subliminal behavioral priming of drink brands was only effective
for participants who were thirsty (Karremans, Stroebe, & Claus, 2006).
Studies using supraliminal CS-US presentations additionally demonstrated that
EC effects were larger when a face showing disgust was paired with a taste of a
beverage than when the face was paired with the color of a beverage indicating a
potential importance of this basic human reaction (Baeyens et al., 1996). In Chapter 4,
a study will therefore be presented investigating the influence of relevance on EC effects
with briefly presented CSs by replicating and extending the study of Verwijmeren et
al. (2012).
Choice as a more sensitive measure. A third characteristic worth investi-
gating is the dependent measure assessing the change of preference after the learning
phase. Even though EC effects appear to be captured in a more sensitive way by
direct evaluative measures (e.g., Likert scales and slider scales) compared to indirect
measures (e.g., reaction time tasks such as the IAT; Hofmann et al., 2010), the previ-
ously mentioned study by Verwijmeren found an effect for subliminally presented CSs
only with a choice measure and not with an evaluative measure. Similar, an effect
with choice as the dependent variable was also found in a paradigm similar to EC,
where CSs were shown briefly and were predictive of a monetary reward/loss in a
Go/No-Go task (Pine, Mendelsohn, & Dudai, 2014). The reward or loss could be
considered a US in this study and after multiple learning trials, participants were
given a 2-AFC task with all CS combinations. Results showed that CSs that were
predictive of a reward were chosen over CSs predictive of a loss. Additionally, Jones
et al. (2010) argue that in an explicit evaluation participants might overthink their
response and the changed attitude—through implicit attribution—might not be acted
upon. They therefore also suggest using a forced-choice dependent variable which
might pick up the associative changes because participants simply have to choose
one CS over another CS and not contemplate over one CS and possibly rely on other
features of the CS (Jones et al., 2009). It therefore seems plausible that a small and
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subtle EC effect might not be reflected in evaluative ratings because they were not
perceived as large enough to justify selection of a different point on, say, a 7-point
scale—but may nevertheless tip the scale when being forced to choose between two
CSs that were paired either with a positive or a negative US.
One additional argument comes from consumer sciences where one tool to
measure spontaneous reactions is the swift-selection platform (Salcher, 1995). In this
paradigm, several products are hidden behind a curtain on a platform and after the
curtain opened for a few seconds, participants are asked to choose a product. The idea
behind this technique is that consumers might not be able to verbalize the reasons for
a product preference and an impulsive consumer choice might be based on different
processes (Salcher, 1995). One could speculate that, if unconscious associations
between a CS and US develop in a subliminal learning paradigm, participants might
not be able to verbalize a preference for a given CS but might choose this CS in a
forced choice task similar to the swift-selection platform. These speculations will be
tested in the studies in Chapter 4 and 6. Regardless of the sensitivity of the measure of
choice, it is interesting whether a choice measure can detect changes of preference after
an EC learning phase as it constitutes an ecologically valid measure of preferences
and might therefore link research on evaluative conditioning and consumer science.
The present research
So far I have outlined that evaluative conditioning appears to be a true effect and
two different models are currently discussed that attempt to explain the mechanisms
underlying EC. While a series of studies—using subliminal stimuli—showed support for
dual-process models, recent studies have challenged these findings and methodological
inaccuracies might explain why EC effects were found in previous studies. In a recent
literature review on evidence for and against propositional single-process models, De
Houwer states that “the idea that all associative learning is propositionally mediated
should, however, not be dismissed too early” (De Houwer, 2014c, p. 22). As Lovibond
and Shanks (2002) postulate that an EC effect without contingency awareness would
be theoretically most interesting in differentiating between single- and dual-process
models, I will report a series of studies testing the propositional nature of evaluative
conditioning by attempting to show EC effects with a subliminal presentation schedule
in the next chapters. The main question of this dissertation is therefore whether EC
effects can be found in the absence of contingency awareness or whether contingency
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awareness is necessary for EC effects to form.
In the next chapter, a replication of the study by Rydell et al. (2006) will be
presented. We chose a study reporting a subliminal EC effect that (1) shows strong
statistical support for subliminal EC effects (see p-curve analysis), (2) appears to be
replicable as two additional papers were published using this paradigm, and (3) is
considered to be a methodologically sound investigation by the peer group (Dedonder
et al., 2014; Sweldens et al., 2014).
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Chapter 2: Of two minds or one? A registered replication of Rydell et al.
(2006)
Additional materials are stored in an online repository: osf.io/c57sr
We constantly rely on preferences to make evaluations and choices in our daily
life: When browsing through online shopping sites, watching political debates, or when
forming impressions of other persons. One way of acquiring preferences is through
evaluative conditioning (EC). An EC effect is defined as a change in liking that is due
to the pairing of a negative or positive stimulus (unconditioned stimulus, US) with a
target object (conditioned stimulus, CS; De Houwer, 2007).
Hofmann et al. (2010) conducted a meta-analysis on EC and concluded that,
“beyond any doubt[,] EC is a genuine phenomenon” (p. 410). Yet, the mechanisms that
enable evaluative conditioning are not fully understood. Considerable progress has been
made in this area, but there is still disagreement about the mental processes underlying
evaluative conditioning (Sweldens et al., 2014). The current debate is between single-
and dual-process views. Single-process views claim that there is only one path that
leads to preference acquisition (De Houwer, 2009; Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; e.g.,
Mitchell et al., 2009). According to single-process propositional views, evaluative
conditioning results from the conscious formation of a proposition about the relation
between a CS-US pair. Consequently, propositional views predict that awareness of the
contingency between the CS and US would be necessary to establish an EC effect. Dual-
process theories propose two distinct systems that may lead to preference acquisition:
In addition to a conscious, propositional system, a second associative system is
proposed in which a link between the stimuli can be formed automatically without
contingency awareness. Thus, according to dual-process models, an EC effect could
result from an associative system even when participants are unaware of the CS-US
link. Influential examples for such accounts are the associative-propositional evaluation
model (APE; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006) and the systems of reasoning account
(Rydell & McConnell, 2006). In addition to the distinction between propositional
and associative systems, especially the latter model proposes a distinction between
implicit and explicit attitudes, such that associations due to CS-US pairings are
typically reflected in implicit evaluations, whereas propositions about CS-US relations
typically form the basis of explicit attitudes (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011; Rydell
& McConnell, 2006).
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One testable difference between dual- and single-process theories is therefore
the question whether contingency awareness is a necessary condition for an EC effect.
One way to experimentally assess the effect of contingency awareness on EC is via
subliminal or suboptimal (i.e., brief and masked) presentation (Dehaene et al., 2006): If
USs (or CSs) are presented suboptimally, they often do not enter conscious awareness,
and the conscious formation of a proposition about the CS-US relationship is not
possible (Dehaene et al., 2006). Following dual-process models, it should nevertheless
be possible to form an unconscious association between CS and US through repeated
pairing, because awareness of the relationship between stimuli is not needed for the
formation of associations. These pairings would ultimately result in EC, which one
should be able to detect with implicit evaluation measures (Gawronski & Bodenhausen,
2011). Finding EC with a subliminal conditioning procedure would be strong evidence
for dual-process accounts.
Research on subliminal EC has so far yielded mixed results: On the one hand,
there are several studies that found subliminal EC (e.g. De Houwer et al., 1994, 1997;
Field & Moore, 2005; Fulcher & Hammerl, 2001). Most of these studies, however had
methodological issues (see Sweldens et al., 2014 for an overview). On the other hand,
numerous studies support the claim that awareness is necessary for EC (Dedonder
et al., 2014; Pleyers et al., 2007; Stahl et al., 2016, 2009). Most of these studies,
regardless of the results, have been criticized or disregarded by researchers in the field.
One study, however, is considered particularly convincing evidence for dual-
process accounts (Sweldens et al., 2014). In this study, Rydell et al. (2006) showed a
selective influence of briefly presented USs on implicit attitudes. In this experiment,
the CS was a picture of a character named Bob, which was preceded by a briefly
presented prime and followed by explicit, behavioral information about Bob. Prime
and explicit information had opposite valence. The key finding of the study is that
explicit attitudes were affected by behavioral information, whereas implicit attitudes
reflected the valence of the briefly presented prime. Rydell et al. (2006) conclude
that their participants held opposite implicit and explicit attitudes at the same time
reflecting on the two types of information received. A prime-recognition check at
the end of the study confirmed that the primes were not recognized above chance
and Rydell et al. (2006) therefore concluded that the primes were indeed presented
subliminally.
The finding is clearly interesting and theoretically relevant. The original study
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was cited more than 200 times and is generally viewed as methodologically strong (i.e.,
has fewer methodical issues than other studies claiming to have found subliminal EC;
Dedonder et al., 2014). On the other hand, it is also based on a complex interaction
obtained from a relatively small sample, inviting questions about its reliability. Fur-
thermore, the study has not been independently replicated, as Sweldens et al. (2014)
point out in their review (but see two similar studies by the original authors; Rydell
& McConnell, 2006; Rydell et al., 2008). Considering the important contribution to
the discussion about EC without contingency awareness and dual-process theories in
general (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011), an independent replication would increase
the confidence in the results, and thereby, the evidence for EC without contingency
awareness.
In the present study, we conducted two replication attempts to investigate
whether implicit attitudes can indeed form on the basis of briefly presented information
(independently to contradicting explicit attitudes). Experiment 1 is a pre-registered
replication using a German sample (see osf.io/cm2sj for the registration of Experiment
1 and osf.io/c57sr for the analysis scripts and material). Experiment 2 is a second
pre-registered replication that aims at overcoming some of the potential limitations of
Experiment 1: Specifically, to avoid potential cultural or language differences, we used
the original material and sampled participants from a similar population as the original
study. In addition, we pretested the prime presentation duration to ensure that the
primes were indeed presented briefly enough so that they were not remembered at
above-chance levels in the awareness check after the learning phase. The goal of both
studies was to replicate the original study as closely as possible, while making sure
that the experimental procedure would have the same psychological effects as the
original procedure, and thus, would yield theoretically relevant results that allow for a
valid test of the underlying theoretical claims by Rydell et al. (2006). On a continuum
between exact/direct versus conceptual replications, therefore, Experiment 1 may
be considered a conceptual replication (only) in the sense that the original material
was translated into German (to make sure our German participants understood its
meaning); Experiment 2 may be considered a conceptual replication (only) in the
sense that the original prime presentation duration was adapted to ensure chance-level
prime awareness as reported in the original study.
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Experiment 1
The goal of the first experiment was to replicate the study of Rydell et al. (2006)
as closely as possible. We contacted the first author and received the original material
of the study. All instructions and the material was translated into German to conduct
the study at the University of Cologne in Germany.
Method.
Design.
As in the original study, we realized a 2 (valence condition: half of the participants
received negative primes and positive behavior in the first block and positive primes
and negative behavior in the second block, while for the other half the blocks were
the other way around) × 2 (times of measurement: after block 1 and after block 2) ×
2 (dependent variable: implicit or explicit attitude) design. The last two factors were
manipulated within participants, the first factor between participants.
Procedure.
For efficiency reasons, we decided to conduct the experiment solely at the
computer and therefore computerized the measures that had been administered as
paper-pencil tasks in the original study. We used PsychoPy as the experimental
software (Peirce, 2007). As in Rydell et al. (2006), we conducted a modified version
of an attitude-learning paradigm developed by Kerpelman and Himmelfarb (1971).
Participants were seated at a computer and instructed that they would be
learning something about a person (called either Bob, Jan, Tim, Tom or Ben). Only
the name Bob was used in the original study. While Bob may be a common American
name, it is not very common in German, so we included the above mentioned additional
names that are more common in Germany. One of those five names was randomly
assigned to the target character for each participant anew.
Each trial started with a blank screen for 1000 ms. Afterwards a fixation cross
was displayed in the middle of the screen for 200 ms, which was replaced by either a
positive or negative prime word in white letters on a black background, which was
presented for 23.5 ms. The prime was presented for 23.5 ms instead of 25 ms (as in
the original study) due to a slight difference in CRT monitor parameters (i.e., 85 Hz
instead of presumably 80 Hz in the original study). We tried to mimic the exact prime
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presentation conditions as in the original study, based on the information given by
the first author of the original study.
All in all we used 10 positive and 10 negative primes. Each prime was presented
10 times, resulting in 200 trials altogether. Half of the participants received 10 × 10
positive primes in the first block and 10 × 10 negative primes in the second block.
The other half received negative primes first and positives primes in the second block.
The order of the 100 primes within each block was randomized for each participant
anew. The prime was immediately followed by an image of the target person, which
was shown without any additional information for 247 ms.
After the target person was shown alone, negative or positive behavioral descrip-
tions -written in white letters- appeared underneath the image, until the participant
pressed either the “c” key or the “u” key to indicate whether he/she thought that
the behavior was characteristic or uncharacteristic for the target person. After the
judgment, the participant received feedback for 5000 ms about whether their judgment
was correct or incorrect (i.e., the corresponding German word was shown on the
screen). In the first block of the learning phase, 50 positive behaviors and 50 negative
behaviors were randomly drawn out of a list of 100 positive and 100 negative behaviors
respectively, and presented in random order (determined for each participant anew). In
the second block, the remaining 50 positive and 50 negative behaviors were presented
in random order. The valence of the primes was always opposite to the valence of the
characteristic behaviors (i.e., when a negative prime was shown, the negative behavior
was uncharacteristic and the positive behavior characteristic of the target character).
After the first block, participants performed the first set of attitude measures,
consisting of explicit evaluations of the target person and an IAT. We used the same
measures as in the original study (but in a computerized version). The order of implicit
and explicit measures was counterbalanced across participants, with the same order of
measures after the first and second block. In the explicit attitude measure, participants
were asked to judge how likable they found the target person, on a 9-point scale,
ranging from 1 (very unlikable) to 9 (very likable). After the participant indicated
his/her response, five 9-point semantic differential scales (Bad-Good, Mean-Pleasant,
Disagreeable-Agreeable, Uncaring-Caring, Cruel-Kind) were presented together on a
computer screen and participants were asked to judge the target person. Subsequently
the participants were requested to evaluate the target person on a feeling thermometer
ranging from 0° to 100°. All scores were z-standardized and a mean explicit rating
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score was calculated.
To assess implicit attitudes the participants may hold toward the target person,
an implicit association test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) was ad-
ministered. As in Rydell et al. (2006), we used a modified IAT version reported by
McConnell and Leibold (2001) consisting of seven 20-trial blocks. Participants had
to press the left key (“d”) or right key (“k”) as part of a classification task. In the
first block, images of the target character as well as images of other persons had to
be categorized as depicting the target character or other persons (counterbalanced
over participants whether the target character was on the left or the right key). The
target character name and “not” plus the target character name were displayed on
the left or right bottom of the screen as category labels. As in the original study
we selected one image—out of the six images in the original material at random, for
each participant anew, to represent the target character (in the learning phase and in
the IAT). The remaining five other images were then used in the IAT to represent
other individuals that were not the target character. In the second block, positive and
negative words had to be categorized as positive or negative (with the position of the
corresponding key for positive/negative counterbalanced across participants). Now
the labels “positive” and “negative” were displayed on the left and right bottom of the
screen. In the third and fourth block, the first and second block were combined: Half
of the participants had the target character together with negative words on one key
and all other images and positive words on the other key (Combination 1), while the
other half of participants classified the target character together with positive words
on one key and all other images and negative words on the other key (Combination
2). The category labels from block 1 and block 2 were combined in this block (i.e.,
Bob + positive). In the fifth block, a classification of the target character vs. other
persons was again performed, but the location of the key for classifying the target
character (vs. other persons) was switched compared to block 1 and block 3/4. In the
final two blocks (i.e., blocks six and seven), participants again worked on a combined
classification task (i.e., a combination of blocks 2 and 5): Participants who worked on
Combination 1 in blocks 3 and 4 now worked on Combination 2 (and vice versa). The
order of trials in the critical blocks 3/4 and 6/7 was randomized for each participant
anew, controlling that there were no more than 5 repetition trials (same key pressed
as in previous trial) and controlling that there were approximately the same amount
of response-switch (switching between the d and k key) and response-repetition trials.
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We processed the reaction times (RT) of the critical blocks 3/4 and 6/7 in the
IAT as described in the original study (Rydell et al., 2006). All trials were used and
responses faster than 300 ms recoded to 300 ms and responses slower than 3000 ms
recoded to 3000 ms. Reaction times were transformed to reduce skewness (natural log)
and a mean log reaction time was calculated for each participant in each critical block.
An IAT effect was calculated subtracting the mean log RT of the block in which the
target character and positive words (Combination 2) were presented from the mean
log RT of the block in which the target character and negative words (Combination 1)
were presented. The IAT effect was then z-standardized (across both IAT measures
and all participants). Therefore a larger IAT effect indicated a more positive evaluation
of the target character.
After the second experimental block and the second set of measures, a recognition
test of the briefly presented primes was administered: 40 words were presented in a
random order on the computer screen simultaneously (20 of them were the previously
presented primes, the other 20 were words that had not been shown in any task
previously). Participants were asked to select those 20 words which they thought had
been shown as primes during the learning phase. At the end of the study, we asked
demographic questions (Age, Study/Job, Gender, Suspected goal of study, Comments).
Materials.
Two individuals translated the instructions and materials independently and a
third person adjusted the translations, if necessary. The original material we received
contained eight positively and eight negatively valenced words used in the IAT, but
the article referred to ten positive and ten negative words.3 We therefore added the
four words “successful” (erfolgreich), “talented” (begabt), “hectic” (hektisch) and
“disgusting” (widerlich) to complete the required ten items for each category.4 We
also noticed that some valenced IAT targets were quite similar to the briefly presented
primes during the learning phase. The word „laughter“ (Lachen), which translated
into German appears very similar to the prime word „smile“ (Lächeln) and the word
„friend“ (Freund), which was used as a prime, were replaced in the IAT with „trust“
3After the data of Experiment 1 was collected we were informed that a different set of target
words was used in the original study.
4The first three words were taken from a study by Bluemke and Friese (2006), while the last word
was explicitly mentioned in the original article by Rydell et al. (2006).
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(Vertrauen) and „humor“ (Humor).5
In our experiment we addressed a potential issue with the original prime-
recognition check: The words “help“, “candy“, “crash[ed]“ and “gun“ occurred as new
words in the recognition task but also as behaviors that describe the character “Bob.”6
Participants might have selected those words because they remembered that they saw
those words before, without remembering their source (i.e., whether they were primes
or words in a different task, such as the IAT, or presented as part of the sentences
describing Bob). If those words were selected frequently it might have resulted in
an underestimation of participants‘ knowledge of the primes. The conclusion that
participants were not able to recognize the primes during learning must therefore be
interpreted with caution.
To eliminate potential issues regarding these words, we substituted the word
“help” (Hilfe) by the word “beautiful” (schön), “crash” was replaced by “fear” (Angst)
and “gun” was replaced by “pistol” (Pistole) in the recognition task. “Candy” was
replaced in the behaviors with “magazines” (Zeitschriften).
In a small pilot study (N = 16) each valent word was rated on a 101 point likert
scale, ranging from -50 to 50. The results confirmed that all translated primes (Mpos
= 78.17; Mneg = 21.34), new words in the prime-recognition task (Mpos = 74.04; Mneg
= 22.14), and words used in the IAT (Mpos = 83.54; Mneg = 21.31) were appropriately
positive (or negative) in the German language.
As Rydell et al. (2006), we also made sure that primes and new words in the
recognition task were on average of approximately equal length and equal frequency
in the German language (Primes: Mlength = 6.1, Mfrequency = 12460.35; New words:
Mlength = 7.2, Mfrequency = 11778.9).
Changes compared to original Experiment.
In addition to computerizing all parts of the study and translating the material
(thereby adding multiple different German names for the target character) we resolved
minor inconsistencies between the paper and the material we received: (1) We received
5Neither “laughter” nor “friend” were used as targets in the original Experiment, but were included
in the material we initially received.
6Additionally the words “Love” and “Peace“ were used as new words in the recognition test, but
were also previously used as valent words in the IAT after block 1 and block 2. To avoid potential
problems in the prime recognition check, we substituted the words”love" (Liebe) and “peace” (Frieden)
with “nature” (Natur) and “cash” (Bargeld) in the prime-recognition task.
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16 IAT attribute words (8 positive, 8 negative) and added 4 words (2 positive, 2
negative) for a total of 20 as mentioned in the method section of the original study.
Of the positive IAT attribute words, two were substituted by new words because one
was very similar to a prime from the learning phase after the translation to German
and another was used as a prime in the learning phase. (2) Beyond the translation
and resolving the inconsistency between the paper and the material received, the
only adjustment was that we replaced distracter words from the recognition test that
had in fact been part of the IAT and/or behavioral descriptions (and were therefore
not new to participants) with truly new words, so as to obtain a valid estimation of
prime recognition. As the memory measure was administered in the very end of the
experiment, we can be confident that this change cannot influence the main pattern
of results obtained in the IAT and evaluative ratings.
Hypotheses.
Explicit evaluation.
Under both propositional single- as well as dual-process theories we would
expect a more favorable explicit rating of the target stimulus (i.e., Bob) when positive
behavior was characteristic of him than when negative behavior was characteristic of
him (Rydell et al., 2006). We thus expect a significant difference between the results of
the explicit attitude measure at time 1 compared to time 2, in the direction described
above. Because half of the participants received positive behavioral information in
the first block and negative information in the second block, whereas the order was
reversed for the other half, we expect a 2 (time of measurement) × 2 (valence condition:
negative primes and positive behavior first vs. positive primes and negative behavior
first) interaction.
IAT effect.
Based on the findings by Rydell et al. (2006), and as predicted by a dual-process
account, we would expect that the implicit measure contradicts the explicit measure
in each experimental block. Specifically, we would expect an IAT effect to reflect the
valence of primes (and opposite to the behavior information), resulting in a significant
difference between the results of the implicit attitude measure at time 1 compared to
time 2.
A single-process view, in contrast, would predict that a subliminal prime has no
influence on the implicit measure. We would therefore expect that the IAT reflects the
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supraliminal behavioral information about the target character as does the explicit
rating.
Both of these opposing patterns would be reflected – similar to the explicit
evaluation – in a 2 × 2 interaction of time of measurement and the valence condition
(negative primes and positive behavior first vs. positive primes and negative behavior
first).
Analysis plan. The data were analyzed in two ways. First, the same frequen-
tist analyses were conducted as in the original article. They were based on the initial
fixed sample size for which the underlying sampling assumptions hold. Second, we
planned to continue sampling, while sequentially computing Bayes factors, until the
relative evidence was strong enough for either the null or alternative hypotheses. For
the frequentist analysis we used α = .05 as inference criterion. In all Bayes Factor
ANOVAs we used the following method to estimate whether a given factor or interac-
tion should be interpreted as having an influence on the dependent variable: The full
model with all effects (i.e., main effects and interactions) was compared to a model
without the effect of interest (i.e., a main effect or an interaction). A Bayes factor for
the alternative hypothesis over the null hypothesis (i.e., BF 10 > 1) for a given effect
indicates that the full model (that includes the predictor term corresponding to the
effect) is favored over the model without the effect given the data (i.e., the predictor
term improved the model, suggesting that the effect had an influence on the dependent
variable). We follow Rouder and Morey (2012) and interpret the Bayes factor as the
evidence for one model (in this case the full model) relative to a competing model (in
this case the restricted model).
In model comparison using Bayes factors, prior distributions on target parameters
represent the hypotheses to be tested. We chose weakly informative priors for the
analysis here, as recommended by Rouder, Morey, Speckman, and Province (2012).
Previous EC studies on contingency awareness using the IAT found small to medium
effect sizes (Rydell et al., 2006: η2 = .1; Olson & Fazio, 2001: d = 0.37). We used these
previous findings as guideline for our expectation for this study and chose our priors
accordingly. For our ANOVA analyses we therefore used default multivariate Cauchy
priors on the effect size parameters (Rouder et al., 2012), with a scaling parameter of
r = 0.5. For all Bayesian t tests Cauchy priors with a scaling parameter of r =
√
2/2
were used (Rouder et al., 2012; Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009),
which expresses our expectation to find small to medium effects. When informative
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prior distributions are used, the question can be asked how the chosen priors affect the
results. To test the robustness of the results to changes of the prior we analyzed the
data with other priors around the chosen scaling factor. We used smaller and larger
prior scaling factors of 0.3 and
√
2/2, respectively, for the ANOVA. The pattern of
Bayes factors did not change substantially (all BF that were >1000 were still >1000
and all BF > 10 were still larger 10). We additionally calculated all t tests with prior
scales of 0.5 and 1: all Bayes Factors originally reported to be larger 1000 were still
larger than 1000, all Bayes Factors that were initially larger than 10 were still larger
than 10 when changing the prior width; and all Bayes Factors that were smaller than
10 remained smaller than 10.7
We additionally report the median and the 95% highest density interval (HDI) of
the posterior distribution of the estimated effect size d. The 95% HDI contains the true
population effect size with a probability of 95%. We considered a Bayes factor > 10 or
< 1/10 to be convincing evidence for the alternative hypothesis relative to the null, or
for the null hypothesis relative to the alternative, respectively. We use BF 10 to indicate
a Bayes factor for the alternative Hypothesis and BF 01 as a Bayes factor for the null
hypothesis (dividing 1 by the calculated Bayes factor). BF 10 or BF 01 smaller than 3
will only be considered to be anecdotal relative evidence (Schönbrodt, Wagenmakers,
Zehetleitner, & Perugini, 2015). We performed all analyses in R (Version 3.4.4; R Core
Team, 2016) and the R-packages afex (Version 0.20.2; Singmann, Bolker, Westfall, &
Aust, 2016), BayesFactor (Version 0.9.12.4.2; Morey & Rouder, 2015), dplyr (Version
0.7.5; Wickham & Francois, 2016), and papaja (Version 0.1.0.9735; Aust & Barth,
2016).
Sample size rationale.
For the initial frequentist analyses, we planned to collect the same number of
participants as in the original study (N = 50), even though an a priori power analysis
with the smallest interaction effect reported in the original study (f = 0.32) and
α = β = .05 yielded a required sample of 34 participants. Since we did not want to
sample fewer participants than in the original study, an experiment with N = 50,
would allow us to detect an interaction effect of f = 0.26 or larger (with α = β = .05).
Starting after reaching this initial sample size (thereby lowering the possibility of a
false positive finding in the Bayesian analyses; Schönbrodt et al., 2015), we planned
7See table robustnessBF.pdf on osf.io/c57sr for a detailed overview of all Bayes Factors with
different prior scaling factors.
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to continue the data collection and computed Bayes factors. We planned to stop
data collection once we had gathered sufficient information (BF 10 or BF 01 larger 10)
regarding our hypotheses of main interest (namely the two-way interactions, for both
dependent measures, of time of measurement × order of information received) or once
we had reached a maximum of 125 participants (which is 2.5 times the original sample
size as recommended by Simonsohn, 2015 for replication studies).
Particicpants.
We initially collected the data of 53 participants and - based on our Bayesian
analyses - did not collect any additional data. One participant aborted the experiment
and one data file was corrupted; both of these events were known during data collection,
and these missing participants were replaced by 2 additional participants. We used
the data of 51 participants in the final analysis.8
Confirmatory analysis. We first report the set of planned and pre-registered
analyses to test our hypotheses, before we turn to additional exploratory analyses.
Recognition test.
A one-tailed t test indicated that the primes were recognized above chance in
the recognition task at the end of the study, M = 12.53, with chance level at 10,
t(50) = 5.22, p < .001; BF 10 = 10, 227.03, d = 0.70, 95% HDI [0.40, 1.01].
Explicit and implicit evaluation.
As in the analysis by Rydell et al. (2006) we first ran a 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA
with the type of the dependent variable (IAT, Explicit), the time of measurement
(time 1, time 2) and the valence condition (negative primes and positive behavior first
vs. positive primes and negative behavior first) with the first two factors manipulated
within participants. As in the original study, we found statistical evidence for a three
way interaction of the variables mentioned above, F (1, 49) = 49.16, MSE = 0.36,
p < .001, ηˆ2G = .149, BF 10 = 1 .14 × 107.
Explicit evaluation.
8In addition, during the final day of data collection, two participants instead of only one were
collected accidentally, resulting in 51 (instead of the planned 50) complete data sets after testing a total
of 53 participants. Results do not change when we excluded the 51st participant (largest deviation of
d = 0.05; largest deviation of η2G = .005). Two participants had to rate the target character also
before the first learning phase, due to a programming error. Excluding these participants did not
substantially alter the results (largest deviation of d = 0.07; largest deviation of η2G = .01).
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We subsequently tested for a 2 (time of measurement) × 2 (valence condition)
ANOVA in the explicit rating data only. As in the original study, we indeed found
a significant interaction of the time of measurement and whether positive behavior
was presented first and negative second or vice versa, F (1, 49) = 274.76, MSE = 0.26,
p < .001, ηˆ2G = .757, BF 10 = 4 .07 × 1030.
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Figure 4 . Standardized explicit evaluation effects of Experiment 1, split by the valence
of the explicit information and the time of the explicit measurement. Error bars
represent 95% within-subject confidence intervals. Pos: positive information, neg:
negative information.
As can be seen in Figure 4 and Table C1, the rating of the character was
according to the explicit information given to the participants. When given positive
information first, the rating of the target character was more positive than when given
negative information, t(27) = 11.52, p < .001; BF 10 = 1 .37 × 109, d = 2.09, 95% HDI
[1.41, 2.79]. Similar, when negative behavior was learned in the first block, the rating
of the target was more negative than when positive information was learned in the
second block, t(22) = 12.14, p < .001; BF 10 = 2 .8 × 108, d = 2.41, 95% HDI [1.57,
3.26].
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Implicit evaluation.
The analysis of the IAT data also revealed a significant 2-way interaction of time
of measurement and condition, F (1, 49) = 14.24, MSE = 0.44, p < .001, ηˆ2G = .075,
BF 10 = 66.31.
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Figure 5 . Standardized IAT effects of Experiment 1, split by the valence of the primes
and the time of IAT measurement. Error bars represent 95% within-subject confidence
intervals. Pos: positive prime, neg: negative prime.
As can be seen in Figure 5 and Table C2, when negative primes were presented
first and positive primes afterwards, we can observe some indications that the IAT
effect became more negative t(27) = −2.54, p = .017; BF 10 = 2.92, d = −0.44, 95%
HDI [-0.82, -0.06]. This pattern is inconsistent with the prime valence but consistent
both with the verbal behaviors presented to the participants, as well as the explicit
ratings. Similarly, when positive primes were presented first and negative primes
afterwards, the IAT effect became more positive t(22) = −2.77, p = .011; BF 10 = 4.50,
d = −0.52, 95% HDI [-0.95, -0.10]. This pattern is again consistent with the explicit
evaluation and inconsistent with the notion that the IAT effect reflects prime valence.
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Exploratory analysis.
Our counterbalancing factors had no influence on the pattern of results in the
implicit nor explicit evaluations (but we cannot confidently conclude an absence of
such effects because the Bayes factors were mostly not conclusive). Additionally, no
correlation between the number of remembered primes and the IAT effect score was
found, r = .15, 95% CI [−.13, .41], t(49) = 1.05, p = .301, BF 01 = 2.28.
Composite effect.
We additionally computed a composite IAT effect score for both groups together
(i.e., negative primes first and positive primes first) and compared it to zero. We
subtracted the mean log IAT effect when the target character was shown with a
negative prime from the mean log IAT effect when the character was shown with a
positive prime.
Values larger 0 would therefore indicate that the target character’s IAT score was
in line with the valence of the briefly presented primes; values smaller than 0 would
indicate that it was in line with the behavioral information received. We observed
a negative value for the composite score (M = -0.08), and a one-sided t test of the
hypothesis derived from the results of Rydell and colleagues (2006) that the effect is
larger than zero was consequently not significant, t(50) = −3.78, p > .999. The Bayes
factor yielded relative evidence for the null hypothesis over the alternative hypothesis,
BF 01 = 28.58, d = −0.50, 95% HDI [-0.79, -0.21], which clearly indicates that the
target character was not implicitly evaluated in line with the valence of the briefly
presented primes.
Similarly, we computed a difference score for the explicit rating. We subtracted
the z-standardized mean explicit rating when negative behavior was learned from the
mean rating when positive behavior was learned. A positive value therefore indicated
an explicit rating in line with the behavioral information, while a negative value would
indicate an explicit rating in line with the briefly presented primes. Unsurprisingly, a
one-sided t test revealed that the target character was rated in line with the behavioral
information received, t(50) = 16.74, p < .001; BF 10 = 2 .16 × 1019, d = 2.29, 95%
HDI [1.77, 2.83].
Discussion Experiment 1. We replicated the pattern of results of the original
study for the explicit evaluation. When participants learned that the target character
was a good person, he was evaluated more positively than when participants learned
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that he was a bad person. Considering that participants had 100 trials to learn about
the target character in each block, we would consider this is a trivial learning effect
consistent with both single- and dual-process accounts.
Contrary to the original study, we did not replicate the pattern of effects for the
implicit measures. While the IAT effects in the original study reflected a change in
line with the briefly presented primes, the pattern observed in this experiment was
opposite to it (i.e., in line with the explicit information about the target character).
We therefore conclude that we did not find evidence that the briefly presented primes
had an effect on implicit evaluations.
Limitations of Experiment 1.
There are two aspects that might account for the difference in result patterns
between the original study and the present replication: First, the translation of the
material into German may have affected the results. For instance, the German prime
words were slightly longer (6.05 letters) than the original primes (4.9 letters), so one
might speculate that the primes could not be fully processed in the brief presentation
time. However, this interpretation does not fit with the prime-recognition result,
which showed a higher rate of prime recognition than in the original study. We would
therefore conclude that prime processing was not reduced in this replication. However,
other language or cultural factors may have moderated the influence of the briefly
presented primes.
Second, perhaps more importantly, our results suggest that prime processing
was not fully subliminal. As in the study by Rydell et al. (2006), we measured the
recognition of the briefly presented primes with a recognition test in the end of the
study. Recall that one half of the primes were shown in the first block only, the other
half in the second block only. Since participants additionally received no information
about the primes, the prime-recognition test in the end of the study is a weak proxy
for the actual visibility of the primes during the learning phases (i.e., decay over time
and interference from subsequent stimuli may have weakened prime memory). We
additionally substituted multiple words from the list of new words used in the original
study with words that were not previously used (see above). We found – contrary to
the original study – that the primes were recognized above chance. We do not know
whether this difference is purely due to a more strict measure of memory (i.e., due to
our using truly new words as distracters in the recognition list given to the participants,
instead of including words that were also used in the behavioral statements), or due
68
to a higher visibility of the primes. Note that we aimed at closely replicating the
presentation conditions of the original study (black background, white letters, font
type and size), used the same images as backward masks, and even realized a slightly
shorter prime presentation time compared to the original study (i.e., 23.5 ms instead
of 25 ms). Together with the slightly increased word length, it could be argued that,
if anything, it should have been more difficult to perceive the briefly presented primes.
However, in contrast to the original study, the result of the prime-recognition check
suggested that the primes were not subliminal, but were supraliminally processed (at
least in part).
Note that prime presentation may also have been supraliminal in the original
study: The differences in prime-recognition performance may be explained by the
improvement made to the prime recognition test (i.e., by using truly new words).
However, we cannot rule out the possibility that the primes were too easy to read
in the present Experiment 1, and were therefore processed in a propositional fashion
instead of the automatic associative process. Following that logic, it would not be
surprising that we did not observe an effect of the primes on the IAT, considering
both primes and verbal information were supraliminal: The clearly visible behavioral
information participants learned about the target person, should have a much larger
effect on preferences than a briefly presented word with no clear relation to the target
person. In order to allow for automatic associative effects on implicit attitudes, it
might be necessary to ensure that prime processing is truly subliminal in the sense that
prime recognition is at chance as reported in the original study. Keeping the original
presentation duration would therefore lead to functionally different presentation
conditions (i.e., above-chance awareness as opposed to chance-level awareness in the
original study), and this would render the results of the replication study all but
uninterpretable. In order to allow for a valid interpretation of the results of our
replication attempt, we therefore aimed to realize presentation conditions that ensured
chance-level awareness of the primes (see Stroebe & Strack, 2014).
Experiment 2
The goal of the second experiment was to conduct a second replication of the
original study, addressing the potential limitations outlined above. We used the
same procedure as in Experiment 1, but used the original materials and a sample
of participants from the same population of US undergraduate students. Primes in
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Experiment 2 were presented for the longest possible duration for which prime memory
(measured as in the original study) did not exceed chance level in a pretest.
Pretest. Participants completed a single learning block with 10 × 10 positive
(negative) primes, receiving the same instructions as in Experiment 2. They were then
asked about their explicit evaluations of the target person (this was done to erase
any prime knowledge from working memory) before completing an adapted version
of the prime-recognition task that contained only the positive (negative) words. We
successively tested prime presentation durations starting with 23.5 ms (continuing
with 20 ms, 17 ms, 13 ms etc.), until the primes could no longer be identified above
chance. We used sequential Bayesian analysis (with the same priors and specifications
as in Experiment 1, starting each analysis after 10 participants) and stopped data
collection for any given presentation time as soon as the Bayes Factor for the test of
prime memory performance against chance level has reached BF 10 > 5 or BF 01 > 5
(with a maximum N of 25 participants per condition). We decided a priory to use the
longest presentation time for which prime identification did not exceed chance level
(i.e., until we obtain a Bayes factor in support of the null hypothesis).9
With a prime presentation time of 23.5 ms, the primes were visible above chance,
BF 10 = 5.41, d = 0.48, 95% HDI [0.05, 0.91], N = 22. This also tended to be the case
with a presentation time of 20 ms, BF 10 = 2.16, d = 0.36, 95% HDI [-0.04, 0.76], N =
24. A test of a prime presentation duration of 17 ms yielded convincing evidence that
prime stimuli were remembered at chance level, BF 01 = 5.78, d = −0.08, 95% HDI
[-0.48, 0.32], N = 21.
Procedure. We used the same experimental scripts as in Experiment 1, but
with the original English instructions and stimulus material (including only the name
Bob for the target character). In contrast to Experiment 1, we used the same IAT
target words as in the original study. As in Experiment 1, we used new words (i.e.,
words that were not used during the learning phase) for the recognition task, to ensure
9The data of the pretest and the main study were collected under a Born Open Data
protocol (Rouder, 2016) in which they were automatically logged, uploaded, and made freely
available after every day of data collection (github.com/methexp/rawdata/tree/master/croco4,
github.com/methexp/rawdata/tree/master/croco4b, github.com/methexp/rawdata/tree/master/croco5).
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a more exact approximation of the visibility of the primes.10 Most importantly, we
changed the presentation time of the prime to 17 ms.
Analysis plan. As in Experiment 1, we conducted frequentist and Bayesian
analyses after a fixed initial sample size and used sequential Bayesian testing for all
further analyses. We used the same annotation, inference criteria, and priors as in
Experiment 1.
Sample size rationale.
As in Experiment 1, we initially collected the data of 50 participants. We
additionally decided to continue recruiting participants using sequential Bayesian
analysis (analyzing the data after every day of data collection) until the two Bayes
factors of interest (see below) were larger than 10 (or smaller than 1/10), or until a
maximum of 125 participants was reached. No new participants would be recruited
after reaching this criterion, but those already signed up at this point were allowed
to take part in the study. We decided to exclude participants who (a) aborted the
experiment or (b) experienced or reported unforeseeable circumstances (e.g., noises,
difficulty with the instructions; based on our experience we did not expect any of
those cases to occur).
Data collection stopping rule and confirmatory Analysis.
As in the exploratory analyses of Experiment 1 we planned to calculate a
composite effect both for the IAT and the explicit evaluation. We planned to run
one-sided t tests and compare the score to 0 (see above) to determine whether (a) the
explicit evaluation is in line with the behavioral information and (b) whether the IAT
effects are in line with the prime valence. We planned to stop data collection once we
have gathered sufficient information on these two contrasts (i.e., BF 10 > 10 or BF 01
> 10).
Additional analyses.
We planned to additionally conduct the same confirmatory analyses as in Exper-
iment 1, but without using these as stopping rules for the data collection.
10In the original study, some of the prime words, as well as some of the new words in the prime
recognition task, also appeared as part of the behavioral statements during the learning phase.
We slightly adjusted the behavioral statements (e.g., substituted single words in the behavioral
description with similar but different words or rearranged the sentence and omitted the word in
question) to remove this possible confound. Two independent raters confirmed that the behavioral
statements were still clearly identifiable as positive or negative.
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Participants.
We collected the data of 57 participants and—based on our Bayesian analyses—
did not collect any additional participants. We collected more than the planned 50
participants, as we allowed participants who had already signed up to participate as
well (see above).
Confirmatory analysis. We will first report on the performance of the par-
ticipants in the prime recognition test and compare it to the chance level, then analyse
the composite effect score testing the two crucial hypotheses (i.e., explicit rating in line
with the behavioral information and IAT effect in line with the valence of the primes),
and we will additionally report the same confirmatory analyses as in Experiment 1
and the original study.
Recognition test.
A one-tailed t test indicated that the primes were not recognized above chance
in the recognition task at the end of the study, M = 10.07, with chance level at 10,
t(56) = 0.46, p = .325; BF 01 = 4.66, d = 0.06, 95% HDI [-0.19, 0.31]. This was
contrary to the results of the first experiment but in line with the results of the original
study.
Stopping rule analysis: Composite effect.
We again computed a composite effect score for the explicit ratings and the IAT
data. Values larger than zero in the explicit rating indicated ratings in line with the
valence learned from the behavioral statements, values larger than zero from the IAT
data indicated IAT effects in line with the valence of the briefly presented primes.
Unsurprisingly, a one-sided t test of the explicit ratings revealed that the target
character was rated in line with the behavioral information received, t(56) = 20.31,
p < .001; BF 10 = 3 .83 × 1024, d = 2.64, 95% HDI [2.09, 3.21].
Importantly, as in Experiment 1 we found a negative value for the composite
score of the IAT (M = -0.11), indicating that the IAT effect was not in line with
the valence of the primes. The pre-registered one-sided t test of the composite score
of the IAT data, testing whether the effect is larger than zero, was consequently
not significant, t(56) = −4.41, p > .999. The Bayesian analysis also yielded relative
evidence for the absence of the predicted effect, BF 01 = 33.85, d = −0.56, 95% HDI
[-0.83, -0.28].
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Overall confirmatory analysis.
As in Experiment 1 and in the original analysis we additionally ran a 2 ×
2× 2 ANOVA with the type of the dependent variable (IAT, Explicit), the time of
measurement (after block 1, after block 2) and the valence condition (negative primes
and positive behavior first vs. positive primes and negative behavior first) with the first
two factors manipulated within participants. We again found statistical evidence for a
three way interaction of the variables mentioned above, F (1, 55) = 54.69, MSE = 0.35,
p < .001, ηˆ2G = .149, BF 10 = 3 .74 × 107.
Explicit evaluation.
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Figure 6 . Standardized explicit evaluation effects of Experiment 2, split by the valence
of the explicit information and the time of the explicit measurement. Error bars
represent 95% within-subject confidence intervals. Pos: positive information, neg:
negative information.
We therefore computed a 2 (time of measurement) × 2 (valence condition)
ANOVA of the explicit rating data only. A significant interaction of the time of
measurement and whether positive behavior was presented first and negative second
or vice versa was found, F (1, 55) = 403.79, MSE = 0.22, p < .001, ηˆ2G = .828,
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BF 10 = 1 .83 × 1042.
As in the previous studies, the rating of Bob was according to the explicit
information given to the participants (see Figure 6 and Table D1). When learning that
Bob was a good person in the first block, the rating of the target character was more
positive than when learning Bob was a bad person, t(30) = 15.18, p < .001; BF 10 =
4 .66 × 1012, d = 2.63, 95% HDI [1.87, 3.42]. Similar, when negative behavior was
learned about Bob in the first block, the explicit rating of Bob was more negative than
when positive information was learned, t(25) = 13.40, p < .001; BF 10 = 1 .16 × 1010,
d = 2.52, 95% HDI [1.70, 3.35].
These results again show a simple learning effect, but also demonstrate that the
participants paid attention to the instructions and the information presented.
Implicit evaluation.
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Figure 7 . Standardized IAT effects of Experiment 2, split by the valence of the primes
and the time of IAT measurement. Error bars represent 95% within-subject confidence
intervals. Pos: positive prime, neg: negative prime.
An ANOVA of the IAT data also revealed a significant 2-way interaction of
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time of measurement and valence condition, F (1, 55) = 18.96, MSE = 0.54, p < .001,
ηˆ2G = .102, BF 10 = 535.23.11
As shown in Figure 7 and Table D1, when negative primes were presented first
and positive primes afterwards, the IAT effect became more negative t(30) = −4.77,
p < .001; BF 10 = 529.65, d = −0.80, 95% HDI [-1.21, -0.39]. This pattern is
inconsistent with the prime valence but consistent with the behavior descriptions
presented to the participants, with the explicit ratings, as well as with the results of
Experiment 1. Even though descriptively true, and contrary to Experiment 1, there
was no statistical evidence that the IAT effect became more positive when negative
primes were shown after positive primes, t(25) = −1.45, p = .161; BF 01 = 1.91,
d = −0.25, 95% HDI [-0.63, 0.12]. One should note, however, that we ran two tailed t
tests in these analyses; the direction of the effect was, for both valence order conditions,
not in line with the prime valence but instead in line with the valence of the explicitly
learned information. Taken together, these analyses—similar to the composite effect
analyses— showed that there was no evidence for the pattern described in the original
study (i.e., no evidence for IAT effects in line with the valence of the briefly presented
primes).
Discussion Experiment 2. In Experiment 2, we again set out to test whether
implicit attitudes could be selectively influenced by briefly presented primes, while
explicit attitudes were influenced by explicitly learned behavioral information. In
contrast to Experiment 1, we used the original instructions and prime words, and
collected data from a similar population as in the original study (i.e., US undergraduate
students). We also used a shorter presentation time of the briefly presented primes
(i.e., 17 ms compared to 25 ms). We speculated that we did not find an effect of
the primes in Experiment 1 because they were sometimes visible and therefore may
have been processed consciously, thus competing with the explicit statements instead
of affecting implicit attitudes. In Experiment 2, we found that primes were not
recognized above chance in the prime recognition task. This result is contrary to the
above-chance recognition in Experiment 1, but in line with the original results. If the
primes in Experiment 1 indeed did not affect the IAT effect because they competed
with explicit information, we should be able to detect an effect of the primes on the
IAT in Experiment 2, where primes were not processed consciously. In a composite
11Additionally, we found no indications for an influence of the order of dependent measures or the
key assignment during the IAT on the IAT results (as in Experiment 1 the Bayes factors were mostly
not conclusive).
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effects analysis, however, we found compelling evidence that the IAT effect was not in
line with the valence of the briefly presented primes. All analyses of the explicit rating
support the previous findings that the explicit ratings were in line with the valence
learned about Bob throughout 100 trials. These findings indicate that participants
paid attention to the instructions and stimuli during the learning phase.
One noteworthy observation from the unstandardized and untransformed IAT
effects from both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 (see table C2 and table D2) is that
IAT effects appear to generally reflect a positive evaluation of the target character.
As one might expect, IAT effects were positive (i.e., greater than 0) when a positive
explicit behavior was learned. Interestingly, IAT effects were also greater than zero
in the second IAT after negative explicit behavior had been learned in the second
block (Valence Condition 1). Importantly, when negative explicit information was
learned first, IAT effect scores in the first IAT do not differ from zero (and are greater
than zero in the second IAT). Thus, there appears to be an asymmetrical effect of
negative versus positive learned behavioral information on the IAT, which should be
investigated by future studies and replication attempts.
Given the results of Experiment 2, we were not able to replicate the dissociating
between implicit and explicit measures described in the original study, despite close
adherence to the original methods and procedures. Compared to the original study,
we used the same instructions, IAT target words, and primes. We slightly modified the
behavioral descriptions to eliminate overlap between the words used in the descriptions
and those used as primes or new words in the recognition task. The most relevant
modification to the original study protocol was the reduction of the presentation
duration of the briefly presented primes: We presented primes for only 17 ms in
order to achieve a functional equivalence in the perception of primes compared to the
original experiment. Nevertheless, we were unable to reproduce the implicit attitude
findings of the original study and instead found evidence for the absence of the effect.
General Discussion
The main goal of this set of experiments was to investigate the potential influence
of subliminal stimuli on (implicit) attitudes. In two experiments, we did not observe
such an influence. We decided to reduce the visibility of the briefly presented stimuli
in Experiment 2 compared to Experiment 1, in order to achieve at-chance prime
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recognition as described in the original study. However, even with prime recognition
at chance level, we were unable to find an effect of the primes on the IAT effect.
A key finding of the original work was that participants held two distinct attitudes
at the same time. Replicating this finding—regardless of the actual visibility of the
primes—would be an important contribution to the literature. However, we were
unable to reproduce this “dual attitude” effect using the same presentation time of
prime words as in the original study in Experiment 1, or using a shorter presentation
time in Experiment 2.
One noteworthy finding of Experiment 1 and the pilots prior to Experiment 2
was that prime stimuli seemed to be visible when presented for the same amount of
time as in the original study. We can only speculate whether the prime recognition
tests in our experiments were more sensitive (as we used truly new words versus words
that had previously appeared in other parts of the study), or whether differences in
the presentation method of the words (e.g., font size, font color) caused prime words
to be recognized above chance in our studies with a presentation time of 23.5 ms.
Future studies should take into account that merely using the same presentation time
as reported in another study does not guarantee that stimuli are perceived in a similar
way; ideally, trial-by-trial visibility checks should be used to determine actual visibility
(Stahl et al., 2016).
Limitations
In Experiment 2, we reduced the presentation time of the primes to ensure a prime
presentation below the visibility threshold (i.e., to present the prime words subliminally
as described in the original study). It seems possible that the reduced presentation
time—while successfully reducing visibility—was insufficient for a subliminal processing
of the prime words. Future studies could investigate the possibility of a longer (i.e., 25
ms) presentation time, while ensuring that the prime words are indeed not visible to
the participants. This could be achieved by a parafoveal and/or masked presentation
of the prime word, as implemented by Rydell and colleagues in a subsequent replication
study of this effect (Rydell et al., 2008). Including a forward mask and a parafoveal
presentation could have the effect that prime words are not visible to the participants,
but a longer presentation time could result in an unconscious processing of the primes
and possibly therefore in an effect of prime words on implicit attitude measures. It
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should be noted however, that another study on evaluative conditioning, using a
masked and parafoveal presentation method, was not able to detect EC effects on
implicit or explicit measures (Dedonder et al., 2014).
One additional noteworthy characteristic of the method used in the original
experiment—which has not been discussed previously—is the length of feedback during
the learning phase. At 5000 ms, this feedback is relatively long; this was sufficiently
noteworthy that some participants mentioned it after the study. While we did not
change the length of feedback—in order to keep the method as close as possible to
the original study—it seems possible that participants’ attention may not remain
focused on the screen for the entire duration of the feedback. Importantly, prime
processing may suffer from this reduction of attention because the brief prime words
were presented just after the feedback, with only a short fixation cross preceding the
prime. As attention towards the subliminally presented stimulus might be a necessary
precondition for their cognitive processing (Dehaene et al., 2006), this characteristic
of the learning phase could be further investigated—and perhaps improved upon—in
future studies. Such improvements (i.e., ways to ensure full attention on the briefly
presented primes) might help strengthen the effects of primes on attitudes, but they
would simultaneously induce greater prime visibility, thereby rendering it less likely to
obtain the original finding.
Implications & Outlook
While the original study is cited as an important finding demonstrating the
influence of briefly presented primes on participants’ implicit attitudes (Sweldens et al.,
2014), our results show that the finding is not easy to replicate. However, at this point
we would refrain from drawing strong conclusions from the present two replication
studies, for two reasons: First, while we ran two replication in two different labs,
we used the same experimental script (i.e., same font, same colors, etc.). Specific—
unknown—settings might have interfered with the original effect; and replications
by other labs, perhaps using a variety of sensible presentation parameters, would be
highly desirable. Second, there are two replications of the original finding (albeit
with slightly altered methods; Rydell & McConnell, 2006; Rydell et al., 2008). Those
studies—while not independent—are important replications of the effect and should
be taken into account when running additional replication attempts. Nevertheless,
should future studies confirm the interpretation that the original findings are not
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robust, this will have important theoretical implications as discussed next.
One theoretical aspect of the original study worth discussing is the duality of
attitudes and their measurement, as proposed in the systems of reasoning account
(Rydell & McConnell, 2006). The original finding suggests that explicitly learned
attitudes map onto explicit rating measures, whereas implicitly acquired attitudes map
onto implicit measures. In other studies in support of the systems of reasoning account,
it was shown that explicit attitudes adapted quickly to new (explicit) information,
while implicit attitudes did not adapt quickly, when new (explicit) information was
encountered (Rydell & McConnell, 2006). This effect was taken as an indication for
the duality of fast-changing explicit attitudes versus slow-changing implicit attitudes.
However, as the authors themselves suggest, the delay in adaptation to new information
exhibited by implicit measures might be due to their reduced sensitivity (i.e., the
IAT may simply be less sensitive to the information), instead of supporting the
existence of dual attitudes. According to the systems of reasoning account (Rydell &
McConnell, 2006), demonstrating an influence of subliminal primes on implicit attitudes
(while influencing the explicit attitudes using supraliminal behavior descriptions) was
therefore important to lend credibility to the proposed duality of attitudes. We
were not able to demonstrate this important effect in our two replication studies. If
additional studies support the present finding, the differences in implicit and explicit
attitudes found previously might indeed turn out to be best explained by a difference
in the measures, not in mental constructs.
Interestingly, in the above-mentioned studies, it was shown that 100 trials of
explicit counter-attitudinal information had an effect on implicit attitudes (Rydell &
McConnell, 2006). With these results in mind, it would be possible that the explicit
information presented to participants in our replication studies might similarly have
interfered with the opposite-valence information provided by the briefly presented
primes. Additional findings also contradict the proposition of an unequivocal mapping
of explicit and implicit measures and attitudes. First, several EC studies reported
unconscious EC effects on explicit ratings (Hütter et al., 2012; Olson & Fazio, 2001).
Second, recent work also showed that implicit attitudes can be accessed and reported
in a conscious manner (Hahn, Judd, Hirsh, & Blair, 2014). Third, additional work
showed that even indirect measures of EC effects relied on contingency awareness
between CS and US during the learning phase (Pleyers et al., 2007; Stahl et al.,
2009). Taken together, the assumption of dual attitude models, that “people can hold
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different implicit attitudes and explicit attitudes about an attitude object at the same
time” (Rydell & McConnell, 2006, p. 1007) is challenged both by recent work and the
present replication attempts.
Another theoretical aspect of this replication attempt is the role of contingency
awareness in EC. The results of the present replication studies are in line with other
studies claiming that contingency awareness is necessary for evaluative conditioning
(Dedonder et al., 2014; Pleyers et al., 2007; Stahl et al., 2016, 2009). The present
studies did not provide evidence for EC in the absence of contingency awareness;
yet the existence of such an effect has been proposed by dual-process models of
attitude acquisition (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). As the original study has
previously been cited as (methodologically) strong evidence for EC with subliminal
stimuli–and therefore for EC without contingency awareness—the results of these
replication attempts question the robustness of this effect and therefore lend support
for the notion that EC requires contingency awareness. Clearly, the present work
realizes only one of many possible ways to investigate contingency awareness in EC;
other possible realizations should be taken into account by future studies addressing
the necessity of contingency awareness in EC.
To conclude, we set out to replicate the finding that briefly presented primes had
a selective influence on participants’ implicit attitudes. In two experiments, we were
not able to replicate the original finding but instead found evidence for its absence. If
confirmed by future work, this suggests a lack of robustness of the original finding
that would considerably weaken the empirical support for dual-attitude theories.
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Chapter 3: Introducing potentially beneficial factors for subliminal EC
effects
The evidential value of the studies by Rydell and colleagues—according to the p-
curve analyses—appeared to be very promising. The goal of the previous investigation
was therefore to establish an EC effect of subliminally presented stimuli using the
paradigm of Rydell et al. (2006). Once an EC effect with briefly presented stimuli
was established, we would be able to test specific problems in the measurement of
subliminality (i.e., studies measuring memory after the learning phase as a proxy
for stimulus visibility; Lovibond & Shanks, 2002) and might be able to adapt the
procedure. However, in two studies we were not able to detect this EC effect and
replicate the finding by Rydell and colleagues (2006).
An additional important finding of the replication studies was that recognition
of the briefly presented words was above chance in the study using similar presentation
conditions as in the original experiment (i.e., Experiment 1). This is particularly
surprising as the recognition measure was administered long after the learning phase
(i.e., half of the stimuli were presented only in the first block and the measure was
therefore taken approximately 30 minutes after the end of this learning block). As
memory might be influenced by multiple factors between the learning phase and the
recognition test (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002), this result strongly indicates that the
stimuli were (partially) visible to the participants during the learning phase. These
results demonstrate that a better test of stimulus visibility during the learning phase
needs to be employed. A study reporting EC effects with briefly presented stimuli is
only of theoretical relevance if the stimulus presentation was truly subliminal, as only
then we can rule out contingency awareness between CS and US. In the experiments
discussed in the next chapters, stronger tests for stimulus visibility will therefore be
deployed.
Importantly, we were not able to replicate the finding by Rydell and colleagues
(2006) that a briefly presented word had an influence on (implicit) evaluations. One
could think of multiple reasons why we did not find an EC effect of the briefly presented
stimuli. The experimental setup was only suited to test for a strong dual-process
claim (i.e., independent influences on implicit and explicit processes that cannot
communicate). While this pattern of effects is possible in the APE model and the
studies by Rydell are explicitly discussed (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011), other
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circumstances in the processing of stimuli might cause associative information to be
“overwritten” by propositional information. In the next chapters, the focus will be
on a “simple” effect of subliminally presented stimuli on evaluations instead of the
double dissociation presented by Rydell and colleagues (2006). We will consider a
series of factors that might have hindered an EC effect in the previous studies or could
be considered beneficial for automatic EC effects.
First, one problem might be that the US was presented subliminally. As
previously discussed, an affective reaction towards the US might require conscious
processing (Lähteenmäki et al., 2015). The absence of an EC effect might therefore
be due to the lack of an affective reaction even though the stimulus might have been
processed unconsciously. Put differently, when the US is presented subliminally it
has to (1) be processed unconsciously and (2) produce an affective reaction, while
when the CS is presented subliminally it only has to be processed (and associated
with a supraliminally presented US). One could therefore argue that EC effects with
subliminal USs pose a higher burden on the subconscious processes than an EC effect
with subliminally presented CSs. In the following chapters, therefore, CSs will be
presented subliminally and USs supraliminally.
Second, as associations in the APE model are described as “co-occurrences
between objects and events result[ing] in a co-activation of their corresponding mental
concepts, which in turn creates an associative link between the two” (Gawronski &
Bodenhausen, 2014b, p. 191), it might be beneficial for associative EC effects to
make use of CSs and USs that might already have some associations. Specifically,
Verwijmeren et al. (2012) showed in a study using subliminal CSs that a stronger
conditioning effect was found when the US carried relevance to the CS. We therefore
made use of the procedure by Verwijmeren et al. (2012) as this study explicitly
addresses the factor of relevance as possibly beneficial for a conditioning effect with a
subliminally presented CS.
Third, an evaluation as the dependent variable might not capture small changes
in preferences after an EC learning phase with subliminally presented stimuli as the
effect size might be considerably smaller than with supraliminally presented stimuli
(however, note that Hofmann et al., 2010 did not find any indications for a smaller
effect). In the study by Verwijmeren et al. (2012) a two-alternative forced choice
measure captured an EC effect after the learning phase while an evaluation did not
show a difference. In the next chapter, a choice measure will therefore be used alongside
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an evaluation to investigate the question whether the choice measure might be more
sensitive to detect a subliminal EC effect than an evaluation.
The aim of the study presented in the next chapter was therefore to find
an EC effect with briefly presented stimuli by following the procedure of a study
successfully demonstrating subliminal conditioning effects (Verwijmeren et al., 2012).
We speculated that (1) a subliminal CS instead of a subliminal US, (2) a relevance
between CS and US with an additional personal relevance to attend the stimuli, (3)
and a choice measure might constitute as beneficial methodological circumstances to
find an EC effect with briefly presented stimuli. We also made sure that CSs were
indeed presented subliminally by using a strict visibility test.
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Chapter 4: Relevance effects in evaluative conditioning: A pre-registered
replication and extension of Verwijmeren, Karremans, Stroebe, &
Wigboldus (2012)
An important and old research question is whether our preferences and actions
are driven solely by our conscious and deliberate decisions, and to which degree
unconsciously processed stimuli and spontaneous impulses also influence our behavior.
The issue of whether preference acquisition can occur automatically is central to
current dual-process theories of attitudes (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006).
Preference acquisition in the absence of conscious awareness is one of two examples
for automatic or unconscious learning phenomena (Mitchell et al., 2009). One way in
which stimuli may be unconsciously processed is when they are presented subliminally
(e.g., very briefly), resulting in a stimulation too weak to enter consciousness (Dehaene
et al., 2006).
Preferences can be acquired when an initially neutral stimulus (the conditioned
stimulus, or CS), after being paired with a valent (positive or negative) stimulus (the
unconditioned stimulus, or US), is evaluated in accordance with the valence of the US;
this phenomenon is called evaluative conditioning (EC). It is of theoretical importance
for theories of learning as well as theories of attitude acquisition and expression because
it is one of very few phenomena that have sometimes been found to demonstrate
automatic learning, or, more specifically, learning without awareness of what is learned.
For instance, EC effects have been found in the absence of participants’ awareness
of the CS-US contingencies (e.g., Fulcher & Hammerl, 2001; Olson & Fazio, 2001).
Yet, these findings have been criticized on methodological grounds (e.g., Pleyers et al.,
2007), and there is ongoing debate about the adequate method of studying learning
without awareness (Gawronski & Walther, 2012; Hütter et al., 2012; Stahl et al., 2009)
and of establishing the subliminality of stimulus presentations (e.g., Pratte & Rouder,
2009).
A central criticism is that in most studies of awareness in EC, memory for CS-US
pairings assessed after the learning phase is used as a proxy for awareness of these
pairings during learning; this is problematic because participants may be aware of a
CS-US pairing during learning but forget about this pairing before the memory test.
This may lead to underestimation of awareness, and thereby, to erroneous conclusions
about automatic EC effects (e.g., Gawronski & Walther, 2012). As one possible
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solution to this problem, awareness can be assessed during learning. Another possible
solution is to manipulate awareness experimentally, for instance by presenting the CSs
subliminally (i.e., preventing the CS from entering awareness implies that the CS-US
relation remains unaware).
A recent paper (Verwijmeren et al., 2012) using subliminally presented CSs,
provides a possible condition for automatic learning effects: goal-relevance of the
learning procedure. In this study, participants attended a stream of stimuli presented
on the screen and were instructed to performed a simple identification task (i.e., they
had to indicate whether an X or an O was presented on the screen). As part of
this stream, they were presented with bottled-water brands for 17 ms, followed by
faces with expressions of either fear or disgust for 2s. The brand paired with a facial
expression of fear was preferred over the brand paired with an expression of disgust.
Importantly, this was only the case for participants who reported higher levels of
thirst, not for those with lower-than-average thirst levels. Similarly, evaluations of
goal-irrelevant airline brands were not affected by the pairings. In another study, the
same finding was reported for supraliminal CS presentations. Thus, an evaluative
learning effect was found for subliminally (and supraliminally) presented CSs that was
modulated by participants’ motivation or goal.
The study by Verwijmeren et al. (2012) is one of very few reports of conditioning
with subliminal CSs. It is consistent with a recent meta-analysis of EC that, among
many other findings, found comparable effect sizes for sub- and supraliminal CS
presentations (Hofmann et al., 2010). However, this conclusion must be interpreted
with caution, for several reasons. First, only eight studies with subliminally presented
CSs were considered. Second, most of the studies that were analyzed are not easily
interpretable in terms of subliminal EC. In some studies, it was unclear whether the
results reflect an EC effect (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004) or whether presentations were
in fact subliminal (e.g., Gawronski & LeBel, 2008, see Chapter 1 for a discussion).
Furthermore, recent studies from our lab consistently showed no EC effects with
subliminal CSs (Stahl et al., 2016). In sum, previous evidence for subliminal EC
effects appears to be weak. It is therefore important to investigate whether the finding
by Verwijmeren et al. (2012) can be replicated.
The finding by Verwijmeren et al. (2012) is not only a demonstration of
successful subliminal conditioning, but it also addresses possible beneficial conditions
for subliminal conditioning. An important role of motivational relevance has been
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suggested by the experimental manipulation of motivational relevance by Verwijmeren
et al. (2012) – see also the role of motivation on the effect of subliminal presentations on
brand choice (Karremans et al., 2006). If we can reproduce this pattern of subliminal
EC under conditions of motivational relevance and its absence otherwise, we will be
one important step closer to reconciling the inconsistent findings in the EC literature.
The present study. We aimed at determining whether the results by Verwi-
jmeren et al. (2012) could be independently replicated. In close collaboration with
the first author of the original paper, we planned to conduct such an independent
replication in a strictly confirmatory manner by conducting a pre-registered study.
We also extended the original design to clarify three important questions that were
not answered in the original work, in order to investigate whether the finding’s inter-
pretation as a subliminal EC effect modulated by participants’ motivation could be
corroborated.
First, it is unclear whether the preference of a brand paired with a fearful
face over a brand paired with a disgusted face constitutes an instance of evaluative
conditioning. In EC, negative USs are typically contrasted with neutral or positive
USs, not with other negative USs. In the Verwijmeren et al. (2012) study, both CSs
could have been evaluated more negatively than a baseline (e.g., a neutrally paired
CS), reflecting an overall EC effect whose magnitude was modulated by goal-relevance;
such an interpretation would be more easily reconciled with the host of EC findings in
the absence of goal-relevance. Alternatively, an EC effect could have been restricted
to the goal-relevant condition (disgusted faces paired with water brands), with EC
effects absent for (negative) fearful faces paired with water brands (as well as airplane
brands); the absence of EC for these stimuli would be more difficult to reconcile with
the literature. To clarify whether the observed effects reflect negative evaluations
of the CSs, and therefore, an EC effect, we introduced a baseline condition of CSs
that were paired with neutral USs. If the findings are in fact EC effects (i.e., due to
stimulus valence), we expect both fear-CSs as well as disgust-CSs to be evaluated
more negatively than the baseline.
Second, it is unclear whether the effect is due to a simple association between
CS and US (as predicted by dual-process models of attitude acquisition; Gawronski &
Bodenhausen, 2006), or whether it reflects more complex propositional or relational
learning. For instance, a recent study paired neutral objects (CSs) with facial expres-
sions of happiness or disgust (Bayliss, Frischen, Fenske, & Tipper, 2007). A main effect
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of emotion was found that could be interpreted as an EC effect: CSs paired with happy
faces were evaluated more positively than CSs paired with disgusted-looking faces.
However, this main effect was qualified by an interaction with the gaze direction of the
face (towards vs. away from the CS): The effect of emotion was restricted to those CSs
that were “looked at” by the face, whereas there was no effect of facial expression on
CS evaluation when the face looked away from the CS. This gaze-cueing effect cannot
be explained by simple (unqualified) CS-US associations but reflects a relational effect
that requires more complex representations such as propositions (see, e.g., Fiedler &
Unkelbach, 2011; Förderer & Unkelbach, 2012; Moran & Bar-Anan, 2013). In other
words, it does not rely on simple association by spatiotemporal co-occurrence but
depends on participants’ interpretation of the facial expression (e.g., of disgust) as a
reaction to the CS (e.g., a water bottle). A similar gaze-cueing effect may have been
operating in the Verwijmeren et al. (2012) study (i.e., a picture of a water brand CS
was followed by the disgusted-looking face, creating the impression that the depicted
person gazed at the CS and responded by expressing disgust). To exclude a potential
gaze-cueing explanation of the finding, we introduced an additional condition in which
we used non-face USs (i.e., IAPS pictures) to elicit the emotion of disgust that did
not convey any relational information. If the finding depended on gaze-cueing (i.e.,
if it is based on a qualification of the CS-US relation), we would expect to replicate
the effect only for face USs. If the finding was due to unqualified associations, we
expected an EC effect for both US materials.
Third, it is unclear whether the CSs were in fact presented subliminally. As
argued by Pleyers et al. (2007), it is necessary to establish awareness not on the
level of the participant but at the level of each of the several CSs. In subliminal-EC
studies, an analysis at the trial level is required: In order to conclude that an EC
effect is based on unconscious processes, it must be established that, on every single
presentation trial, the stimulus was not identified. Otherwise, if, for example, one of
the water brands was consciously visible only once, and perceived by the participant
as paired with a facial expression of disgust, this might be sufficient to account for
the effect. Setting the CS presentation duration to 17 ms is not sufficient to establish
subliminality; visibility also depends on the features of stimulus, mask, context, and
even participants’ motivation or engagement in the task (Pratte & Rouder, 2009).
To establish subliminality more strictly, we assessed awareness during learning on a
trial-by-trial basis.
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Integrating the assessment of awareness into the learning phase also solves two
methodological problems of standard subliminal presentation methodology: First,
it allows an assessment of awareness on a trial-by-trial basis, instead of an overall
assessment at the participant or group level. Second, it replaces an indirect assessment
of awareness from a separate subliminality check phase, typically administered after
the main experimental task, by a direct assessment. Typically, the main experimental
task—for instance, a priming task with masked primes and clearly visible targets in
which participants are instructed to classify the targets—is followed by a separate
subliminality check task (in which participants are instructed to classify the masked
primes) to assess whether the masked primes were in fact subliminal. If participants
are not able to do so above chance level in the subliminality check task, it is concluded
that the masked primes were also not visible in the main experimental task. This
conclusion relies on the questionable assumption that prime visibility is identical in
both tasks. In fact, Pratte and Rouder (2009) showed that this is not necessarily the
case because task difficulty is often not held constant (i.e., identifying targets in the
priming task is considerably easier than identifying masked primes in the visibility
check): In their study, visibility of masked primes was improved when clearly visible
primes were interspersed, thereby maintaining participants’ motivation to perform the
task.
In addition to assessing awareness on a trial-by-trial basis during the learning
phase, we combined subliminal and supraliminal presentations to avoid the task-
difficulty artefact. In sum, we asked participants, after each CS presentation, to
identify the just-presented CS (i.e., select it out of a set of options). If participants
were not able to select the correct CS, we concluded that it was not consciously visible
on that trial. Only those CSs that were never identified correctly were counted as
truly subliminal; we compared the pattern of results for those subliminal CSs with
those CSs that were identified on one or more trials, and with CSs that were presented
clearly supraliminally.
To summarize, the present study aimed at replicating and extending the original
finding by Verwijmeren et al. (2012), with the goal to test whether it (a) could be
replicated, (b) reflects a change in liking (i.e., an EC effect) of (fear- and) disgust-CSs
when compared with a neutral baseline, (c) reflects an association between the CS and
an experience of disgust, or instead a relational gaze-cueing effect, and (d) operates
on truly subliminal CSs that were never consciously visible to participants.
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Method
The original design was used, with the following modifications to address the
above-mentioned goals: (a) In order to avoid the task-difficulty artefact in subliminal
presentation, we combined the designs of both studies by manipulating CS presentation
duration (sub- vs. supraliminal) as a within-participants factor. This allowed us to
replicate both the sub- and the supraliminal effects reported by Verwijmeren et al.
(2012) in a single study. (b) We added a neutral condition in which CSs were not
paired with a valent US but with a neutral filler stimulus. (c) We added a second
disgust condition in which IAPS pictures were used as disgust-eliciting USs. (d) We
replaced the X-O identification task, which was used in the original study to ensure
participants’ attention on the CS and US stimuli, by a CS identification task that
served the same purpose and allowed us to assess CS visibility on each trial.
Modifications to materials and procedure included: the generation and pre-
testing of new CS materials (which was necessary because we used 8 instead of only 2
brands of each type), the choice of a stronger pre-mask (i.e., because the CSs appeared
to be quite readily visible when using the original mask together with the original
presentation parameters, we replaced the original mask, which consisted of a blurred
version of the CSs, by a random-checkboard-pattern mask), the choice of rating scales
for the evaluation and thirst measures (i.e., 200-point instead of 7-point scales), and
the realization of a four-alternative forced choice instead of a two-alternative forced
choice (AFC) task to accommodate the two additional conditions (i.e., neutral baseline
and disgust-eliciting pictures).
Design. A 4 (US type: disgusted face, fearful face, disgust-eliciting picture,
neutral) × 2 (CS presentation duration: 17 ms vs. 1000 ms) × 2 (CS type: water
vs. airline brand) within-subjects design was realized.
Sample size. To be able to replicate the original finding of a subliminal EC
effect, we aimed at a sufficiently large sample size and followed suggestions to multiply
the original sample size by 2.5 (Simonsohn, 2015). With 46 participants in the central
analysis of the original paper (Verwijmeren et al., 2012, Exp.2), this requires at least
115 participants. To err on the safe side, we decided to recruit N = 135 participants
from the student pool. Due to our participant exclusion criteria, we expected to
exclude approximately 7% of the participants resulting in a total of 125 participants
included in the analysis. At α = .05, this allowed us to detect even small effects
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(d = 0.22) with an acceptable power (1-β > .79), and small-to-medium effects (d
= 0.3) with high statistical power (i.e., 1-β > .95). EC effects of the magnitude of
approximately d = 0.4, which were obtained by the meta-analysis (Hofmann et al.,
2010) for both subliminal as well as supraliminal CSs, could be detected with a very
high power of 1-β > .997.
Materials. As CSs for the thirst-relevant condition, we used 8 water bottles,
all with a different logo (but the same bottle), found in a web search. For the thirst-
irrelevant condition we used 8 pictures of airline logos. The two sets were taken from a
pilot study (N = 31) in which a larger set of bottles and airplane company logos were
rated on an evaluative rating scale, and neutrally evaluated pictures were selected.
No selected picture was reported as known by more than 6.6 % of the participants in
this pilot study.
As USs, we used 5 pictures of faces looking disgusted and 5 pictures of faces
looking fearful (Langner et al., 2010), which were the same USs as in the original study.
In addition, we used 5 disgust-eliciting IAPS pictures as USs (P. J. Lang, Bradley, &
Cuthbert, 2008) that were judged in another pilot study (N = 30) to reliably elicit
disgust and that were not associated with food/drink or transportation. Six colored
pixel masks were created, one to be used as a forward-mask in every trial, including
the supraliminal trials, and five to serve as neutral USs.
Each CS of a given type was assigned randomly, for each participant anew,
to one of the cells of the 4 (US) × 2 (presentation duration) design. Each CS was
presented 5 times (once with each US from a given category). This procedure was
repeated once, resulting in 160 critical trials.
Procedure. Participants were told that they would see a lot of pictures, some
very briefly. It was their task to attend to all pictures in order to identify them and
select the appropriate one from the set. They were told that the task was difficult
and that they had to guess when not sure.
A trial was constructed as follows: A colored, squared sized, forward-mask in
the middle of the screen announced every trial. Immediately afterwards, a CS was
shown with the same size as the forward-mask. Depending on the condition, the CS
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was shown for either 17 ms12 or for 1000 ms. The CS was replaced by the US which
also functioned as a post-mask. Afterwards the screen was cleared. After every trial,
a screen appeared showing all 8 CS objects (either all 8 water-bottles or 8 airline
logos, depending on the condition in the trial). To report which object they have
identified, participants had to select an object by pressing a corresponding number.
The arrangement of objects in the identification task was randomized for each trial.
In addition to the 160 critical trials, we also presented 10 trials in which a new
bottle (and 10 trials with a new airplane logo) was presented for 83 ms, followed by a
neutral US. This was an additional measure to keep up participants’ motivation to
detect a briefly presented CS (Pratte & Rouder, 2009). The data from these trials
were not relevant for our hypotheses. This setup resulted in a total of 180 trials that
were part of the learning phase. Order of trials was randomized for each participant
anew.
After the learning phase, evaluative ratings and choices were collected. The
order in which the two depended variables were collected was counterbalanced over
participants. In the evaluative ratings, each critical water bottle and each airplane
logo were shown separately and rated on a 200-point slider scale (anchored “very
negative” . . . “very positive”). Water bottle ratings were always asked first, followed
by the ratings of the airline logos.
In the choice measure, participants were instructed to select the water bottle
they would like to drink. First, the 4 bottles from the subliminal condition were shown
on a screen and participants selected a bottle by typing the corresponding number.
After one bottle was selected, the remaining 3 bottles were shown again and a second
choice was asked for. This process was repeated a third time with the remaining two
bottles. The same procedure was then repeated for the supraliminally presented CSs,
and accordingly with the airline logos.
Thirst was measured in the end by two questions (e.g., “How thirsty do you
feel at this moment”), using a slider with two anchors (i.e., “not at all thirsty” and
“very thirsty”). We also assessed familiarity with the brands. In the end the following
demographic items and debriefing data were collected: age, study, gender, as well as
12The brief presentation duration of one frame on a 60Hz refresh rate monitor was based on two
pilot studies (total N = 8) which showed a correct identification of the water bottles in 16.4% of
the cases, with a chance level of 12.5%. Airplane logos were correctly identified 32.8% of the times.
Based on this the airplane logos were shrunk to ensure a lower identification rate in the main study.
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an open question regarding their idea of the study’s goal.
Hypotheses and analysis plan. The central finding in the original study is
the proportion of choices of the disgust-paired beverage and its modulation by thirst.
It was analyzed using a logistic regression. CS evaluations were similarly analyzed by
regressing evaluative ratings onto thirst. We used the same parallel regression analysis
approach for both dependent variables (choice and evaluation).
In addition to thirst, CS visibility was added as a predictor (as well as their
interaction). In other words, we investigated the slope of the regression line separately
for subliminal CSs that were never identified correctly, subliminal CSs that were
identified at least once, and supraliminal CSs. If an effect is independent of awareness,
it should operate on subliminal CSs, regardless of whether they are identified correctly
or not. If, on the other hand, it depends on conscious visibility of the CS, it should be
restricted for correctly identified briefly presented CSs; effects might also be restricted
to longer presentation durations more common in EC studies.
The hypotheses (specified below) were addressed by a set of three regression
analyses, each involving one of three dependent variable. The dependent variables
were computed as independent contrasts from the four US conditions (neutral, fearful
face, disgusted face, and disgust-eliciting picture).
Hypothesis (I): If the finding reflects an EC effect (i.e., in the sense that it is
based on US valence), then we expect CSs paired with negative USs (fearful and
disgusted faces, and disgust-eliciting pictures) to be evaluated more negatively than
CSs paired with neutral USs.
To address Hypothesis I we compared evaluations for neutrally paired CSs with
those of the three negative CS conditions. The resulting values should be different from
zero if there is an EC effect (i.e., if CS evaluations reflect US valence). Furthermore,
if EC effects for sub- and supraliminal CSs are of similar magnitude, this effect should
not be modulated by CS visibility; if, on the other hand, EC depends on the conscious
linking of the US and the CS (as Stahl et al., 2016 and the study in Chapter 2
suggests), we should see an interaction with CS visibility. Reflecting the pattern in
the original study, we expect no effect of thirst. We have no specific prediction for
choice as dependent variable.
Hypothesis (II): We expect to replicate the finding that, for thirsty participants,
water brands paired with fearful faces are preferred and liked better than water brands
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paired with disgusted faces; this finding should be independent of CS visibility.
To address Hypothesis II, we compared disgust USs (faces and pictures) with
fear USs. We expected to replicate the negative regression weight of thirst (i.e., fewer
choices and more negative evaluations of disgust-CSs over fear-CSs with increasing
thirst); we also expected to replicate the finding for both sub- and supraliminal
presentation.
Hypothesis (III): If the finding reflects the simple association of an initially
neutral CS with an experience of disgust elicited by the US, then we expect the finding
to extend to disgust-eliciting pictures as USs. If, on the other hand, it reflects a
relational effect based on gaze cueing, we expect the effect to be restricted to disgusted
faces.
To address Hypothesis III, we compared CSs paired with disgusted faces with
those paired with disgust-eliciting pictures. If the type of US affects the results as
predicted by the gaze-cueing account, we expected an effect of thirst only for the faces
but not for the pictures. We have no specific prediction for an effect of CS visibility
(although gaze-cueing effects are perhaps more likely to be found for consciously visible
CSs).
Data preprocessing. Thirst ratings were standardized prior to regression
analyses. Individual evaluative ratings of the CSs were standardized, and contrasts
were computed as indicated above. From the 4AFC data, the proportion of choices of
each CS will be computed and contrasted as indicated above. Subjects who are familiar
with one of the brands used as CS will be excluded. Based on the pilot study this
will be approximately 7 % of participants. Additionally, any participant whose correct
identification performance was more than 1.5 interquartile ranges below the median of
the control items (i.e., those presented for 83 ms to keep up participants’ motivation
in the identification task) was excluded, as this indicated a lack of motivation to
follow the instructions (specifically, if they attend to the stimuli but fail to respond
accurately, these participants may be able to consciously identify more stimuli than
their identification performance suggests).
Results
Preparing the data. The data from eight participants were excluded due to
errors during data collection (one session was aborted due to computer malfunctioning;
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four sessions had inappropriate monitor settings; three participants had already
participated in pilot studies). These cases were identified during data collection and
additional participants were tested to reach our preset goal of 135 participants (101
female, mean age 23.71, range 17 - 60).
According to our pre-specified criteria, we excluded 15 participants with identifi-
cation performance more than 1.5 interquartile ranges below the median of correct
identification in the 83 ms condition. The data of these 15 participants were not used
in any analyses as the poor performance indicates a lack in motivation to follow the
instructions. We additionally excluded 41 participants who indicated that they were
familiar with one of the brands used as CSs. This resulted in a total sample size of N =
79 (Mage = 23.41; SDage = 5.80) for the confirmatory analyses, which—although much
smaller than expected—was still greater than the sample (N = 46) in Experiment 2
of the original article.
Identification performance of CS stimuli was as expected: The proportion of
correctly identified CSs was practically perfect (M = 0.98, SD = 0.04) for those
presented for 1000 ms, and was reduced to 0.88 (SD = 0.16) for the control stimuli
presented for 83 ms. Finally, for the CSs presented for 17 ms, the proportion of correct
identifications was 0.21 (SD = 0.20), which was somewhat greater than expected on
the basis of pilot tests and was clearly above the .125 chance level, t(631) = 10.56,
p < .001.
In the confirmatory analyses, we distinguished between three types of CSs: CSs
presented for 17 ms that were never correctly identified in the visibility test, CSs
presented for 17 ms that were identified correctly at least once, and CSs presented
for 1000 ms. For a given participant, a CS that was presented for 17 ms was viewed
as truly subliminal only when it was never correctly identified in the visibility test.
Approximately one correct identifications per CS would be expected by chance, but to
allow for a strict test of the subliminal EC hypothesis (i.e., to exclude the possibility
that an EC effect may be due to a single consciously processed pairing), all CSs
that were correctly identified at least once – whether due to guessing or due to
conscious identification – were regarded as potentially consciously visible in the set of
confirmatory analyses.
In the 4AFC choice task, the identification performance for each of the four 17
ms CSs that comprised the set of four choice options must be considered, because the
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conscious processing of only one of the CSs would be sufficient to affect choices. That
is, in the absence of subliminal EC effects, if only one of the CSs had been consciously
visible during learning, this may lead to the selection of this visible CS—if it had
been linked with a neutral US—or to the selection of any of the other CSs, if the
visible CS had been linked with a negative US. Accordingly, the visibility criterion
was applied at the level of the set of four CSs: An effect on choice was viewed as truly
subliminal only if none of the four CSs had ever been correctly identified during the
learning phase. This strict criterion yielded zero subliminal cases – all participants had
correctly identified at least one of the 17 ms CSs at least once. We were therefore not
able to report logistic regression analyses for CSs that were never identified correctly;
instead, we conducted the planned logistic regression analyses separately for the subset
of CSs presented for 17 ms (i.e., of which at least one CS had been correctly identified
at least once in each case, so that choices may have been influenced by conscious
learning processes) and the subset of CSs presented for 1000 ms.
Data from the sequential 4AFC choice task were coded as follows: A choice was
classified as either in line with a given hypothesis (and coded as 1) or not (coded as
0). For the first hypothesis, a participant’s choice was coded as 1 if the CS paired
with the neutral US was chosen first and 0 otherwise. For the second hypothesis, a
participant’s choice was coded 1 if the CS paired with the fearful face was selected
before any of the two disgust-paired CSs were selected, and 0 if any disgust-paired CS
was selected before the fear CS. For the third hypothesis, a choice was coded 1 if the
CS paired with the disgust-eliciting picture was chosen before the CS paired with the
disgusted face, and 0 otherwise.
The two thirst ratings had a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.85. An average score was
calculated and standardized.
Confirmatory analysis.
Evaluative ratings.
Separate regression analyses were run for evaluative ratings of water and airline
CSs as dependent variable, with participant as random factor and visibility and thirst
as well as their interaction as independent variables. First, we addressed whether an
overall EC effect was present (hypothesis I), that is, whether CSs paired with any of
the negative USs were evaluated more negatively than CSs paired with the neutral
USs. This was not the case, neither for water CSs, F(1, 543) = 1.22, p = .27, nor for
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airline CSs, F < 1, p = .87; and there was no modulation by visibility or by thirst
or their interaction (smallest p = .17). This indicates the absence of an overall EC
effect on evaluative ratings. Second, we investigated whether water brands paired
with fearful faces were preferred over water brands paired with disgust USs (faces and
pictures; hypothesis II). This was not the case, F(1, 385) < 1, p = .33, and there
were again no effects of visibility, thirst, or their interaction (smallest p = .11). In
other words, we did not obtain the expected finding of a thirst-modulated preference
for fear-paired water bottles over disgust-paired water bottles. A parallel analysis of
airline CSs also yielded no significant effects. Third, we compared water CSs paired
with disgusted faces with those paired with disgust-eliciting pictures (hypothesis III).
Again, no significant effects were obtained, but in contrast to our hypothesis, CSs
paired with disgust-eliciting pictures tended to receive more negative evaluations than
those paired with disgusted faces, F(1, 227) = 2.98, p = .086. This trend is in the
opposite direction to that predicted by the gaze-cueing explanation; results therefore
suggest the absence of a gaze-cueing artifact.
Choice.
The set of confirmatory analyses aimed at comparing performance for CSs that
were never identified correctly with those that were identified at least once. Yet, with
CS identification clearly above chance, for each participant at least one of the four
CSs present in the 4AFC task was identified correctly at least once. Therefore, the
planned set of confirmatory analyses could only be computed for 17 ms CSs, which
were correctly identified at least once, and for the 1000 ms CSs. For these subsets,
and separately for water and airline brands, we computed logistic regression analyses
with each of three choice variables (computed according to our hypotheses) regressed
onto thirst.
Contrasting our hypotheses, in none of the analyses thirst predicted choice (all
ps > .28). There was, however, a preference for water CSs paired with disgusted
faces over those paired with disgust-eliciting pictures (i.e., contrary to hypothesis
III): Significant intercept terms for both presentation times indicated selection of the
CS paired with disgusted faces in more than 50% of cases (17 ms: B = -0.49, Wald
= 4.46, p = .035; 1000 ms: B = -0.77, Wald = 10.12, p = .001).13 This finding is
13Because the null hypothesis of no preference was .25 for the choice of neutral versus all other
CSs (hypothesis I) and .33 for the choice between the fear CS and the two disgust CSs, the intercept
tests against .5 are not informative and results are not reported
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consistent with the above trend towards more negative evaluations for CSs paired
with disgust-eliciting pictures as compared to CSs paired with disgusted faces.
Confirmatory analysis: Summary and discussion.
With the possible exception of a trend toward a less favorable evaluation of water
CSs paired with disgust-eliciting IAPS pictures when compared with CSs paired with
disgusted faces, the confirmatory analyses of evaluative ratings yielded no evidence
for an overall EC effect, nor for a preference of fear CSs over disgust CSs, as well as
no evidence for a moderation by thirst. We also found no evidence for a gaze-cueing
artifact. However, contrary to our hypothesis III but consistent with the trend in
evaluations, the choice data showed a preference for water CSs paired with disgusted
faces over those paired with disgust-eliciting pictures. This effect was found for CSs
presented for 1000 ms, and it was also found for CSs which were presented for only
17 ms (but recall that this effect cannot be interpreted as subliminal because, for all
participants, at least one of these 17 ms CSs had been correctly identified on the
visibility test at least once).
The pre-defined exclusion criteria were knowingly chosen very conservative, in
order to be able to present a strong case for subliminal EC effects. However, there were
no EC effects on evaluation – subliminal or supraliminal – after excluding participants
as planned. This finding may be due to reduced statistical power but also due to
increased error variance (i.e., if EC effects are absent for 17 ms CSs which were
correctly identified only by chance, combining these data with those of visible CSs
will tend to mask any EC effects for the latter). In fact, more participants had to be
excluded than could be expected based on pilot data. First, an unexpectedly large
number of people indicated that they were familiar with at least one of the 16 brands.
In a pilot study of the brands, only 7 % of the participants indicated familiarity
with one of the 16 brands used in the present study, which would have resulted in
the expected exclusion of approximately 10 participants. Yet, in the main study, 48
participants reported being familiar with one or more brands. One reason for this
could be demand effects—participants may have felt uncomfortable to report that
they knew no brand at all—a notion that was supported by informal interviews with
participants after the study. We therefore conducted a set of exploratory analyses,
reported below, that included these participants.
Second, identification of briefly presented CSs was better than expected based
on pilot data. With a total of 40 trials during which CSs were presented for 17 ms (i.e.,
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four CSs presented 10 times each), and given eight choice options in the identification
task (i.e., a chance level of 12.5%), five correct identifications – slightly more than
one per CS – were expected by chance. Whereas we expected performance to be
only slightly above chance (i.e., 6 correct identifications) based on pilot data, the
observed identification performance corresponds to almost twice the chance level (i.e.,
nine correct identifications). In the conservative approach used above, all correctly
identified CSs—whether due to guessing or due to conscious identification—were
classified as potentially consciously visible. A more liberal criterion would allow for a
single correct identification per CS that might have arisen by chance. We used this
relaxed visibility criterion in the exploratory analyses of the evaluative rating data
reported below; in other words, we distinguished between CSs which were identified at
or below chance (i.e., in zero or one cases) and those CSs that were correctly identified
at above-chance levels (i.e., in two or more cases).
In the 4AFC choice task, the visibility of each of the four 17 ms CS, which
comprised the set of four choice options, may have affected choices. Accordingly, the
relaxed visibility criterion was applied to the set of four CSs. However, applying the
same chance-level criterion as for the rating data (i.e., a maximum of 4 out of 40 correct
identifications) yielded zero cases of chance-level performance. For all participants,
identification of the set of four 17 ms CSs was above chance. To nevertheless test
whether CS visibility affects EC in the choice task, we therefore relaxed the criterion
further by allowing a maximum of 8 out of 40 correct identifications (this yielded 66
participants with 8 or fewer correct identifications for the set of four 17 ms water
CSs, and 86 participants for the 17 ms airline CSs). In the analyses of participants’
choices, we therefore distinguished between 17 ms CSs with low (but still above-
chance) identification performance (i.e., 20% correct identifications) and those with
high (>20%) identification performance. In sum, the exploratory analyses reported
below repeated the planned analyses with a larger number of participants as well as a
relaxed visibility criterion.
Exploratory analysis.
Evaluative ratings. The set of analyses reported above was repeated but
with a relaxed visibility criterion (i.e., allowing for a single correct identification per
CS that would be expected by chance) and a greater sample size of N = 120 as
participants were not excluded who reported to know any of the brands (see Figures 8 -
10). The only new finding was that the preference for water CSs paired with disgusted
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faces over those paired with disgust-eliciting pictures was now clearly confirmed, F(1,
350) = 13.37, p < .001 (see Figure 10). Given that the CSs paired with face USs
were evaluated similarly to those paired with neutral USs, the face CSs effectively
represented a neutral baseline. The above finding can therefore be interpreted as an
EC effect that is known to be robustly obtained when IAPS pictures are used as USs
(e.g., Pleyers et al., 2007; Stahl et al., 2009), but was restricted here to the water CSs.
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Figure 8 . Evaluations are depicted showing the averages (horizontal black lines) with
the 95% highest density intervals (in color) displayed around them for Hypothesis
I, comparing CSs paired with neutral USs to all other CSs (i.e., those paired with a
negative US). The CSs presented for 17 ms are separated by identification performance
(at chance: zero or one out of ten correct identifications; above chance: two or more
correct identifications). The figure includes data from participants who indicated
familiarity with one or more of the brands. Dots represent individual EC effects and
additionally the smoothed distribution for each condition is shown.
To further explore the joint influence of all factors of the design, a regression
analysis was computed for evaluative rating as the dependent variable, with participant
as random factor, and CS type (Water or Airline), US type (disgust-eliciting picture,
disgusted face, fearful face or neutral), CS presentation time (17 vs. 1000 ms), and
knowledge of brand (yes or no) as independent variables, and including all interactions
of these independent variables. A significant effect of CS type was found, F(1, 1770)
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Figure 9 . Evaluations are depicted showing the averages (horizontal black lines) with
the 95% highest density intervals (in color) displayed around them for Hypothesis II,
comparing CSs paired with a fearful USs to CSs paired with a disgust US (disgusted face
or disgist-eliciting image). The CSs presented for 17 ms are separated by identification
performance (at chance: zero or one out of ten correct identifications; above chance:
two or more correct identifications). The figure includes data from participants who
indicated familiarity with one or more of the brands. Dots represent individual EC
effects and additionally the smoothed distribution for each condition is shown.
= 7.23, p = .007: Airline CSs were rated less likable than water logos. In addition,
a significant main effect of US type was found, F(3, 1770) = 7.44, p < .001. This
effect reflected the less favorable rating of the CSs paired with disgust-eliciting US
pictures (see Appendix E). No other effects were obtained. Interestingly, there was
no two-way interaction of both factors, F(3, 1770) = 1.26, p = .286; however, when
analyzed separately for airlines and water CSs, the effect of US type was restricted to
the water CSs, F(3, 826) = 6.79, p < .001, but disappeared for the airline CSs, F(3,
826) = 1.93, p = .124.
In addition, there was also no interaction of US type with presentation time,
F < 1, suggesting that the EC effect extended to the 17 ms condition. To further
explore the possibility of a subliminal EC effect in the evaluative ratings of water CSs,
separate analyses were performed for CSs presented for 17 ms that were correctly
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Figure 10 . Evaluations are depicted showing the averages (horizontal black lines) with
the 95% highest density intervals (in color) displayed around them for Hypothesis III,
comparing CSs paired with a disgusted face US to CSs paired with a disgust-eliciting
picture US. The CSs presented for 17 ms are separated by identification performance
(at chance: zero or one out of ten correct identifications; above chance: two or more
correct identifications). The figure includes data from participants who indicated
familiarity with one or more of the brands. Dots represent individual EC effects and
additionally the smoothed distribution for each condition is shown.
identified at chance levels (i.e., no more than once), for those 17 ms CSs that were
correctly identified at above-chance levels (i.e., in two or more cases), as well as for the
CSs presented for 1000 ms. A significant main effect of US type was found for 1000
ms CSs, F(3, 354) = 4.57, p = .004, as well as for those 17 ms CSs with above-chance
identification, F(3, 158) = 3.21, p = .025. Paired comparisons revealed that, in both
cases, this effect reflected a less favorable evaluation of CSs paired with disgust-eliciting
IAPS pictures, compared to all other CSs (see Appendix E). Importantly, however,
there was no EC effect for those 17 ms CSs with at-chance identification, F(3, 103) =
1.51, p = .216.
A similar analysis for airline CSs yielded a main effect of US type for the 1000
ms CSs only, F(3, 354) = 2.86, p = .037. Paired comparisons revealed that this overall
main effect reflects a preference for the neutral CS over all other CSs (see Appendix E).
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Figure 11 . Proportion of participants who preferred a CS paired with a specific
US based on the three hypothesis (neutral US vs. all other USs, fearful face US
vs. digust USs, and disgusted face US vs. disgust-eliciting image). The horizontal
line (at .25/.33/.5) indicates chance level. Asterisks indicate a significant deviation
from chance (α = 5%). The CSs presented for 17 ms were all identified at above-
chance levels; they are split by identification performance (low: 20% or fewer correct
identifications; high: more than 20% correct identifications). The figure includes data
from participants who indicated familiarity with one or more of the brands.
For exploratory purposes, the set of originally planned analyses was conducted
after re-including those participants who reported being familiar with one or more of
the brands and after relaxing the visibility criterion. Logistic regression analyses were
conducted with thirst as predictor, separately by CS type and visibility (17 ms low, 17
ms high, 1000 ms). These analyses again yielded no significant effects of thirst, neither
for water CSs (smallest p = .379), nor for airline CSs (smallest p = .059). Choice
proportions largely reflect the pattern of participants’ evaluations, as illustrated in
Figure 11. Figure 11a shows that, when CSs were presented for 1000 ms, participants
preferred the neutral CS over any of the negative CSs, both for water brands, χ2(1, N
= 120) = 11.38, p < .001, and for airline brands, χ2(1, N = 120) = 11.38, p < .001.
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Figure 11c shows that, when CSs were presented for 1000 ms, participants preferred
the CS associated with the disgusted face over that paired with the disgust-eliciting
picture, χ2(1, N = 120) = 6.53, p = .011. The remaining choice proportions did not
deviate significantly from chance.
Discussion
The present study aimed at replicating and extending the finding that, for thirsty
participants, subliminally presented water brands could be evaluatively conditioned
by pairing them with relevant disgust stimuli. However, the confirmatory analyses
revealed neither an overall EC effect (hypothesis I), nor a preference for fear CSs over
disgust CSs (hypothesis II), nor any modulation by thirst. This was true regardless of
CS presentation time and identification performance. We will discuss possible causes
below. The only significant finding that emerged in the confirmatory analyses was a
preference for CSs paired with disgusted faces over those paired with disgust-eliciting
pictures, which was contrary to the prediction of the gaze-cueing account (hypothesis
III) and was obtained for both 1000 ms CSs as well as the subset of 17 ms CSs which
were correctly identified at above-chance levels.
Exploratory analyses based on a larger sample yielded two additional findings.
First, the choice data revealed an overall EC effect: For both water and airline brands,
participants preferred the neutrally paired CS over any of the negative CSs when the
CS was clearly visible (i.e., presented for 1000 ms); this preference was also reflected
in evaluative ratings of airline CSs (but was only descriptively present in evaluative
ratings of water CSs). If we take this pattern to suggest that the choice task was
more sensitive (see also Verwijmeren et al., 2012), the exploratory findings can be
tentatively interpreted as evidence for an overall EC effect in line with hypothesis I.
Second, an EC effect for water CSs emerged when the disgust-eliciting IAPS
pictures were used as USs. This effect did not interact with CS visibility; however,
simple effects showed EC effects only for those CSs that were either clearly visible to
participants (i.e., presented for 1000 ms), or were presented briefly (i.e., 17 ms) but
identified above chance in the visibility check. This effect on evaluations parallels the
finding obtained in the confirmatory analyses of the choice data (i.e., CSs paired with
disgusted faces were preferred over CSs paired with disgust-eliciting pictures, but this
preference was obtained only for clearly visible 1000 ms CSs as well as for 17 ms CSs
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which were correctly identified at above-chance levels).
Taken together, these results are consistent with the original finding in two
important ways. First, EC effects by disgust USs were obtained only for water brand
CSs but not for airline CSs, supporting the point made by Verwijmeren et al. (2012)
that EC occurs more reliably when CS and US are related in a meaningful way.
Second, as in the original study, the result has been obtained for CSs presented
for 1000 ms as well as for (a subset of) CSs presented for only 17 ms. Setting aside
the issue of awareness for a moment, these results replicate the finding that, even with
a relatively small number of very brief and suboptimal presentations, novel brands
can reliably acquire valence by way of an evaluative conditioning procedure.
With regard to these two central aspects, the present finding can be seen as a
partial replication of the finding by Verwijmeren et al. (2012). Two other aspects of the
findings diverged from the original pattern. First, in contrast to the two experiments
reported in the original study, the EC effect was not modulated by participants’
reported thirst. In theoretical terms, we do not replicate the effect of goal relevance
on evaluative conditioning. Given that the measure of thirst was practically identical
in both studies, and that there was sufficient variability of thirst ratings, we could
only speculate about the causes of this discrepancy. Future research is clearly needed
to clarify this issue. Second, the EC effect was obtained only when disgust-eliciting
IAPS pictures were used as USs; it failed to obtain for the same disgusted faces that
were used in the original study. We will discuss possible causes in the next section.
Limitations. One major difference to the study by Verwijmeren et al. (2012)
was that we used IAPS pictures as additional USs. The inclusion of the IAPS pictures
modified the stimulus context and may thereby have affected participants’ attentional
focus: In the original study, the difference between facial expressions was the only
source of variability, and participants were therefore more likely to attend to facial
expression. In the present study, however, the US stimuli varied on different dimensions,
such that a broader distinction could be more easily made between faces and IAPS
pictures, and comparably subtle differences between fearful faces and disgusted faces
might have gone unattended. Alternatively, the addition of IAPS pictures may have
induced a different processing mode: Whereas participants in the original study may
have processed the faces in a more global impression-formation manner, the presence
of the IAPS pictures (and/or the presence of the CS identification task), may have
induced a more analytic processing style. This notion of a context-dependent EC
104
effect is consistent with findings showing that the effect of a specific US is modulated
by participants’ attention (Gast & Rothermund, 2011) as well as processing goals
(Corneille, Yzerbyt, Pleyers, & Mussweiler, 2009). Additional research is necessary to
determine whether these effects of US context can be replicated, and whether they
can be interpreted as effects of attention and/or processing goals.
A second major difference was that all manipulations were done within partici-
pants, resulting in eight different CSs per CS category, compared to only two CSs in
the original study. This greater number of CSs and conditions reflects an increased
complexity of the learning situation and perhaps an increased processing load. This
increased load might have interfered with an EC effect by reducing the strength of
associative learning (e.g., Pleyers, Corneille, & Luminet, 2009). It is not easy to see,
however, why the effect of complexity or load would interfere with the effects of facial
expressions but spare the EC effect elicited by disgust-eliciting pictures.
The visibility check might also have interfered with associative learning because,
in between unconscious processing occasion of the CSs, people consciously perceived
and processed the same CSs during the identification task. This might have caused
associations to form among the neutral CSs, and these, in turn, may have weakened
the associations between CS and US. Another possibility is that, with the CS being
presented before the US, participants might have attempted to ignore the US in order
not to forget the CS for the upcoming identification task. Perhaps this top-down
influence was overcome in a bottom-up manner by the disgust-eliciting IAPS pictures,
but not the disgusted or fearful faces, restricting the EC effect to the disgust-eliciting
picture condition. This explanation is, however, inconsistent with findings from brain
activation studies comparing responses to emotion-eliciting stimuli with responses to
emotional facial expressions, suggesting that neurophysiological reaction to faces are
similar to—or even stronger than—those elicited by IAPS pictures (Britton, Taylor,
Sudheimer, & Liberzon, 2006; Hariri, Tessitore, Mattay, Fera, & Weinberger, 2002).
CS identification and subliminality. A final feature of the present study
was the concurrent visibility test during the learning phase, which assessed participants’
ability to identify the briefly presented CS. On average, a CS presented for 17 ms was
correctly selected, from among eight options, in one fifth of cases. This is clearly above
the level expected by chance, indicating that participants were able to perceive the
briefly presented CSs at least partially in at least some cases, and demonstrating that
CS presentation in the 17 ms condition was not strictly and objectively subliminal. It
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is important to note here that participants may nevertheless have been subjectively
unaware of the stimuli at the time of presentation. Future research is needed to
distinguish between different types of awareness and their role in EC.
For a strong claim that EC operates unconsciously, we sought to establish an EC
effect for CSs that were either identified not even once (strict criterion), or identified
only at chance levels (in the relaxed criterion). However, the EC effect was found
only for those CSs that were identified at above-chance levels, not for those never
identified, nor for the CSs identified at chance. This finding is consistent with a series
of findings from our lab in which we manipulated CS visibility across materials and
learning conditions by varying CS duration and masking, and found EC effects for
correctly identified CSs but not for those that could not be identified by participants
during the learning phase (Stahl et al., 2016). In a broader sense, the present finding
is also consistent with previous findings of EC effects for IAPS pictures that emerged
only in the presence of awareness of the CS-US pairing (e.g., Pleyers et al., 2007; Stahl
et al., 2009).
In the original study (Verwijmeren et al., 2012, Experiment 2), a joint assessment
of visibility and memory for the paired US was made at the very end of the experiment,
so it is not clear whether participants’ failure to report their conscious perception
of CSs presented for 17 ms in this measure is due to true subliminal perception, or
instead due to forgetting over the course of the experiment, due to the joint assessment
method, or an interaction of both. To the degree that presentation conditions were
similar to those in the original study, the present findings can be used as a proxy for
the visibility of stimuli in that study: Presentation conditions were similar in that
presentation duration was identical, and the same US faces as well as similar CSs
were used. However, the CSs were somewhat less likely to be consciously visible in
the present study because (1) in contrast to the original study, the present CSs did
not feature the name of the brand in black-on-white plain text below the image of
the brand, and (2) the high-contrast pre-mask used in the present study disturbed
perception more than the blurred water-bottle mask used in the original study. If
we use the present above-chance identification performance for the CSs presented for
17 ms as a conservative estimate, it appears that participants in the original study
may have been able to identify the CSs at least partially and at least in some cases.
If we accept this possibility, the potential discrepancy disappears and both findings
can be consistently interpreted as EC effects for briefly presented but not necessarily
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subliminal CSs.
Outlook. As mentioned above, the increased complexity due to the within-
subjects design and the addition of the disgust-eliciting pictures could be an explanation
why the original pattern of EC effects could not be fully replicated. One possible
way to test this would be to leave out the disgust-eliciting pictures for one set of
participants while using them for another set. If our above suggestions hold, we would
not find an EC effect of faces in the conditions where disgust-eliciting pictures are used,
but the effect would re-emerge in the absence of IAPS pictures. As the inclusion of the
IAPS pictures has apparently interfered somehow with the face USs’ ability to elicit
an EC effect, the present findings do not speak to the question of whether the original
EC effect was based on gaze cueing or not. To test this hypothesis more directly,
future research could manipulate gaze direction (i.e., as in the study by Bayliss et al.,
2007).
In short, this paper has partially replicated the Verwijmeren et al. (2012) study
in that it provides additional evidence for a relevance effect in EC, even when the CS is
presented very briefly. In the present study, relevance increased the chance of finding
an EC effect in the absence of motivational influences. Future research should address
the scope and limitations of this effect in terms of stimuli and experimental contexts;
in addition, it is of course necessary to further investigate the role of motivation and
goals, and to identify the conditions under which motivational influences interact with
CS-US relevance.
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Chapter 5: Simultaneous CS-US presentations as a necessary condition
for automatic EC?
The replication and extension of the study by Verwijmeren and colleagues (2012)
yielded a series of interesting results. First, we found an EC effect, as a preference
for water bottles (and airline brands) paired with neutral USs over CSs paired with
negative USs was observed. Additionally, an EC effect was observed even with
stimuli presented for 17 ms. While the visibility test clearly showed that an EC
effect for CSs presented for 17 ms only emerged when the stimuli were identified
correctly above chance level, an effect with stimuli presented for 17 ms could still
be considered interesting. As Stahl and colleagues (2016) demonstrated that above
chance identification is not sufficient for an EC effect, the results obtained in the
previous study indicate that EC effects with very briefly presented (and above-chance
identified) stimuli might be possible. While this finding might not be interesting for
the theoretical question of contingency awareness in EC (as contingency awareness
might have existed) it might have interesting implications for marketing research (i.e.,
brief exposure to stimuli might be sufficient for behavioral changes).
The main goal of this experiment was to investigate potential beneficial factors
in automatic EC (e.g., relevance, choice measures) while making sure that CSs were
indeed presented subliminally. However, we did not find any evidence for EC effects
with truly subliminally presented CSs in any condition. Additionally, the (goal)
relevance of thirst appeared to play no role. Thirst did not predict EC effects in
any of our analyses and we found no evidence that the motivational state to attend
relevant CS-US pairs might be of importance in (automatic) EC effects. There were
some indications for a larger effect of the IAPS images compared to the disgusted
face for water bottles than for airline brands, as this effect emerged only for water
brands in the analyses with lower statistical power. However, the effect reported by
Verwijmeren et al. (2012) that an effect was only found for water brands and not for
airline brands could not be observed in our study. While we would not exclude the
possibility that CS-US relevance might be beneficial for (automatic) EC effects, it did
not appear to have had a large influence in the present study.
Another step that was taken to find (possibly small) changes in preference after
a subliminal EC paradigm was to introduce a measure of choice as the dependent
variable. In the confirmatory analysis—with few participants—we only observed
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a choice effect (admittedly for CSs that were likely consciously observed) but no
effect with an evaluative rating. This could be interpreted as an indication that
choice measures might be more sensitive to affective reactions on CSs after an EC
paradigm than evaluative measures. However, unlike claimed by Verwijmeren et
al. (2012) we did not observe any choice effects when the CSs were presented truly
subliminally. Another important point is that we used a forced choice paradigm with
four choice options (then three options, then two options) instead of a 2AFC as used
by Verwijmeren et al. (2012) and suggested by Jones et al. (2010). A 4AFC might
not have the characteristics assumed and does not capture spontaneous associations,
but participants might be consciously debating which CS to choose first, second, third,
last. We will therefore implement a 2AFC in the experiment presented in the next
chapter.
A last important finding of the previously discussed experiment is that CS
identifications were above chance in the 17 ms condition. Of course it is mere
speculation, but the findings by Verwijmeren et al. (2012) might be based on visible—
but briefly presented—stimuli. As discussed, we acknowledge the possible influence of
the visibility check on the processing of the CS-US pairs in the previous study and
address this problem in an experiment presented in the next chapter. One additional
problem that will be addressed is that statistical power is automatically reduced when
only analyzing stimuli that were identified at or below chance in the 17 ms condition.
Therefore finding an EC effect in a clearly visible presentation condition (e.g., for a
CS presented for 1000 ms) but not in a subset of stimuli or participants in the 17
ms condition might be criticized as not being a fair test of an automatic EC effect.
We will therefore pay attention that stimuli are identified at or below chance in the
next studies, in order to have more statistical power to find an EC effect in the brief
presentation time (i.e., “subliminal”) conditions.
Both studies discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 2 made use of a sequential
presentation paradigm of the CS-US pair. The US was followed by the CS in the
experiments in Chapter 2, while the CS was followed by the US in the experiment
presented in Chapter 4. As discussed in Chapter 1, studies indicated that automatic EC
effects might only be found when CS and US have been presented simultaneously. This
characteristic could explain why we did not observe any EC effects in the previous three
experiments. Thus, we will attempt to realize simultaneous presentation conditions in
the experiments discussed in the next chapters.
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Chapter 6: Subliminal influence on preferences? A test of evaluative
conditioning for brief visual conditioned stimuli using auditory
unconditioned stimuli
Additional materials are stored in an online repository: osf.io/cx5eh
The acquisition of preferences plays an important role in our daily life: Companies
want us to prefer their products over their competitors’, politicians want us to prefer
them over their opponents, and governmental bodies want us to adopt a healthy
lifestyle. Given the multitude of motivations to sway our preferences it is important
to establish whether a person’s attitudes can be shaped without her becoming aware
of the procedure. Evaluative conditioning (EC ) is one way in which preferences can
be acquired: When an initially neutral stimulus (the conditioned stimulus or CS)
is paired with a positive or negative stimulus (the unconditioned stimulus or US),
it is subsequently evaluated in accordance with the valence of the US. We argue
that understanding processes underlying evaluative conditioning could have a major
impact on the understanding of preference acquisition in general. There are currently
two dominant families of theories trying to explain the mechanisms that underlie
the EC phenomenon (see Sweldens et al., 2014 for a review). Single-process theories
propose that the acquisition of preferences can only happen in a conscious, deliberate,
propositional manner (e.g., Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; Mitchell et al., 2009). Dual-
process models, in contrast, propose that preferences can also be acquired in an
automatic, non-conscious manner (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). Whereas
dual-process models posit an “indirect influence on propositional reasoning mediated
by direct influence on associative evaluation” (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, p.
703) for which contingency awareness is not necessary, propositional single-process
models posit that contingency awareness is a necessity for changes in preference to
occur (Mitchell et al., 2009). Whether a change in preferences can be achieved when
people are unaware of the contingency between the CS and US is, therefore, a central
question for theories of EC.
In support of associative processes, Olson and Fazio (2001) report EC effects
for participants who were unaware of the CS-US contingency. Others however, have
argued that awareness is a necessary condition for EC effects to occur: Pleyers and
colleagues have demonstrated that unaware EC effects are found only for those CS-US
pairs for which participants could recall the specific US that had been paired with the
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given CS (Pleyers et al., 2007). Similarly, Stahl et al. (2009) found that EC effects
are absent when participants cannot recall the valence of the US that was paired with
a given CS. An alternative explanation for these findings is that participants relied on
their automatic affective response to the CS to answer questions about the paired US
valence rather than reporting their actual memory (Gawronski & Walther, 2012; Stahl
et al., 2009). Such an “affect-as-information” account can explain the correlation of
EC effects with participants’ report of US valence from a dual-process perspective in
which EC is in fact independent from awareness (Hütter et al., 2012). Consistent with
the latter view, when using a method that avoids this problem, Hütter and colleagues
found EC effects in the absence of contingency awareness (Hütter et al., 2012).
Because these previous studies investigating contingency awareness as a necessary
precondition for EC have relied on retrospective reports by participants, they have been
the target of two methodological criticisms: First, such reports are merely correlational
and thus causal inferences cannot be drawn; second, they are susceptible to forgetting.
When awareness of the CS-US pair is assessed only after the learning phase (Lovibond
& Shanks, 2002; Sweldens et al., 2014), it is possible that a stimulus pair has been
perceived during the learning phase but the episode cannot be retrieved during the
contingency-awareness assessment at the end of the study. Awareness is therefore
systematically underestimated if assessed by retrospective reports (Lovibond & Shanks,
2002). To the same effect, a recent meta-analysis also showed that awareness tests
of unconscious learning effects are often underpowered (Vadillo et al., 2015). The
authors of this meta analysis show that a joint analysis of awareness checks yields
clear evidence for above-chance levels of awareness, a finding that contradicts the null
findings reported in the investigated individual studies that were due to insufficient
statistical power.
Experimental manipulations of contingency awareness may provide stronger
evidence and further illuminate the discussion. One way to manipulate contingency
awareness is by way of presentation duration (see Dedonder et al., 2014 for a different
approach): Briefly presented and masked stimuli may sometimes be processed without
reaching consciousness (Dehaene et al., 2006; Van den Bussche, Van den Noortgate,
& Reynvoet, 2009). By showing either CS or US very briefly, the complete CS-US
pair cannot be perceived consciously, thereby interfering with contingency awareness.
Observing EC under such conditions would support the notion that EC effects can be
formed “independent[ly] of conscious awareness” in associative learning (Gawronski
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& Bodenhausen, 2014b, p. 193). A dual-process model would provide the most
plausible explanation for such a finding, given that propositional theories propose
that “associative learning is never automatic and always requires controlled processes”
(Mitchell et al., 2009, p. 187).
Previous experiments have demonstrated EC effects with subliminal stimuli
(De Houwer et al., 1994, 1997; Fulcher & Hammerl, 2001; Krosnick et al., 1992;
Niedenthal, 1990). In those studies, however, it was the US (not the CS) that was
presented subliminally. This is critical because it has been shown that the perception
of valenced information may be possible even with very short presentation times
[Nasrallah, Carmel, and Lavie (2009); Zeelenberg, Wagenmakers, and Rotteveel (2006);
cf. Lähteenmäki et al., 2015]. If, in the above studies, the valence of the US has been
processed consciously, then any EC effects in these studies can be explained by a
propositional single-process model and do not require dual processes. Only very few
studies have so far reported EC effects for briefly presented CSs (e.g., Dijksterhuis,
2004), and these studies’ methodologies have been criticized, for example, for employing
between-subject manipulations of the CSs or of US valence (see Stahl et al., 2016 for
a brief review; Sweldens et al., 2014). Hofmann and colleagues conclude in their meta
analysis on EC in humans that more research is needed before any conclusions can be
drawn about a subliminal EC effect (Hofmann et al., 2010).
A recent study in our lab addressed the possibility of subliminal EC in a series
of experiments that attempted to overcome the above-discussed methodological prob-
lems. In this study, CS-US contingency was manipulated by varying CS presentation
duration and/or masking, and awareness of brief and masked visual CSs was assessed
immediately after their paired presentation with visual US images. Across six experi-
ments no EC effects were found, despite the fact that CS identification was slightly
above chance (Stahl et al., 2016). The present study aims to test whether EC effects
can be found under slightly above-chance CS identification conditions, when three
potential shortcomings of the study by Stahl et al. (2016) are addressed.
The present study. The goal of the present set of experiments is to provide
an even more stringent and fair test of EC with briefly presented CSs than Stahl et
al. (2016). As in those studies, our goal was to improve upon the methodological
shortcomings of previous studies discussed by Sweldens et al. (2014). In line with
previous work, therefore, we manipulated positive and negative USs within participants
to rule out any effects of mood induction; and we manipulated presentation conditions
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of the CSs rather than the USs to avoid that— even if USs are not reliably identified—
conscious processing of US valence could be invoked as a single-process explanation
for an EC effect.
First, note that, in the study by Stahl et al. (2016), both the CS and the US
were visual stimuli, presented concurrently and next to each other on the computer
screen. This was done to increase the chances of EC effects by way of an implicit
misattribution process (Jones et al., 2009), which assumes that participants first
experience an affective response (elicited by the US) that is then misattributed to
the CS because it happens to be the stimulus that is attended at the time the
affective response occurs. Factors that supposedly increase the chances of implicit
misattribution with visual stimuli are (1) relative salience of the CS, (2) simultaneous
onset of CS and US stimuli, (3) shifts of attention (eye gaze) between CS and US,
and (4) moderately valent (“mildly evocative”) US stimuli (Jones et al., 2009). One
problem that arises with the above method is that, when limiting presentation duration
of the CS, participants’ attention must be directed towards the CS during its brief
presentation for it to have any chance of affecting cognition and behavior. This may
interfere with the effect of a simultaneous stimulus onset in the sense that it requires
that participants process the US and CS sequentially and in that order. If that is
the case, it was perhaps less likely in this procedure that participants experienced an
affective response elicited by the US while they attended the CS.
On a related note, recent studies have investigated the effect of sequential versus
simultaneous CS-US presentation on implicit EC effects. Results indicated that EC by
way of an automatic process requires simultaneous pairing of stimuli, whereas an EC
effect by propositional processes can also be found with sequential pairings (Hütter
et al., 2012; Sweldens et al., 2010). This finding might contribute to explaining the
absence of an EC effect in the experiments by Stahl et al. (2016).
To address these problems, we used a cross-modal EC procedure in which the
visually presented CS is paired with a simultaneously presented auditory US. This
allows not only for a simultaneous CS-US presentation but also for a simultaneous
processing of CS and US. Auditory USs paired with visual CSs have been used in
conditioning procedures with children (Neumann, Waters, Westbury, & Henry, 2008)
and product preference studies (Gorn, 1982; Schemer et al., 2008). The previously
mentioned meta analysis by Hofmann and colleagues (Hofmann et al., 2010) estimated
that the size of a cross-modal EC effect does not differ significantly from unimodal
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EC effects. Using this cross-modal approach of CS-US presentation allows for a brief
CS presentation and ensures that CS and US can be attended at the same time, an
issue which has received only little attention in previous studies on subliminal EC.
Second, we assessed whether EC for near threshold visible CSs can be obtained
not only in the presence but also in the absence of an online CS identification task. To
ensure that briefly presented stimuli are not clearly visible, in two initial studies we will
measure visibility during the learning phase, thereby using an online visibility criterion
as in the studies by Stahl et al. (2016). Following every CS-US pairing, participants
will be asked to identify the previously presented CS from a selection of all CSs. Using
this online visibility criterion, we can assess an average identification rate for each CS
for each participant. We use this estimate as a proxy for the perceptual awareness
of the CS (while recognizing that this measure may be influenced by unconscious
influences on familiarity as well as guessing). If we observe an EC effect for stimuli
that were not identified at above-chance levels during the learning phase, this would
constitute strong evidence that this EC effect was caused by associative processes and
not by conscious propositional processes. If we observe no EC effect, even for CSs
that were correctly identified at slightly above-chance levels, a single-process model of
evaluative learning would be preferred as the more parsimonious account.
The visibility-check task has the additional benefit of directing participants’
attention toward the CS, but it may also induce an analytic task set that may not
be conducive for automatic EC. In addition, participants are presented with a set of
several CSs as choice options in close temporal proximity with the US; this may dilute
automatic EC effects because (a) affective response may be attributed to different
CSs, and/or (b) the additional CSs presented on the visibility-check task may also be
associated with USs of different valence over the course of the learning phase. In sum,
it may be argued that the visibility-check task may interfere with the formation of
subtle CS-US associations during learning. To address this possibility, in a final study
participants will work on a different task during the learning phase.
Third, in order to provide optimal conditions for obtaining even subtle EC effects,
we introduced an additional, potentially more sensitive dependent measure: In a two
alternative forced choice (2-AFC) task, we are pitting two CSs against one another
that were paired with USs of opposite valence. In at least one study on subliminal
influence a 2-AFC task showed a significant effect while an evaluative rating did not
show an effect (Verwijmeren et al., 2012). It seems plausible, therefore, that small
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and subtle EC effects might not be reflected in evaluative ratings because they were
not perceived as large enough to justify selection of a different point on, say, a 7-point
scale—but may nevertheless tip the scale when being forced to choose between two
CSs that were paired either with a positive or a negative US.
As in Stahl et al. (2016), we wanted to be certain that automatic processes
have a fair chance to operate and to produce EC effects. In the study at hand we
therefore realized near-threshold but slightly above-chance (instead of fully subliminal)
presentation conditions. We can therefore be certain that the brief visual CS stimuli
could in fact be processed, and that automatic processes were given a fair chance to
operate on them.
Taken together, across three experiments we investigated EC effects for clearly
visible as well as for near-threshold visual CSs that were paired with auditory USs.
In the unregistered Experiments 1 and 2, we used an online visibility-check task as
an index of contingency awareness; the pre-registered Experiment 3 tested whether
near-threshold cross-modal EC can be found in the absence of an online visibility
check. In Experiments 1 and 3, a 2-AFC choice measure was administered to test
whether EC with briefly presented CSs can be found on this potentially more sensitive
measure.
Experiment 1
The first experiment tested if we can observe a cross-modal EC effect with CSs
presented for 1000 ms as well as with CSs presented 17 ms, while strictly assessing CS
visibility during the learning phase.
Method.
Design.
In Experiment 1 we manipulated the presentation time of the CS (17 ms vs. 1000
ms) as well as US valence (positive vs. negative) within participants. We manipulated
the order of dependent measures (2-AFC or rating first) between participants.
Sample.
An a-priori power analysis for a paired one-sided t-test with α = β = .05 and
d = 0.3, which is approximately the effect size found by Olson and Fazio (2001),
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yielded a required sample size of N = 122. We recruited 123 participants for this
study; three participants aborted the study, leaving 120 participants for the final
analysis (Age M = 22.98, SD = 5.40). Participants were mostly University of Cologne
students who received partial course credit for their participation.
Material.
Eight grey-scale drawings of cars were used as CSs. The contrast of the images
were equated to ensure comparable visibility of all cars under brief presentation
conditions. Large differences between images could result in high identification rates
in the online measure of awareness, overestimating the visibility of the image. Based
on a small pilot study (N = 28) the most neutral images with low standard deviations
were selected as CSs for this experiment. Two additional images were selected for
filler trials. 10 positive, 10 neutral, and 10 negative sound files were selected from the
IADS data base (see Appendix F; Bradley & Lang, 1999). All experimental scripts,
data files, and analysis scripts are available at https://osf.io/cx5eh/.
Procedure.
Participants were seated in front of a 60-Hz CRT monitor and instructed to
attend to and memorize image-sound pairs. Furthermore, participants were told that
they would be asked to identify the presented image from a set of 8 images after every
trial.
Each CS was randomly assigned to the positive or negative valence condition
for each participant anew. CS-US pairs were shown 10 times, resulting in 80 critical
trials. Each trial started with a 2100 ms blank screen, followed by a 700 ms forward
mask. Afterwards, the CS was shown for either 17 ms or 1000 ms. The sound of the
US had the same onset as the CS image and an average length of 3462 ms (SD = 359
ms). Each CS was followed by the same pixel mask for 2000 ms and a subsequent
2000 ms blank screen. The order of trials was randomized.14
In addition to the 80 critical trials, there were 20 filler trials in which two
additional images of cars were presented for 85 ms and paired with 10 neutral sounds.
These trials served the sole purpose of motivating the participants to attend to the
briefly presented CSs (Pratte & Rouder, 2009). The same two images of cars were
used for these trials, and no rating data was collected for these images.
14The experiment was programmed using PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007).
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Following every critical trial, participants performed the identification task by
selecting one CS from an array of all 8 CSs by pressing a corresponding number on the
keyboard. For filler trials, participants selected an image from an array of 6 random
critical CSs and the two filler images. Participants were instructed to guess if they
did not know which image had been presented.
After the learning task, participants indicated how much they liked each CS
(presented in random order) on a slider ranging from -100 (not at all) to 100 (very
much; saved as 0 to 200). In the 2-AFC task, a positively-paired and a negatively-
paired CS from the same presentation time condition were pitted against each other
at random. Each CS was shown only once in the 2-AFC, yielding four choices in
total (i.e., two for CSs presented for 17 ms and two for CSs presented for 1000 ms).
Participants were instructed to choose the car they would actually want to buy. The
order of dependent variables was counterbalanced across participants. In the end
participants provided demographic data (age, gender, and occupation), speculated
about the goal of study, and could provide additional comments.
Data analysis.
We report p values and Bayes Factors as inference criteria for all analyses. Bayes
Factors are readily interpretable as changes in model odds. Thus, Bayes factors can
be interpreted as a measure of evidence for an alternative hypothesis relative to the
null hypothesis given the observed data (e.g, Wagenmakers, Lodewyckx, Kuriyal, &
Grasman, 2010). We use BF10 to denote the evidence for the alternative hypothesis
relative to the null hypothesis (i.e., BF10 > 1 indicates support for the alternative
hypothesis) and BF01 to denote the evidence for the null hypothesis relative to the
alternative hypothesis (i.e., BF01 > 1 indicates support for the null hypothesis). We
report Bayes factors rather than posterior model odds because they can be used to
determine the rational posterior belief in a hypothesis based on any subjective prior
belief in the hypotheses. The α-level for all frequentist analyses was .05.
We performed repeated measures ANOVA to analyse evaluative ratings and
paired t tests to examine interaction effects. To compute ANOVA Bayes factors we
used default multivariate Cauchy priors as described by Rouder et al. (2012) with
a scaling parameter of r = 0.5; for all t tests we used Cauchy priors with a scaling
parameter of r =
√
2/2 (Rouder et al., 2009). All Bayes factors are estimated with
errors less than 1%.
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To analyse 2-AFC responses we used logistic mixed effects regression models.
For the frequentist analyses we specified maximal random participant effects with
intercepts and slopes for presentation time (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tily, 2013). We
tested each effect by comparing the full model with a model without the effect of
interest by means of likelihood ratio tests. For specific contrasts we compared least
square means (i.e., predicted marginal means) from the full model. To compute Bayes
factors we used independent Cauchy priors with scaling parameters r = 0.91 for all
experimental factors and r = 1.28 for the intercept (see Appendix G1; Gelman, Jakulin,
Pittau, & Su, 2008). We chose these scaling parameters by transforming the scaling
parameters used in the Bayesian ANOVA and t tests to logits (Eq. 7.3, Borenstein,
2009). In this analysis the intercept corresponds to the main effect of US valence, i.e.,
the inclination to select the positively paired CS rather than the negatively paired
CS. We chose a wider prior for the intercept in correspondence with our priors in t
tests on liking responses. Finally, we used the default uninformative priors specified
by the brms-package (Bürkner, 2016) for all other (nuisance) parameters. In contrast
to the frequentist analysis, we added a crossed maximal random effect for CS pairs
with intercepts and slopes for all within-item effects (this additional random effect was
omitted in the frequentist analysis to overcome convergence problems). We estimated
Bayes factors as Savage-Dickey density ratios of prior distributions and maximum
likelihood Gaussian density estimates of the posterior distributions (Morey, Rouder,
Pratte, & Speckman, 2011).
We performed all analyses in R (Version 3.4.4; R Core Team, 2016)15 and Stan
(Carpenter et al., in press).
Results. Prior to our main analysis, we inspected correct responses in the
online visibility check for CSs that had been presented for 85 ms or 1000 ms. We
expected both stimulus durations to be long enough to allow supraliminal processing
and substantially above chance identification performance. We, thus, examined
performance in these conditions to identify inattentive or unmotivated participants.
With eight CS options to choose from, random guessing would yield 12.5% correct
responses. Using the Tukey boxplot outlier criterion, we excluded 9 participants from
further analyses whose identification performance was below 12.50% at 85 ms or below
15We, furthermore, used the R-packages afex (Version 0.20.2; Singmann et al., 2016), BayesFactor
(Version 0.9.12.4.2; Morey & Rouder, 2015), papaja (Version 0.1.0.9735; Aust & Barth, 2016), RCurl
(Version 1.95.4.10; D. T. Lang & CRAN team, 2016), rvest (Version 0.3.2; Wickham, 2016), tidyr
(Version 0.8.0; Wickham & Henry, 2017), and yarrr (Version 0.1.5; Phillips, 2017).
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57.50% at 1000 ms.
Visibility.
The remaining 111 participants on average correctly identified 87.66% (SD =
32.90) of CSs presented for 1000 ms and 64.50% (SD = 47.86) of CSs presented for 85
ms. Correct identification for CSs presented for 17 ms was on average 21.37% (SD =
41.00), which was significantly above chance, t(110) = 7.73, p < .001, BF 10 > 1000,
d = 1.75, 95% HDI [1.45, 2.05].
Evaluation.
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Figure 12 . Evaluations of CSs in Experiment 1, split by the order of dependent
variables, CS presentation time, and valence of the US paired with the CS. Error
bars represent 95% within-subjects confidence intervals, dots represent participants’
individual data points.
As can be seen in Figure 12, CSs paired with positive USs were preferred to
CSs paired with negative USs (BF 10 = 28.59, F [1, 109] = 13.54, MSE = 1, 003.34,
p < .001, ηˆ2G = .021), and CSs presented for 1000 ms were preferred to CSs presented
for 17 ms, BF 10 = 11.88, F (1, 109) = 8.33, MSE = 1, 372.89, p = .005, ηˆ2G = .018.
Descriptively, there was some indication of an interaction of US valence, presentation
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duration, and the order of dependent variables, but the evidence was ambiguous,
BF 01 = 1.19, F (1, 109) = 3.13, MSE = 1, 189.78, p = .080, ηˆ2G = .006.
We explored the data using two separate follow-up ANOVA to analyze each
order-of-dependent-variables condition separately. When participants chose between
CSs before rating them (i.e., choice-first), we found no significant effects of our
experimental manipulations on evaluative ratings (2.43 < BF 01 < 4.61 and p ≥ .12).
When participants rated CSs before choosing between them (i.e., rating-first), CSs
paired with positive USs were preferred to CSs paired with negative USs (BF 10 = 25.33,
F [1, 55] = 12.86, MSE = 1, 055.84, p = .001, ηˆ2G = .043), and CSs presented for 1000
ms were preferred to CSs presented for 17 ms, BF 10 = 34.71, F (1, 55) = 9.15,
MSE = 1, 573.02, p = .004, ηˆ2G = .045. Most importantly, the effect of US valence
depended on CS presentation duration, albeit the evidence was weak, BF 10 = 1.41,
F (1, 55) = 4.10, MSE = 1, 299.90, p = .048, ηˆ2G = .017. Follow-up tests did not
indicate an effect of US valence when CSs were presented for 17 ms (t[55] = −0.94,
p = .350, BF 01 = 2.75, d = 0.12, 95% HDI [-0.14, 0.38]), but showed clear indication of
an effect when CSs were presented for 1000 ms, t(55) = −3.73, p < .001, BF 10 = 112.39,
d = 0.48, 95% HDI [0.20, 0.75].
Choice.
CSs that were paired with positive USs were chosen more frequently than CSs
paired with negative USs in the 2-AFC task, χ2(1) = 14.41, p < .001, BF 10 = 24.44,
d = 0.25, 95% HDI [0.10, 0.41]. We found weak evidence that the inclination to choose
positively paired CSs was independent of the order of dependent variables, (i.e., there
was positive evidence for the absence of an effect of order; see Figure 13), BF 01 = 4.34,
χ2(1) = 0.00, p = .979. The data did not provide evidence for or against an effect of
presentation time on choice behavior, (BF 01 = 2.05, χ2[1] = 1.60, p = .206); a possible
effect of presentation time appeared to be independent of the order of dependent
variables, albeit the evidence was weak, BF 01 = 3.28, χ2(1) = 1.34, p = .247.
We further explored the effects of CS-US pairings on choice behavior in the
condition where the 2-AFC task was administered first. Here, Bayesian and frequentist
analyses yielded conflicting results. The Bayesian analysis testing whether positively
paired CSs were chosen more frequently than negatively paired CSs was inconclusive,
both for CSs presented for 17 ms (BF 01 = 1.88, d = 0.23, 95% HDI [-0.06, 0.53]) and
1000 ms (BF 01 = 1.67, d = 0.25, 95% HDI [-0.05, 0.56]). The frequentist analysis,
however, indicated significant effects in both conditions, z = 1.85, p = .032 and
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Figure 13 . Rate of two-alternative forced-choice responses between positively and
negatively conditioned CSs in Experiment 1. Higher values indicate a preference for
the positively conditioned CS. Points and error bars represent Bayesian estimates of
condition means and the corresponding 95% highest density intervals from the logistic
mixed effects regression model.
z = 2.07, p = .019 for 17 and 1000 ms, respectively. We found no difference between
the presentation time conditions, BF 01 = 5.53, z = −0.09, p = .927.
Discussion Experiment 1. Extending the findings by Stahl et al. (2016),
we did not find evidence for automatic processes in EC in the present cross-modal
procedure. For the visual CS presented for 1000 ms, our findings replicate previous
studies that have demonstrated cross-modal EC.
Our results indicate that the order of our dependent variables may have affected
participants’ evaluative ratings of the CSs (note though that the statistical evidence
was ambiguous): Only when participants evaluated CSs before choosing between them
did we find an EC effect for stimuli presented for 1000 ms. Yet, irrespective of the
order of dependent variables, we observed no EC effect for CSs presented for 17 ms,
despite the fact that they were clearly identified better than chance. The statistical
evidence of the Bayesian analyses for the absence of EC for briefly presented CSs was,
however, merely suggestive. Thus, we have addressed a potential limitation of previous
studies that showed the absence of an EC effect for briefly presented CSs (i.e., Stahl
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et al., 2016), and have replicated this finding. Yet, because of the relatively weak
evidence for this absence, our results need to be replicated before strong conclusions
can be drawn.
The analysis of 2-AFC responses revealed an overall EC effect: Positively paired
CSs were chosen more frequently than negatively paired CSs. This result indicates
that the implemented 2-AFC task in which participants choose between positively and
negatively paired CSs is suitable to assess EC. The preference for positively paired
CSs appeared to be independent of the presentation time of CSs during the learning
phase and the order in which the dependent variables were measured. However,
when exploring choice responses of participants who performed the choice task before
evaluating CSs, our data, again, did not provide conclusive evidence. Bayesian
and frequentist analyses yielded conflicting results and, thus, should be interpreted
cautiously. Nevertheless, the 2-AFC task appeared to be a valid measure of EC. A
replication in a larger sample could shed more light onto the possibility that choice
might be more sensitive than evaluative rating to detect potentially subtle EC effects
for briefly presented CSs.
Limitations of Experiment 1.
Our findings challenge the existence of an automatic associative conditioning
process underlying EC. One might, however, criticize the continuous assessment of
CS visibility during the learning task. Whereas the visibility check provides strict
control over awareness of CSs, it could be argued to interfere with the automatic
conditioning process. Specifically, the visibility check may induce highly focused and
deliberative stimulus processing and thus obscure the influence of unaware learning
experiences. The deliberative and analytic mindset may have been further promoted
by the instructions to memorize the CS-US pairs. In short, it is possible that our
visibility check and instructions obstructed the automatic EC process.
Three additional aspects of our experimental design may constitute suboptimal
conditions for obtaining an automatic EC effect for briefly presented CSs. First, our
CSs were highly similar in shape and contrast to ensure equivalent visibility under
brief viewing conditions. Similar stimuli may result in a confusability that could affect
automatic associative processing of the CSs. Thus, the high similarity between briefly
presented CSs may mitigate a potentially weak EC effect.
Second, the duration of USs used in Experiment 1 was relatively long (M =
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3462 ms, SD = 359 ms) compared to the briefly presented CS. This mismatch in
presentation duration may have resulted in a higher salience of the US compared to
the CS, which, as suggested by Jones et al. (2010), might have inhibited automatic
EC effects. Third, a simultaneous presentation onset of CS and US might not have
resulted in a simultaneous processing of both stimuli: Specifically, the valence of
the auditory US may have been extracted only after a delay that may have been
longer than the entire presentation duration of the CS, such that the processing of
the affective response may have been delayed to after the processing of the CS.
To sum up the findings of Experiment 1, while the paradigm is well-suited to
study EC, it might not yet provide optimal conditions for automatic processes in EC
by way of implicit misattribution. Thus, the results of Experiment 1 can be considered
inconclusive for several reasons. In Experiments 2 and 3, we aimed at replicating and
extend our findings to address methodological criticism.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we used different materials and modified several aspects of
the procedure. Experiment 2 aimed at replicating the pattern of EC effects across
CS presentation duration levels on evaluative ratings as the sole dependent measure.
Experiment 2 also implemented an on-line CS identification task; data from this task
was to serve as reference for a final Experiment 3 in which the on-line CS identification
task was omitted.
We used new CSs for which mean visibility under the presentation conditions
was unknown, so we again used an online visibility check to estimate CS identification
performance for these new CSs across critical presentation duration levels, and to
find presentation conditions under which the new CSs were identified at slightly
above-chance levels. Based on previous findings from our lab (Stahl et al., 2016), we
selected duration levels of 20 ms and 30 ms, in addition to a 1000 ms condition.
Furthermore, we compared the simultaneous CS-US onset, which we used in
Experiment 1, to a 400 ms delayed onset of the CS relative to the US. Using this onset
asynchrony, the briefly presented CS was presented in the middle of the auditory US
in order to create a stronger sense of simultaneous CS and US processing as compared
to a mere simultaneous CS-US presentation onset. More specifically, we estimate
that the affective response to be misattributed to the CS according to the implicit-
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misattribution account may take approximately 400 ms to develop: Research has
shown that the pupillometric response to a valent sound starts after 400 ms (Partala
& Surakka, 2003), indicating that the valence of the sound is actively processed after
this interval. By using a 400ms stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), we ensured that
the CSs presented during that time are especially likely to be the target of implicit
misattribution, and therefore, likely to show an automatic EC effect.
Method.
Design.
In Experiment 2 we manipulated the presentation time of the CS (20 ms vs. 30 ms
vs. 1000 ms) as well as the valence of the US (positive vs. negative) within participants.
Half of the CSs presented for 1000 ms had a simultaneous CS-US onset, the onset
was delayed by 400 ms for the other half, and all CSs presented for 20 ms or 30 ms
were delayed by 400 ms. We assumed that a delayed onset would be better suited to
induce a simultaneous experience of CS and US when the CS is presented briefly. To
test our intuition and ensure that a delayed onset yields an EC effect of at least the
same magnitude, we compared the delayed and simultaneous onset in the long CS
presentation condition. To focus our resources on the more critical evaluative ratings
measure, we did not administer the 2-AFC task in Experiment 2.
Material.
CS.
As CSs, we used Pokémon cartoons similar to those used in previous studies
(Stahl & Heycke, 2016). The images were changed to greyscale and contrasts were
slightly reduced. 24 stimuli were pretested in a small pilot study (N = 27). Eight
cartoons were selected based on mean evaluative ratings within 5% above or below
the mean of the scale and the lowest standard deviation. The selected set had a mean
evaluative rating of 98.69 and standard deviation of 36.33 on a 201 point slider scale
(see Experiment 1).
For each participant, two different CSs were shown for 20 ms, for 30 ms, for 1000
ms with a delayed CS-US onset, and for 1000 ms with a simultaneous CS-US onset.
Each CS was randomly assigned to one of the four conditions for each participant
anew.
US.
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We used a set of ten harmonious and ten disharmonious tones (Topolinski &
Deutsch, 2012, 2013), which were cut into 800 ms segments, as USs. Eight of these
tones have been successfully used in a previous cross-modal EC study (Gast et al.,
2016) and we selected twelve additional similar tones from the set. Finally, we created
ten neutral sounds that consisted of three metronome ticks in varying pitches.
Procedure.
Participants were seated in front of a 100 Hz CRT monitor. In contrast to
Experiment 1, participants were not instructed to memorize CS-US pairs. They were
instructed to pay attention to the sounds and images, and told that they would be
asked to identify the images after every trial.
Each trial started with a blank screen for 500 ms, followed by a fixation cross
shown for 500 ms. Then a black-and-white pixel mask was shown for 500 ms (which
was randomly rotated by 0, 90, 180 or 270 degrees), followed by the CS presentation
(duration was 20 ms, 30 ms, 1000 ms, or 80 ms for filler trials as in Experiment 1). As
mentioned above, US presentation started 400 ms before the onset of the CS in the 20
ms, 30 ms, and half of the 1000 ms trials. For the other half of the 1000 ms trials,
the onset of CS and US was simultaneous. The CS was immediately followed by a
post-mask shown for 100 ms (which was again randomly rotated by 0, 90, 180 or 270
degrees, but at a different angle than the forward mask). Afterwards a blank screen
was shown for 1000 ms.
Similar to Experiment 1 we included a visibility check after every trial. However,
in Experiment 2 we gave participants only CSs that were shown for a similar presen-
tation time (either for 20 ms and 30 ms or for 1000 ms) to choose from, in order to
better control for guessing strategies. Participants may have correctly reasoned that a
CS that was previously presented and correctly perceived at a longer presentation time
may not be a plausible option in trials with a brief presentation time (such guessing
strategies may have inflated previous estimates of stimulus visibility). Participants
were again asked to select the CS they had seen during the trial from a list of these
four CSs. If the CS was shown for 80 ms, two additional Pokémon images that were
not used in the learning phase were given as distractors.
After evaluating the critical CSs as in Experiment 1, participants indicated how
well they knew the Pokémon on a 4-point scale (not at all, looks familiar, know it,
know it very well) and answered the same demographic questions as in Experiment 1.
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Additionally, we asked participants whether they had worn the headphones during
the entire procedure.
Sample.
We used a sequential Bayesian analysis to analyze the incoming data (Rouder,
2014). We started analyzing the data after collecting 30 participants to reduce the
chance of false positive evidence (Schönbrodt et al., 2015) and analyzed the data after
every day of data collection. Our main analyses consisted of two t tests for EC effects
in the 1000 ms condition separately for the simultaneous and delayed CS-US onset.
We planned to collected data until the Bayes factor for both EC effects was larger
than 5 or until a maximum of 55 participants was collected.
These criteria were met, and data collection was therefore stopped, after 46
participants. Participants were mostly University of Cologne students and received
partial course credit or two Euro for their participation. 5 participants were excluded
due to poor performance on the visibility check at 80 and 1000 ms (see Experiment
1 for details). Three additional participants were excluded because they reported
that they did not wear the headphones during the entire procedure. Two additional
participants reported for at least one CS, that they knew it very well and were therefore
excluded. We, thus, included 37 participants in the final analysis (Age M = 23.51,
SD = 3.83, 26 female).
Data analysis.
We used Bayes Factors for inference in all analyses as described in Experiment
1. We again performed repeated-measures ANOVA to analyse liking responses and
paired t tests to examine interaction effects. We only report Bayesian analyses because
p values are uninterpretable when the sampling plan is not clearly defined a priori, as
was the case in our design (e.g. Chapter 11, Kruschke, 2015).
Results.
Visibility.
One goal of Experiment 2 was to ensure that the new stimulus material was
identified at slightly above-chance levels. Participants were asked to identify the CS
from an array of four CSs, which resulted in a chance level of .25. One stimulus was
correctly identified in 90 % of cases in the 20 ms condition and in 93.33% of cases
in the 30 ms condition. We excluded this stimulus for all further visibility analyses.
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The average correct identification rate in the 20 ms condition was 0.45, ranging from
0.36 to 0.54, which was clearly above chance, BF 10 = 932.30, d = 1.77, 95% HDI
[1.24, 2.30]. The CSs showed highly similar standard deviations, ranging from 0.48
to 0.50. Similarly, in the 30 ms condition the average correct identification rate was
0.57, ranging from 0.46 to 0.80, which was significantly above chance, BF 10 > 1000,
d = 2.22, 95% HDI [1.62, 2.86] (standard deviations in the 30 ms conditioned ranged
from 0.40 to 0.50).16
Evaluation.
Bayesian t test (µ = 0, r = 2 2)
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Figure 14 . Sequential Bayes factor of t tests of the 1000 ms condition in Experiment
2 (with the visualization starting after five participants).
As shown in Figure 14, Bayes factors for the simultaneous (BF 10 = 9.86, d = 0.43,
95% HDI [0.10, 0.76]) and delayed CS-US onset (BF 10 = 49.94, d = 0.54, 95% HDI
16One of the CSs was highly visible even with brief presentations. In an attempt to reduce its
visibility, we modified the image file to reduce the contrast of that stimulus. A small pilot study
(N = 7), where we presented all 8 CSs for 20 ms ten times and asked participants to identify the CS
from a list of all 8 CSs, showed that the visibility of this stimulus was substantially reduced but still
elevated compared to the other CSs (mean visibility = 0.66).
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Figure 15 . Evaluations of CSs in Experiment 2, split by the presentation time (20
ms, 30 ms or 1000 ms) and the SOA of CS and US (delayed onset by 400 ms of
the CS or simultaneous onset of CS and US for one 1000 ms condition only). Error
bars represent 95% within-subjects confidence intervals, dots represent participants’
individual data points.
[0.20, 0.88]) were larger than 5, which was our stopping rule, and both developed
similarly over the course of data collection. The data, moreover, indicated that there
was no difference between the delayed and simultaneous onset in the EC effect for CSs
presented for 1000 ms, BF 01 = 3.95, ηˆ2G = .003.
We computed an ANOVA for presentation time (20 ms, 30 ms, 1000ms) × US
valence (positive, negative) and found evidence for an interaction between the two
factors, BF 10 = 5.17, ηˆ2G = .029, see also Figure 15. As in Experiment 1, we found an
EC effect only for CSs presented for 1000 ms and not for briefly presented CSs: There
was a robust EC effect only for CSs presented for 1000 ms, BF 10 = 394.81, d = 0.66,
95% HDI [0.30, 1.02]. In contrast, there was some evidence for the absence of an EC
effect for CSs presented for 20 ms, BF 01 = 4.12, d = 0.06, 95% HDI [-0.25, 0.36], as
well as for CSs presented for 30 ms, BF 01 = 7.01, d = −0.05, 95% HDI [-0.35, 0.27].
Discussion Experiment 2. Replicating Experiment 1 with different CS and
US materials, Experiment 2 found a cross-modal EC effect for CSs presented for
1000 ms, but not for those presented for 20 or 30 ms. Additionally, there was no
detrimental effect of the 400 ms SOA on EC for supraliminal CSs: Based on the
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findings of Experiment 2, we conclude that a slight CS-US onset asynchrony does not
affect the EC effect at long presentation times compared to a simultaneous CS-US
onset. We speculate that using a 400 ms-delayed CS-US onset may induce a stronger
experience of simultaneous presentation for briefly presented CSs compared to a
simultaneous onset. We propose that the delayed CS-US onset may provide more
favorable conditions for EC effects with briefly presented CSs, as it might increase the
chances of affective responses to the US being experienced simultaneously with the
CS presentation.
The visibility of the briefly presented CSs was clearly above chance even for
stimuli presented for 20 ms. This was expected, given that the CSs used in Experiment
2 were more easily discriminable than those used in Experiment 1, and given that CS
duration was slightly longer than the 17 ms implemented in Experiment 1. CSs were
identified above chance, but the correct identification rates were much lower than for
stimuli presented for 80 ms or 1000 ms. Presenting the CSs for 20ms therefore yields
a suboptimal yet clearly not invisible method of presentation given the stimuli and
procedure at hand.
Finally, there was no indication for an EC effect for briefly presented CSs. Both
in the 20 ms and in the 30 ms condition, the data suggested that a near-threshold EC
effect was absent. Although we made procedural changes to create more favorable
conditions for automatic processes in EC compared to Experiment 1 (i.e., we eliminated
instructions to memorize CS-US pairs, high similarity between CSs, and simultaneous
CS-US onsets), we were not able to find an EC effect with briefly presented CSs. But,
again, caution is warranted when drawing conclusions about automatic processes in
EC based on the findings of Experiment 2 alone. The evidence for the absence of an
EC effect was moderate and, as mentioned above, we cannot preclude that the online
visibility check interfered with an automatic processing of the pairings. We therefore
aimed at a replication of Experiment 2 with a larger sample and including again the
potentially more sensitive 2-AFC measure.
Registered Experiment 3
The goal of Experiment 3 was to replicate the findings of Experiment 1 and 2 in
a sample large enough to detect medium to small EC effects for near-threshold CSs,
or conversely to accumulate conclusive statistical evidence for the absence of such an
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effect. The only major difference to Experiment 2 was that we did not administer the
visibility check throughout the learning task to avoid inducing an analytic deliberative
mindset that may have obstructed automatic processes in Experiments 1 and 2 (see
also Stahl et al., 2016). As in Experiment 1, we additionally assessed CS preferences
in a 2-AFC choice task. In a high-powered study, this inclusion will contribute to
answering the question whether choice is a more sensitive measure to detect small
changes in preference as compared to evaluative ratings. From the visibility data of
Experiment 2, we can conclude that the visibility of the briefly presented CSs was
above chance even at 20 ms. Given that CSs are identified above chance, an absence
of an EC effect for briefly presented CSs would be highly informative because we have
attempted to create optimal conditions under which dual-process theories of EC would
predict an automatic EC effect.
If, on the other hand, we observed an EC effect with briefly presented CSs, the
results would contradict findings by Stahl and colleagues (Stahl et al., 2016) who
found no EC effect for near-threshold but above-chance visual CSs. Such a result
would call into question their conclusion that there is no automatic EC effect, and it
would lend credibility to the critique that the absence of EC in previous studies may
have been caused by the experienced delay between CS and US, by a focused, analytic
stimulus processing mindset induced by instructions to memorize CS-US pairings, or
by interference from the online visibility check. Thus, Experiment 3 will provide a
stringent and fair test of the predictions of single- versus dual-process models of EC.
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 2 except that all
briefly presented CSs were displayed for 20 ms and all CS onsets were delayed by
400 ms relative to USs. The study, thus, followed a 2 (presentation time: 20 ms or
1000 ms) × 2 (US valence: positive or negative) × 2 (DV order : 2-AFC or rating
first) design; the first two factors were manipulated within participants. The order of
dependent variables was counterbalanced across participants.
We substituted the visibility task with a target-detection task similar to the one
used by Olson and Fazio (2001) in the surveillance paradigm. In Experiment 3, one
of the two filler CSs was randomly selected to serve as the target stimulus for this
task. It was presented for 200 ms (while the other filler stimulus was presented for 80
ms), and participants were instructed to press the space bar as quickly as possible
whenever it appeared on screen during the learning phase. This task achieves the goal
of focusing participants’ visual attention on the CSs in a manner comparable to the CS
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identification task while being much less resource-demanding and considerably easier to
perform. Most importantly, the task has repeatedly been shown to successfully support
EC effects in incidental EC procedures that are supposedly due to the operation of
automatic associative processes (Olson & Fazio, 2001).
Material.
Based on the combined visibility data from Experiment 2 and the small pilot
test administered afterwards, we decided to select the four most clearly visible CSs to
be shown for 1000 ms only and the four CSs with lowest visibility to be presented for
20 ms only (for an overview of the visibility rates see Appendix H). Note that all CSs
were identified at above-chance levels in both data sets.
Analysis plan. Before conducting our analyses, we excluded participants who
(a) reported for at least one of the Pokémon CSs that they “know it very well” (because
pre-experimental preferences towards the stimuli are typically not affected by EC); (b)
reported that they did not wear the headphones during the learning task; (c) missed
too many targets in the ongoing task (participants were excluded based on Tukey’s
outlier criterion, but only if that criterion reaches 3 misses, thereby allowing for 1
or 2 lapses during the learning phase); (d) aborted the experiment prematurely; or
(e) explicitly reported other major (but unforeseeable) issues during the experiment
that hindered them to participate in an orderly fashion (e.g., loud noises during
experiment, difficulty understanding the instructions; based on our experience from
previous studies we expect at most one of such cases to occur).
After the initially set N was reached, we analyzed the data using frequentist and
Bayesian data analyses. All further incoming data were analyzed using a sequential
Bayesian analysis (Rouder, 2014; Schönbrodt et al., 2015).
Planned sample size.
We first collected a fixed number of 122 participants based on the same a-priori
power analysis as described for Experiment 1, which ensured adequate power for a
one-sided paired t-test with α = β = .05 and medium-to-small effects of d = 0.3 that
are at the lower end of typical incidental EC effect sizes. A minimal N = 122 should
also help to minimize the chance of a false positive finding in the sequential Bayesian
analyses (Schönbrodt et al., 2015). We continued data collection until all targeted
Bayes factors had reached (or exceeded) 10 or greater (or less than 1/10 when the
inverse Bayes factor is considered), or until we ran out of money (i.e., participants were
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paid 2e for the short study, and funds were available to pay a maximum of N = 300
participants). The total N might be higher than 300 because some participants may
opt to participate in exchange for partial course credit. After the minimal sample size
was reached, the data were analysed after every day of data collection.
Stopping rule.
We planned to stop data collection when the evidence for both EC effects (20
ms and 1000 ms) was conclusive, both for evaluative ratings and the choice measure.
That is, we monitored four Bayes Factors, and we stopped data collection when, in
each of the four cases, either BF 01 > 10 or BF 10 > 10.
Confirmatory analysis.
In our confirmatory Bayesian analyses, which were also the basis of our data
collection stopping rule, we first tested if the order of dependent measures affects the
outcome of our experimental manipulations. Only when finding compelling evidence
that the order of dependent measures did not affect results (BF 01 > 10) we ignored the
factor of dependent measure order. If we observed inconclusive statistical evidence, or
if we found evidence that the order of dependent measures affected our results (BF 10
> 10), we would analyze the evaluation data only for the subset of participants who
first evaluated the CSs, and vice versa for the choice data analysis. For the frequentist
analyses planned to be conducted on the initial fixed sample size of N = 122, we
would ignore the factor of dependent measure order if we did not find a significant
effect of the order on our results.
Initial confirmatory analysis. To probe for the presence or absence of EC
effects within each level of the presentation time factor (20 ms and 1000 ms), we
calculated one-tailed (Bayesian and frequentist) paired t-tests. We used the same
priors and settings as in Experiment 1 and 2. For the initial analysis, we used the first
122 valid data sets (i.e., continued data collection if we had to exclude participants
for any of the reasons given above until N = 122 was reached).
Evaluation.
Since the results of the frequentist and Bayesian analyses diverged, we will report
them separately.
Frequentist analysis.
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There were no indications for an interaction of the measurement order and
the US valence, F (1, 120) = 2.47, MSE = 1, 174.34, p = .118, ηˆ2G = .004, nor the
measurement order and the US valence and CS presentation time, F (1, 120) = 0.63,
MSE = 1, 335.92, p = .429, ηˆ2G = .001. We therefore used the data of all participants
(i.e., participants who did the evaluation task first and participants who did the
choice task first) for further analyses of the evaluation. Of the CSs presented for
1000 ms, those shown with positive USs were evaluated more positively than those
presented together with negative USs, t(121) = 4.72, p < .001, d = 0.43. There were
no indications for an EC effect for CSs presented for 20 ms, t(121) = 0.51, p = .307,
d = 0.05 .
Bayesian analysis.
The Bayesian analyses on the potential influence of the order of measurement did
not yield sufficient evidence to ignore the factor of measurement order. This was true
for the three way interaction of order × presentation time × US valence, BF 01 = 3.99,
ηˆ2G = .001, and the interaction between US valence and order, BF 01 = 2.58, ηˆ2G = .004.
For the following analyses, we therefore only used the data of participants who
performed the evaluation task before the choice task (N = 59). As in the frequentist
analyses, for the CSs presented for 1000 ms a clear EC effect was found, BF 10 = 498.39,
d = 0.53, 95% HDI [0.26, 0.80]. There was however, no evidence for nor against an EC
effect for CSs presented for 20 ms, BF 10 = 1.20, d = 0.22, 95% HDI [-0.03, 0.47]. Since
both of these Bayes factors were part of the sequential stopping rule, we continued
data collection after the initial data analysis.
Choice.
We analyzed 2-AFC responses using logistic mixed effects regression models,
using the same specifications as in Experiment 1 for both frequentist and Bayesian
analyses. In these analyses, in which the proportion of choices of the CS paired with
positive USs is the dependent variable, the intercept can be interpreted as a main
effect of US valence, corresponding to an inclination to select positively paired CSs
over negatively paired CSs. A main effect of presentation time would be equivalent to
a modulating effect on EC, indicative of a stronger EC effect for one of the two levels of
the presentation-duration factor. We planned to assess the respective intercept terms to
probe for the presence of EC effects on choice in each level of the presentation-duration
factor.
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Frequentist analysis.
No significant interaction of order and US valence, χ2(1) = 0.03, p = .858, nor a
significant three-way interaction of the order of dependent measures × US valence ×
presentation time of the CS was found, χ2(1) = 0.36, p = .549. We therefore ignored
the order factor and analyzed the data of all participants. Of the CSs presented for
1000 ms, those conditioned with positive USs were chosen more often than those paired
with negative USs, z = 3.87, p < .001. For CSs presented for 20 ms, there was no
indication for a preference for CSs paired with positive USs, z = −0.41, p = .685. The
results of the choice variable therefore reflected the result of the evaluation variable
reported above.
Bayesian analysis.
Similar to the analyses of the evaluation data, the Bayes Factors for the interac-
tion of the US valence and the order of dependent measures, BF 01 = 4.40, as well as
the interaction of US valence × order of dependent variables × CS presentation time,
BF 01 = 3.88, did not reach our pre-set level of a Bayes Factor larger 10 for the null
hypothesis, which would have allowed us to ignore the order of dependent variables.
We therefore only analyzed the data of participants who performed the choice task
before the rating task (N = 63). Even through, descriptively, CSs shown for 1000 ms
and conditioned with positive USs were more likely to be selected, the Bayes Factor
was inconclusive, BF 10 = 2.64, d = 0.37, 95% HDI [0.06, 0.69]. The Bayes Factor
was more conclusive for stimuli presented for 20 ms: The data supported the null
hypothesis of no preference for CSs conditioned with positive USs, BF 01 = 12.01,
d = 0.03, 95% HDI [-0.23, 0.28].
Since we did not find conclusive evidence for all four target Bayes Factors in our
initial analysis, we continued data collection and analyzed the data after every day of
data collection.
Confirmatory analysis after sequential testing. During the sequential
data collection, one of the target Bayes Factors did not reach our pre-set level (i.e.,
> 10 or < 1/10), and we therefore collected the previously set maximum data of
300 paid participants (363 participants in total, including participants who took part
for partial course credit). Two participants took part twice and the second data
set was removed. The data of one participant was removed because she reported
that she did not wear the headphones and two participants were excluded due to
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technical difficulties. Additionally, 42 participants were excluded because they did
not press the space bar at least 8 times when the target was shown and additional 56
participants were excluded because they reported to know at least one Pokémon very
well. Consequently 260 participants are included in the analysis (age M = 23.58, SD
= 6.03; 208 female).
Evaluation.
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Figure 16 . Evaluations of CSs in Experiment 3, split by the order of dependent
variables, CS presentation time, and valence of the US paired with the CS. Error
bars represent 95% within-subjects confidence intervals, dots represent participants’
individual data points.
Since we observed an interaction between US valence and the order of dependent
measures, BF 10 = 17.74, ηˆ2G = .009, we analyzed only the data of participants who
performed the evaluation task before the choice task (N = 125). As in the initial
analysis, we observed an EC effect for CSs presented for 1000 ms, BF 10 > 1000,
d = 0.59, 95% HDI [0.40, 0.78]. Interestingly, we also observed an indication for the
presence of an EC effect for briefly presented CSs, BF 10 = 6.88, d = 0.24, 95% HDI
[0.06, 0.41], see Figure 16 (and see Figure 17 for a visual comparison of all EC effects).
Even though this Bayes Factor did not reach our pre-set thresholds, and the effect
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Figure 17 . EC effects from all three Experiments in the evaluative rating, split by
the order of dependent variables and CS presentation time. Values above 0 indicate a
more positive evaluation of CSs paired with positive USs than paired with negative
USs. Large dots represent the mean EC effect and the corresponding error bars the
95% highest density intervals. Small dots represent participants’ individual EC effects.
* = simultaneous CS-US onset.
size is small, the results indicate that even when CSs were presented for only 20 ms,
participants evaluated CSs presented with positive USs as more positive than CSs
presented with negative USs.
Choice.
As with the initial analysis, we did not find sufficient evidence—according to our
pre-set thresholds—for the absence of an influence of the order of dependent measures
(Order × US valence: BF 01 = 6.68, d = −0.02, 95% HDI [-0.10, 0.07]; Order × US
valence × CS presentation time: BF 01 = 6.70, d = 0.02, 95% HDI [-0.07, 0.10]) and
therefore only analyzed the participants who completed the choice task before the
evaluation task (N = 135). After the sequential analysis, we observed statistical
evidence for a preference for CSs conditioned with positive USs, when the CSs were
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Figure 18 . Rate of two-alternative forced-choice responses between positively and
negatively conditioned CS in Experiment 3. Higher values indicate a preference for
the positively conditioned CS. Points and error bars represent Bayesian estimates
of condition means and the corresponding 95% HDI from the logistic mixed effects
regression model.
presented for 1000 ms, BF 10 = 339.31, d = 0.38, 95% HDI [0.20, 0.57]. When the CSs
were presented for 20 ms, we found evidence for the absence of a preference for CSs
conditioned with positive USs, BF 01 = 15.12, d = 0.03, 95% HDI [-0.13, 0.20], see
Figure 18. Note that the EC effects on the choice variable were consistently smaller
than the EC effect on the evaluation variable.
Exploratory analysis. In a first set of additional—not registered—analyses,
we explored the sensitivity of our results to our pre-registered participant exclusion
criteria. In a second set of analyses, we explored the interaction between our two
dependent variables.
Different participant exclusion criteria.
In a first analysis we focused on the small EC effect on evaluative ratings obtained
for CSs presented for 20 ms; this effect was based on the subset of participants who
completed the evaluation task before the choice task. Here, we again analysed only
the evaluation data for those participants, and we again excluded all participants who
did not press the space bar at least 8 times. The only difference to our confirmatory
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Table 2
Effect of different exclusion criteria on the evaluation (evaluation first) and choice
(choice first) dependent variables
Presentation Time Registered Include Space Include Knowing Include Both
Evaluation
1000 ms BF 10 > 1000 > 1000 > 1000 > 1000
20 ms BF 10 6.88 2.77 2.45 1.48
N 125 144 154 179
Choice
1000 ms BF 10 339.31 > 1000 > 1000 > 1000
20 ms BF 10 1/15.12 1/14.66 1/19.01 1/18.16
N 135 149 162 179
Note. In the ’Include Space’ analyses only participants who reported to know at least
one of the Pokemon very well were excluded. In the ’Include Knowing’ analyses only
participants who did not press the space bar at least 8 times were excluded.
analyses was that we only excluded those participants who reported to know any of
the Pokémons shown for 20 ms very well (in the confirmatory analysis, a participant
was excluded as soon as she indicated knowing any Pokémon very well). In effect,
this analysis included 137 participants (instead of 125 in the confirmatory analysis).
Including participants who report to know any of the Pokémon shown for 1000 ms
very well—but none of the Pokémon presented for 20 ms—should not have an effect
on the evaluation of CSs in the 20 ms condition. However, the results of the evaluation
analysis for CSs presented for 20 ms (evaluation-first only) was now inconclusive,
BF 10 = 1.40, d = 0.17, 95% HDI [0.00, 0.33] (i.e., there was no evidence for a preference
for positively paired CSs over negatively paired CSs anymore). Even though adding
these participants to the analysis should not influence the ratings for CSs presented
for 20 ms, the Bayes Factor was reduced and we did not find any statistical evidence
for the alternative hypothesis over the null hypothesis.
We additionally explored the effect of relaxing all previously set exclusion
criteria (i.e., include participants who did not press the space bar often enough,
include participants who knew at least one of the Pokémon very well, or both) on the
choice measure as well as the evaluation measure (see Table 2), with the following
results: For the choice measure, relaxing any of the exclusion criteria did not affect
the pattern of results. Similar, the conclusions remain unaltered for EC effects on
evaluative ratings of CSs presented for 1000 ms. Results changed only for evaluation of
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CSs presented for 20 ms; here, the Bayes Factor was smaller—and inconclusive—when
additional participants (other than those in the registered analysis) were included. It
should however be noted that, in theses analyses, we also found no statistical evidence
for the absence of an EC effect for CSs presented for 20 ms.
Influence of order of the dependent variables.
Choice.
First we checked whether the choice results were affected by the order of depen-
dent measures. We analyzed the data of the evaluation-first group and found evidence
for the absence of an EC effect in the 20 ms condition, BF 01 = 13.78, d = 0.06, 95%
HDI [0.04, 0.09], but evidence for EC in the 1000 ms condition, BF 10 > 1000, d = 0.43,
95% HDI [0.25, 0.62]. This pattern of results was equivalent to the choice-first group.
Unsurprisingly, when we analyzed the entire sample and ignored the order of dependent
variables, we found evidence for the absence of an EC effect in the 20 ms condition,
BF 01 = 18.45, d = 0.03, 95% HDI [-0.09, 0.15], but evidence for an EC effect in the
1000 ms condition, BF 10 > 1000, d = 0.41, 95% HDI [0.27, 0.55].
Evaluation.
As reported above, we observed a clear indication for an interaction between US
valence and the order of dependent measures in the evaluation task, BF 10 = 17.74,
ηˆ2G = .009. There was an indication for the absence of the interaction between
US valence, the order of dependent measures, and the presentation time of CSs,
BF 01 = 6.81, ηˆ2G = .000. Interestingly, for the CSs shown for 1000 ms the interaction
between US valence and order of dependent variables was inconclusive, BF 01 = 1.37,
ηˆ2G = .006, but we found clear indications for an US valence × order of dependent
variables interaction for CSs presented for 20 ms, BF 10 = 12.08, ηˆ2G = .015. This
interaction for CSs presented for 20 ms reflects the finding that the EC effect was
larger when the evaluation was administered before the choice task, than when it
was administered after the choice task, BF 10 = 9.91, d = 0.36, 95% HDI [0.12, 0.60]
(a parallel comparison for CSs presented for 1000 ms yielded inconclusive results,
BF 01 = 1.48, d = 0.22, 95% HDI [-0.02, 0.45]).
Discussion Experiment 3. The main goal of the third experiment was to
investigate whether we can find EC effects with brief (20 ms) and longer (1000 ms) CS
presentation times when participants do not have to answer to a visibility check after
every trial. For an evaluation of CSs after the learning phase as well as a 2-AFC task,
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we found that CSs presented for 1000 ms and paired with positive USs were preferred
over CSs presented for 1000 ms and paired with negative USs. On the evaluative
rating measure, we also found some evidence that CSs presented for 20 ms and paired
with positive USs were rated as more positive as CSs presented for 20 ms and paired
with negative USs. Interestingly, this pattern was not found in the choice task: Here,
CSs presented for 20 ms were as likely chosen when they were paired with positive
USs as when they were paired with negative USs. We additionally observed that the
EC effect on evaluative ratings in the 20 ms condition was modulated by the choice
task, in that the EC effect was smaller after the choice task compared to the effect
found when the evaluation was administered before the choice task. In the following
section, we will discuss the finding of an EC effect for CSs presented for 1000 ms,
the diverging findings of EC effects for CSs presented for 20 ms, and the potential
interference of the choice task on the rating task.
The finding of an EC effect in the evaluation of CSs presented for 1000 ms
replicated the previous two experiments, as well as previous studies on cross-modal
EC with stimuli that can be consciously perceived. The result therefore shows that
the present paradigm is capable of reliably demonstrating cross-modal EC effects in
evaluative ratings. Results were somewhat more mixed with regard to the choice
measure: In Experiment 1, the evidence for an EC effect for CSs presented for 1000 ms
in the 2-AFC task was not conclusive. In Experiment 3, however, we found compelling
evidence that CSs presented for 1000 ms and paired with positive USs were preferred
over CSs presented for 1000 ms and paired with negative USs. This finding shows that
evaluative conditioning might be a useful tool to influence decision-making behavior,
and it lends ecological validity to the EC phenomenon. Future studies in an applied
setting could further build on this finding.
In contrast to CSs presented for 1000 ms, we did not find a preference for
positively paired CSs presented for 20 ms in the 2-AFC task. We can only speculate
whether this is due to the fact that either it is simply not possible to influence
participants’ decision-making behavior with briefly presented CSs, or whether the
choice task was not sufficiently sensitive to detect small effects. Based on previous
findings (Verwijmeren et al., 2012), we had originally speculated that choice might be
a more sensitive measure of preferences than evaluations. In both Experiment 1 and
Experiment 3—which used both choice and evaluation as dependent measures—effect
sizes in the evaluation task were larger than effect sizes in the choice task. In light
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of these findings, we would argue that choice might not be a more sensitive measure
than evaluation.
Consistent with this interpretation, there was some evidence for an EC effect in
the 20 ms condition in the evaluation (but not the choice) task. For the interpretation
of this effect, it should be noted that—as in the Study by Stahl et al. (2016)—the
briefly presented CS stimuli were not truly subliminal but in fact visible at above-
chance levels. We therefore refrain from claiming that we have found an EC effect
for stimuli that were truly subliminal. Nevertheless, the present indication for an EC
effect for stimuli presented only very briefly contradicts previous findings (Stahl et al.,
2016) suggesting that EC effects require much longer CS presentation durations. There
are a few factors that might explain this discrepancy: In contrast to the experiments
by Stahl et al. (2016), the present studies (1) did not include a visibility check
after each trial, and (2) they implemented a cross-modal EC procedure which might
have allowed for a more simultaneous experience of CS and US (Jones et al., 2009).
Combined, these changes might have resulted in the formation of an EC effect even
with a very brief presentation time. It has to be noted, however, that the effect size
found in this study was very small; this could explain why previous studies (e.g.,
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2) did not find the effect. Another important point
is that, in contrast to the effect for CSs presented for 1000 ms, the effect in the 20
ms presentation time condition was not robust to additional—exploratory—analyses.
Including only a few additional participants (i.e., those who knew one or more of the
CS stimuli presented for 1000 ms but not those presented for 20 ms) sharply reduced
the statistical evidence for an EC effect in the 20 ms condition (i.e., the Bayes Factor
indicated merely anecdotal evidence). Nevertheless, the EC effects on the evaluation
of CSs presented for 20 ms are interesting and give reason to invest additional efforts
into the question whether a cross-modal setting to achieve simultaneous presentation
of CS and US—as used in this paper—might be well-suited for automatic EC effects.
It is additionally worth discussing the order effect of our dependent variables.
For CSs presented for 20 ms, the evaluation EC effect was smaller when evaluation was
administered after (as compared to before) the choice task. One possible explanation
for this pattern of results is a consistency effect in the choice-first group: participants
may have evaluated the CSs in line with their previous choices; if, as our results
indicate, there was no EC effect on choice, these choices were likely to be random (i.e.,
equally likely to be consistent as inconsistent with US valence), and this may have
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masked, or interfered with, the small EC effect on evaluations. This is in line with
research showing that choices can influence the preference of initially equally valued
items (Brehm, 1956). Note, however, that this finding has recently been critically
discussed, and possible boundary conditions were suggested for the influence of choice
on preferences (Voigt, Murawski, & Bode, 2017).
General Discussion
We set out to test the hypothesis that simultaneous CS-US presentation might
be beneficial for EC with briefly presented CSs. To achieve a simultaneous CS-US
presentation that guaranteed that the visual attention could be directed towards the
briefly presented CS, we implemented a cross-modal paradigm with auditive USs
and visual CSs. In the first two studies, we did not observe an EC effect for briefly
presented CSs: If anything, we observed some evidence for the absence of an EC effect
for briefly presented CSs. However, interference arising from the CS identification
task—which was prompted after every trial in the learning phases of Experiment 1 and
2—, as well as lack of statistical power, could be reasons for not finding an EC effect
in these conditions. We therefore omitted the CS identification task in a high-powered
Experiment 3, and we additionally introduced a slightly delayed CS onset to create
a more simultaneous experience of CS and US. In this third study, we found some
evidence for an EC effect for briefly presented CSs, which appeared to be contingent
on our—registered—exclusion criteria.
One important limitation is that CSs were not presented truly subliminally
in any of the presented studies. CS identification was above chance for all the
realized conditions, such that the observed EC effects might have been driven by
some participants’ conscious perception of some of the CS presentations. Awareness of
the contingency between these CSs and the auditive USs may therefore have formed
consciously and might underlie the EC effects found in the brief presentation condition.
It therefore does not follow that the process underlying the EC effect with briefly
presented CSs in Experiment 3 must have been an automatic one. The notion that
only a few stimuli were consciously perceived by perhaps only a small subset of
participants could also explain the small effect size found for CSs presented for 20
ms in Experiment 3, which could arise from a mixture of an average-sized EC effect
contributed by participants who saw the briefly presented stimuli and a null EC effect
of participants who did not see the stimuli. Nevertheless, the results of Experiment 3
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give reason to further investigate the possibility of an EC effect with truly subliminal
CS presentation.
The core proposition of this paper was that a simultaneous presentation of CS
and US might be beneficial for EC effects with briefly presented CSs. Through a
cross-modal EC procedure with visually presented CSs and auditive USs, we attempted
to achieve a simultaneous experience of CS and US. Using this procedure an EC
effect with briefly presented—but above chance visible—CSs was obtained, which is
in contrast to the findings by Stahl et al. (2016). However, the present study does
not address whether the procedural changes indeed had the discussed causal effects,
due to the non-experimental manipulation of the (presence versus absence of the) CS
identification task, and due to the lack of evidence regarding the effect (or its absence)
of slightly delaying the CS onset on EC with briefly presented CSs.
Future research should more directly address the possibility that a simultaneous
experience of CS and US might be beneficial for EC effects to occur (Jones et al.,
2009), and that a CS identification task to assess visibility, administered after every
trial, might interfere with EC for briefly presented CSs. Perhaps most importantly, the
present work found a small EC effect with briefly presented CSs, suggesting that the
search for a set of enabling conditions for subliminal EC effects might prove worthwhile,
and that the cross-modal paradigm proposed here might be a useful method for future
studies.
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Chapter 7: No evaluative conditioning effects with briefly presented
stimuli
Additional materials are stored in an online repository: osf.io/3dn7e
The evaluative conditioning (EC) effect is a change in the evaluation of an
initially neutral conditioned stimulus (CS) after (repeated) pairing with a negative or
positive unconditioned stimulus (US) in the direction of the valence of the US (De
Houwer, 2007). While there is no doubt about the existence of the effect (Hofmann
et al., 2010), there are currently two opposing views about the underlying processes
explaining EC effects; namely propositional single-process views (Mitchell et al., 2009)
and dual-process views (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 2014b). One important
difference between the two views concerns the role of CS-US contingency awareness and
its necessity for EC effects to occur (for a review see Sweldens et al., 2014). Proponents
of propositional single-process views claim that contingency awareness is a necessary
precondition for EC effects to occur (Mitchell et al., 2009). Put differently, participants
have to be aware of both the CS, the US, and their co-occurrence during the learning
phase in order for a change in CS valence (in line with US valence) in a subsequent
evaluation to occur. Support for this claim comes from studies demonstrating that EC
effects were only found when participants were aware of the US valence with which
CSs had been shown (Stahl et al., 2009).
Proponents of dual-process views (for example as described in the associative-
propositional evaluation model; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 2014b) claim that
in addition to a propositional learning process, associative learning processes exist that
require no contingency awareness for associations to form. A change in preference—in
an associative framework—can be the result of a co-occurrence of a CS and US in
the absence of the explicit knowledge of participants that these two stimuli appeared
together. Dual-process theories are supported by findings of EC effects in experimental
conditions under which contingency awareness is highly unlikely or even impossible:
When one of the two stimuli in an EC learning phase is presented subliminally, it should
be processed unconsciously, and cannot be consciously linked to the US (Dehaene et al.,
2006). If EC effects can be found with a subliminal presentation schedule, contingency
awareness between CS and US can be ruled out. Such effects could therefore not be
explained by propositional single-process views (Mitchell et al., 2009).
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A number of studies empirically support the notion of EC effects with subliminally
presented stimuli (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004; Niedenthal, 1990; Rydell et al., 2006).
Most of these studies, however, have been criticized on methodological grounds (i.e.,
manipulation of US valence between participants allowing for mood differences between
groups as an explanation for evaluation differences; Sweldens et al., 2014) or could
not be replicated by an independent lab (Heycke, Gehrmann, Haaf, & Stahl, 2018).
Additional empirical evidence for the absence of EC with briefly presented
stimuli was recently introduced by Stahl et al. (2016). In a series of studies, no EC
effects were found with stimuli that were identified slightly, but substantially, above
chance. In most of the experiments, Stahl and colleagues measured the visibility of
the briefly presented words using an online visibility check. Specifically, after every
trial during the learning phase, participants had to select the CS (from a selection
of CSs) that was presented during that trial. This online check of visibility enabled
the researchers to obtain a more accurate estimation of the actual visibility of stimuli
during the experiment (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002) as compared to asking for memory
of briefly presented stimuli only at the end of the study (e.g., Rydell et al., 2006).
One could speculate, however, that this online visibility check might interfere with
the learning procedure in two ways: (I) participants might be in a deliberative and
analytic mindset during the task as they are trying to identify the briefly presented
stimuli, and therefore associations between the briefly presented CS and the US might
not form if they depend on holistic processes, (II) assuming that a new evaluative
response toward the CSs is acquired during the learning phase, showing multiple CSs
that were paired with USs of different valence after every trial during the learning
phase could be considered an additional trial of the learning phase, and could therefore
interfere with the intended CS-US pairing schedule. A recent experiment by Heycke,
Aust, and Stahl (2017) attempted to tackle this potential interference by omitting
the online visibility check, while also addressing another potential limitation: the
presentation schedule of the CS-US pairs.
One potentially important factor in EC with briefly presented stimuli—central
to the studies reported by Heycke and colleagues—is the simultaneous presentation
of CS and US. Recent findings support a claim by the implicit misattribution theory
(Jones et al., 2009) that EC effects acquired in an associative automatic fashion require
a simultaneous presentation of CS and US (Hütter & Sweldens, 2013; Sweldens et al.,
2010). If this characteristic of the learning phase is indeed necessary for automatic EC
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effects to occur, it could help explain why recent replication studies did not find an EC
effect in a sequential learning paradigm (Heycke et al., 2018). Studies showing the need
for a simultaneous CS-US presentation for associative automatic EC effects, however,
did not use a subliminal presentation schedule. In a subliminal presentation paradigm,
participants’ visual attention might be focused on either the briefly presented CS, or
the US, but not both. It therefore seems difficult to realize a simultaneous visual
presentation of CS and US when either one is presented subliminally.
Heycke and colleagues speculated that a cross-modal EC paradigm, with (sublim-
inal) visual CSs and positive/negative sounds as USs, might allow for a simultaneous
presentation (or, more importantly, simultaneous processing) of CS and US and
therefore might provide a better test of subliminal EC effects acquired via implicit
misattribution (Jones et al., 2009). In a high-powered study using this paradigm—that
avoided the potential problem of the online visibility check—indications for an EC
effect with briefly presented stimuli were indeed found by Heycke and colleagues (2017).
It should be noted, however, that pilot studies, which made use of an online visibility
check, showed that CSs were recognized at above-chance levels under the conditions
realized in that study. Nevertheless, the results were in contrast to previous findings
of no EC effect with briefly presented (but visible slightly above chance) CSs (Stahl
et al., 2016).
Taken together, Heycke et al. (2017) found an EC effect for briefly presented—
but slightly supraliminal—CSs, when using a cross-modal presentation paradigm and
no online visibility check. However, the Bayes factor found by Heycke and colleagues
in support of this finding (BF10 = 6.88) was not convincing if one might hold a strong
prior believe against the existence of EC effects with briefly presented stimuli. The
effect was also only present when a substantial amount of participants was excluded
(based on pre-specified exclusion criteria). Nevertheless, the cross-modal approach
appeared promising and an important question is therefore whether the EC effect
found by Heycke et al. (2017) can be replicated, and whether it relies on above chance
CS identification or extends to CSs detected at chance level.
Method
As the current study aims at replicating the findings by Heycke et al. (2017),
we used the same experimental script, with some minor adjustments: (1) In order to
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ensure that the effect found by Heycke et al. (2017) can be generalized to different
stimuli, we used a new set of CSs that were randomly assigned to a brief and a longer
CS presentation time condition. (2) We additionally added an extensive visibility
check, which was conducted after the measurement of the dependent variable. The
study can therefore be considered a close replication of the study by Heycke et al.
(2017), using different participants, different CSs, and adding an extensive visibility
check. (3) We dropped the choice task (which appeared to have had an effect on the
evaluation task and would therefore require counterbalancing) in order to focus the
statistical power on the more promising dependent variable (in the original study, no
EC effect on choice was found for briefly presented CSs).
Design. The study followed a 2 (US Valence: positive vs. negative) × 2 (CS
duration: 30 ms vs. 1000 ms) within-subjects design.
Material. We used the same harmonic and disharmonious sounds (Topolinski
& Deutsch, 2012, 2013) as USs that were used in the study by Heycke et al. (2017),
but replaced the Pokemon images that we used as CSs in previous studies by a new
set of less familiar stimuli.
The CS selection procedure consisted of two parts: first, images were rated in
order to select neutrally valenced images, second, a visibility task was administered
for this subset of images to select images that could not be identified above chance in
a procedure similar to the learning paradigm of the main study.
We downloaded 100 images of toy figures (Gogo’s Crazy Bones), transformed
them to black and white and removed all photo artifacts. In an online study, all
images were rated on a scale ranging from -100 to 100 by 119 participants (who were
shown 50 semi-randomly selected images each, resulting in 44 to 52 evaluations per
image). We selected the 16 most neutral images (i.e., the 16 images with mean ratings
closest to the midpoint of the scale) based on this pilot study.
In a second pilot study, participants came to the lab and were presented with
images in a procedure highly similar to the main study (see below): This second pilot
study–in which each of the 16 images was shown 10 times for 30 ms in a cross-modal
learning procedure—served as a test for the visibility of stimuli. The images were
presented along positive/negative sounds (randomly determined for each participant
anew) to keep the presentation conditions as close as possible to the main study. After
every trial, participants had to indicate which stimulus was shown in the preceding
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trial. Two additional images (that were not part of the selected 16 neutral images) were
presented for 80 ms or 200 ms (10 times each) to raise the motivation to detect brief
and masked stimuli (Pratte & Rouder, 2009), which we will refer to as motivational
stimuli. The intertrial interval, fixation cross, and timing of image-sound pairs were
identical to the main study. In contrast to the main study, after every trial all 18
stimuli (16 CSs plus the two filler stimuli) were shown on the screen and participants
were asked to select the image that had appeared during the trial.
In a first part of this second pilot study with 30 participants we identified four
images that were identified at chance level (with BF01 > 5). We reduced the contrast
of all other images in order to reduce the visibility of the stimuli and ran another
pilot study with the four images identified in the first part and all other images with
a reduced contrast (16 CSs plus two filler stimuli). In total 16 new participants took
part in the second part, and results implicated eight stimuli that were not identified
above chance (all BF01 > 5). Those eight stimuli served as CSs for the main study.
Procedure. The learning phase followed the procedure of the experiment
by Heycke et al. (2017). Participants first received a surveillance task instruction
(i.e., press the space bar as soon as a specific target character appears). One (of
two) stimuli (which were the same motivational stimuli as in the pilot studies) was
randomly selected to be the target stimulus for each participant anew. Participants
then completed a 10-trial practice phase for the surveillance task. In this practice
phase, the actual target (shown 4 times) plus three stimuli (shown twice each) were
shown (targets for 200 ms and the other images for 30 ms or 1000 ms). The three
non-targets were only used for this practice phase, while the target was also the target
in the following learning phase. During the practice phase, only neutral sounds were
played (see below). Additionally—and contrary to the subsequent learning phase—
feedback was given when the space bar was pressed but no target animal was shown
and feedback was given after trials in which a target was shown but the space bar
was not pressed. We included these practice trials as we had observed in previous
studies that the surveillance task was not performed by all participants. As we used
the performance on this task as an outlier criterion (see below), we wanted to make
sure that participants were aware that their performance on the task was measured.
After the practice phase, the same target stimulus was shown again, and participants
were instructed that they would not receive feedback anymore on their performance
in the following detection task.
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Each trial in the subsequent learning phase was set up as follows: A fixation
cross with a duration of 500 ms in the center of the screen announced the trial and
was followed by a random-checkerboard pattern mask presented for 500 ms. The mask
was randomly rotated by either 0, 90, 180 or 270 degrees. Afterward, either a CS
was shown for 30 ms or 1000 ms; or a surveillance target was presented (for 200 ms);
or the (non-target) motivational stimulus (see above) was shown for 80 ms. The US
onset was always 400 ms before the CS onset, in order to approximate a simultaneous
experience of CS and US valence. The trial was followed by a 100 ms backward mask
(also randomly rotated, but with a different angle than the forward mask) and a 1500
ms intertrial interval with a blank screen.
The learning phase consisted of 4 CSs presented for 30 ms and 4 CSs shown for
1000 ms, which were randomly assigned to the presentation time for each participant
anew. Half of the CSs were paired with positive sounds, the other half with negative
sounds, which was also randomly determined. Additionally, as described above, a target
image was randomly selected for each participant anew out of the two motivational
stimuli. Both motivational stimuli were always paired with neutral ticking sounds
taken from Heycke et al. (2017). During the learning phase, each image-sound pair
was shown 10 times in a random order, which resulted in 100 trials in total.
After the learning phase, evaluative ratings of the CSs were administered. Par-
ticipants were instructed to give their spontaneous evaluation of the previously shown
figures. Each CS was presented in the center of the screen (in a random order), and
evaluation on a slider ranging from -100 to 100 was administered.
In the subsequent visibility test, all CS-US pairs (including the target and
motivational stimulus) were shown again in the same order as in the learning phase.
However, no target instructions were given; instead, after each trial, participants were
presented with all 10 CS stimuli (8 CSs, 1 motivational stimulus, 1 surveillance target
stimulus). Participants were instructed to click on the stimulus that had just been
shown in that trial. At the end of the study, participants answered demographic
questions (age, study, gender, was the headphone worn, goal of experiment, and
comments).17
17The data of the pretest and the main study were collected under a Born Open Data
protocol (Rouder, 2016) in which they were automatically logged, uploaded, and made freely
available after every day of data collection (github.com/methexp/rawdata/tree/master/croco4,
github.com/methexp/rawdata/tree/master/croco4b, github.com/methexp/rawdata/tree/master/croco5).
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Data analysis. We used the same outlier and exclusion criteria as in the
previous study (Heycke et al., 2017). Before conducting any data analyses, we
excluded participants who (a) reported that they did not wear the headphones during
the experiment, (b) did not press the space bar often enough when a target image was
shown (using Tukey’s outlier criterion but only if the criterion reached 3 misses out
of 10 trials, allowing for 1 or 2 misses), (c) aborted the experiment or (d) explicitly
reported major (unexpected) problems during the experiment (e.g., distractions or
difficulties with the instructions).
For the data collection, we used a sequential Bayesian analysis paradigm (Rouder,
2014; Schönbrodt et al., 2015), analyzing the data after every day of data collection
and stopping after a pre-defined criterion was reached (see below). We use BF10 to
denominate the evidence for the alternative hypothesis relative to the null hypothesis
(i.e., BF10 > 1 indicates support for the alternative hypothesis over the null hypothesis)
while BF01 denominates the evidence for the null hypothesis relative to the alternative
hypothesis (i.e., BF01 > 1 indicates support for the null hypothesis). All data analyses
were performed in R (Version 3.4.4; R Core Team, 2016)18.
Repeated measures ANOVAs were performed to analyze the interaction between
US valence and presentation time in the evaluative ratings and paired t tests to
examine interaction effects. In the Bayes Factor ANOVA analyses, the following
method of estimation whether a given interaction or factor should be considered to
have an influence on the evaluative rating was used: A full model with all main effects
and interactions was compared to a model without the main effect or interaction
(i.e., the predictor) of interest. A Bayes factor for the alternative hypothesis over
the null hypothesis (i.e., BF 10 > 1) could be interpreted as relative evidence for one
model (i.e., the full model including our predictor term of interest) over the competing
model (without the predictor interest). As in the previous studies by Heycke et al.
(2017), we used default multivariate Cauchy priors (Rouder et al., 2012) with a scaling
parameter of r = 0.5 in the Bayes factor ANOVA and Cauchy priors with a scaling
parameter of r =
√
2/2 for all t tests (Rouder et al., 2009). All errors for Bayes
factor estimates were less than 1%. For all t tests we also report the median of the
posterior distribution as an effect size estimate and its 95% highest density interval
18We, furthermore, used the R-packages afex (Version 0.20.2; Singmann et al., 2016), BayesFactor
(Version 0.9.12.4.2; Morey & Rouder, 2015), papaja (Version 0.1.0.9735; Aust & Barth, 2016), RCurl
(Version 1.95.4.10; D. T. Lang & CRAN team, 2016), rvest (Version 0.3.2; Wickham, 2016), tidyr
(Version 0.8.0; Wickham & Henry, 2017), and yarrr (Version 0.1.5; Phillips, 2017).
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(HDI; with a probability of 95%, the true population effect size is within the 95% HDI).
Additionally, for all analyses, the total number of individual participants included in
the analysis is reported in brackets.
Sample size rationale.
As part of the sequential Bayesian analyses paradigm, we started the data
analysis after initially collecting the data of 30 participants, with the same stopping
rules used by Heycke and colleagues (2017) in Experiment 3. Specifically, we decided
a priori to collect data until either the Bayes factors for both t tests of interest (i.e.,
for an EC effect in the 1000 ms condition and an EC effect in the 30 ms condition)
were larger than 10 (for the null or alternative hypothesis) or until a maximum of 150
(paid) participants was reached. We ran the analyses after every day of data collection
and decided that signed-up participants were allowed to participate, even if we had
already stopped the data collection based on the above-specified analyses.
Participants.
We stopped data collection after 166 participants took part in the study (Npaid =
94, all others received partial course credit), based on the results of the t tests (see
below). Six participants were excluded, as they either took part in previous studies of
this series or because they were told about the procedure of this study by others before
taking part. One participant reported that she did not wear the headphone during
the entire procedure and seven additional participants did not detect the surveillance
target stimulus at least 7 times during the learning phase. These participants were also
excluded before running any of the analyses. The total sample size in the following
analyses was therefore N = 152 (Mage = 23.51, SDage = 6.93; 105 female).
Results
We first report the same analyses as in the previous experiment by Heycke et al.
(2017) in order to test whether an EC effect could be found in the 30 and 1000 ms
condition. Afterwards, we report additional analyses using the data from the visibility
check.
Evaluation. In the overall ANOVA, we found an interaction of the presentation
time of the CSs and the US valence, BF 10(152) = 83.25; ηˆ2G = .018, see Figure 19).
The interaction was characterized by the fact that, when stimuli were presented for
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1000 ms, an EC effect was present, BF 10(152) = 3, 355.25, d = 0.37, 95% HDI [0.21,
0.53]. We therefore replicated previous findings, showing that images shown while a
positive (harmonic) sound was played were evaluated more positively than images
that were shown while a negative (disharmonic) sound was played. Contrary to our
previous finding, we found statistical evidence for the absence of an EC effect when
stimuli were presented for 30 ms, BF 01(152) = 10.47, d = 0.01, 95% HDI [-0.15, 0.16].
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Figure 19 . EC effects, split by CS presentation time. Large horizontal bars represent
the mean EC effect, with the 95% highest density intervals (in color) displayed around
them. Dots represent individual EC effects and additionally the smoothed distribution
for each presentation time condition is shown.
Visibility. We tested whether stimuli were identified above chance in the
visibility testing procedure which followed the learning and evaluation phase. Stimuli
that were presented for 30 ms were indeed identified above chance, BF 10(152) =
1, 504.92, d = 0.37, 95% HDI [0.20, 0.53] (chance level = 0.1, average visibility = 0.13,
SD = 0.09).
Exploratory analysis. To investigate whether an EC effect might exist for
stimuli that were not consciously perceived, we excluded individual ratings of stimuli
that were identified three or more times in the visibility check (i.e., we included only
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stimuli identified below, at, or slightly above chance).19 Similar to the result when
using all evaluations, we found evidence for the absence of an EC effect for stimuli
presented for 30 ms, BF 01(143) = 17.87, d = −0.06, 95% HDI [-0.23, 0.10].
Second, we also analyzed only evaluations of stimuli presented for 30 ms in
the learning phase that had been selected at least 3 times during the subsequent
visibility check. There were only 18 participants that had correctly identified at least
one positive and one negatively paired CS more than three times, allowing for their
inclusion in the paired t test analysis. Nevertheless, we found strong indications for
an EC effect for briefly presented CSs that had been identified at least three times in
the visibility test, BF 10(18) = 31.54, d = 0.73, 95% HDI [0.21, 1.27].20
Discussion
The main goal of this experiment was to replicate our previous finding of an EC
effect for briefly presented stimuli, using a cross-modal design. Replicating previous
work, we found compelling evidence for EC effects with stimuli shown for 1000 ms,
demonstrating that the general finding of cross-modal EC is robust and generalizes
to a new set of CSs. However, and contrary to our previous study, we did not find
any evidence for an EC effect for briefly presented stimuli, but strong evidence for the
absence of EC effects for these stimuli. If indeed spontaneous associations between
CS and US underlie EC effects in the absence of contingency awareness, one could
speculate that perceiving CSs consciously might prevent EC effects. We therefore
analyzed only the evaluation of stimuli that had been identified at or around (but not
above) chance level, but the conclusion remains unaltered: We again found statistical
evidence for the absence of an EC effect.
In contrast, we observed an EC effect in the subset of stimuli that were briefly
presented but recognized at least 3 times in the subsequent visibility test. Considering
this substantial EC effect for briefly presented stimuli (d = 0.74) in this subgroup,
one could speculate that the EC effect found in our previous study was driven by
a similar subgroup of individuals, who saw some of the stimuli. This speculation
19As we had two stimuli per experimental cell (e.g., two different CSs for briefly presented stimuli
paired with a positive US), we had at least one rating per US valence in the 30 ms condition for 143
participants when applying the exclusion criterion.
20We additionally tested whether these 18 participants, who showed a better visibility for the 30 ms
stimuli, also showed a larger EC effect for stimuli presented for 1000 ms than all other participants.
There were no indications that this was the case, BF01(152) = 1.65, d = 0.30, 95% HDI [-0.15, 0.77].
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should be taken into consideration when looking at previous studies that claim to
have found subliminal EC but did not check for actual visibility in a stringent manner
(as criticized by Sweldens and colleagues, 2014). The results of the present study
therefore demonstrate that (I) a cross-modal EC effect with stimuli presented for a
longer duration appears to be robust; (II) when stimuli are presented briefly, but can
still be identified, a cross-modal EC effect can also be obtained (cf. Stahl et al., 2016);
and (III) when stimuli are presented briefly but cannot be identified, EC effects are
absent even in the cross-modal paradigm that allows for simultaneous presentation.
Limitations. The visibility check of the main study showed that stimuli
presented for 30 ms were identified at above-chance levels. This finding is surprising,
as our pre-tests indicated that the same stimuli were identified at chance level. There
was, however, an important difference between the visibility checks in our main study
and the pre-tests: In the pre-test, the majority of trials included briefly presented
stimuli, whereas more than half of the stimuli were presented for a longer duration
in the main study. The fact that most stimuli were difficult to see in the pre-tests
could have had an influence on the motivation to detect the stimuli, leading to a lower
visibility rate (Pratte & Rouder, 2009). Additionally, the same characteristic could
have had an influence on participants’ response strategy: As half of the CSs were
presented for 1000 ms (and two additional stimuli for 80 ms or 200 ms), those stimuli
could easily be identified during the task. When a stimulus was shown briefly and
participants were asked to identify the stimulus from the set of ten stimuli, participants
might have discarded the six stimuli that they knew were shown for longer durations.
This would lead to a guessing rate of 1/4 instead of the rate of the 1/10 we assumed.
Note that the visibility of the subset of stimuli that showed EC (i.e., those correctly
identified on 3 or more trials) would still be above the thus-corrected chance level.
Future research should assess the plausibility of these speculations.
If we take these results at face value, we replicated the finding by Stahl et al.
(2016) that above chance CS identification might be insufficient for EC effects with
briefly presented stimuli. However, given our speculations about the visibility check
above, it might be possible that stimuli were indeed presented subliminally and we
overestimated the actual visibility. In any case, the main conclusion remains unaltered:
EC effects were not found for briefly and masked CSs, while EC effects were found
when the CS was presented for a longer duration (i.e., 1000 ms).
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Implications. The main theoretical goal of this study was a test of the ne-
cessity of contingency awareness for EC, as predicted by propositional single-process
views. The results of this study clearly support this view as contingency awareness
was found necessary for EC effects to form. It should be taken into account that
contingency awareness could be manipulated by means other than brief presentation;
future studies should look at different options of manipulation contingency awareness
directly. However, recent studies using parafoveal presentation (Dedonder et al.,
2014) or continuous flash suppression (Högden et al., 2018) to manipulate contingency
awareness experimentally, also failed to find any evidence for EC effects in the absence
of contingency awareness. In addition, it would be interesting to test whether EC
effects with briefly presented and masked CSs follow other regularities than EC effects
with clearly visible CSs, as recently suggested by Greenwald and De Houwer (2017).
Furthermore, single-and dual-process views have different predictions that go beyond
contingency awareness (e.g., relational information about CS and US) that should be
considered before evaluating the merits of both views in explaining the mechanisms
underlying EC (for a review see Corneille & Stahl, 2018).
Taken together, the results of this study challenge the finding by Heycke et al.
(2017) that a cross-modal EC paradigm might be beneficial for EC effects with briefly
presented stimuli and support the claim made by Stahl and colleagues (2016) that
above-chance CS identification may be necessary but insufficient for attitude learning.
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Chapter 8: General Discussion
We set out to test whether contingency awareness is necessary for EC effects to
form and therefore experimentally manipulated contingency awareness using subliminal
stimulus presentation paradigms. A series of previous studies had reported such EC
effects with subliminally presented stimuli. However, as discussed in the introduction,
a p-curve analysis of these studies revealed no particularly convincing results. The
three studies of Rydell and colleagues appeared to be of particular importance for the
evidential value of the p-curve, which could indicate that the results of Rydell and
colleagues might be based on a robust paradigm. However, in two close replications—
using the original stimulus material—we did not replicate the findings reported by
Rydell et al. (2006).
We then tested an additional set of possibly beneficial factors in subliminal EC.
First, we tested whether the relevance between US and CS as well as the goal relevance
for the participants would moderate an EC effect. We did not find any evidence that
these factors might be beneficial for automatic EC effects and did not observe any EC
effects with truly subliminally presented stimuli. Second, we attempted to measure
preference with choice measures, as it had been proposed that choice might be a
more sensitive measure for automatic EC effects than explicit evaluations. However,
we did not observe any EC effects using a choice measure when CSs were presented
subliminally. In contrast, we did observe an EC effect with briefly presented—but
visible—CSs with an evaluative but not with a choice measure in Experiment 3 in
Chapter 6. Third, we speculated whether a simultaneous presentation of CS and US
using the visual and auditory modality might be beneficial for subliminal EC effects,
as previous studies had shown that automatic EC effects might rely on a simultaneous
presentation schedule. While we found an EC effect with briefly presented CSs with a
simultaneous cross-modal presentation schedule, an additional experiment suggested
that the observed EC effect was only found when participants consciously perceived
the stimuli. We set out to test the question whether EC effects require contingency
awareness. The results of the series of empirical investigations suggest that, indeed,
contingency awareness is necessary for EC effects to form.
One important additional aspect of the studies presented in the previous chapters
was that we wanted to ensure that stimuli were not perceived consciously during the
learning phase (i.e., were presented truly subliminally). While a number of previous
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experiments on subliminal EC did not test whether the briefly presented stimuli were
visible (see Chapter 1), we used different methods to assess visibility: We tested the
visibility during the learning phase (Chapter 4 and Chapter 6) as well as after the
learning phase (Chapter 7) by asking participants what they saw on a trial-by-trial
basis. Two important findings can be deduced from the results of the empirical studies
presented in the previous chapters: First, EC effects can form even when stimuli
are presented very briefly (e.g., for 17 ms) as long as the stimuli can be perceived
consciously. It therefore appears necessary that each study investigating the influence
of subliminally presented stimuli needs to deploy a visibility check. Only then one can
draw the conclusion that the behavioral change was the result of subliminal stimulus
processing and not the result of a conscious perception of the CS-US pair. Merely
presenting stimuli for a brief period of time is not sufficient to claim that the stimuli
were presented subliminally. Second, measuring visibility is not as straightforward
as it might appear. As we saw in Chapter 7, the correct identification of the same
stimuli (with the same presentation time) might depend on the number of stimuli
to select from or on the number of stimuli presented briefly. Guessing strategies and
personal differences (e.g., conservative vs. liberal decision criteria; see Lovibond and
Shanks, 2002) should be taken into account when estimating stimulus visibility in
studies using subliminal presentation schedules.
To summarize the findings from the previous chapters, we found no evidence
for EC when stimuli were presented truly subliminally and therefore did not find any
evidence for EC without contingency awareness.
Meta-Analysis
To investigate the influence of the presented studies (and the results by Stahl and
colleagues, 2016) on an overall estimation of EC effects with briefly presented stimuli,
the meta-analysis was calculated again, now including these studies. A random effects
analysis revealed a mean effect size of d = 0.32 (Z = 0.16) with a 95 % confidence
interval from d = 0.22 to d = 0.42, see Figure 20. The analysis yielded that the study
results were not homogeneous Q = 88.66, df = 49, p < .001, which was mainly due to
the reversed effects reported in Chapter 2 (and the reversed effects found by Versluis
et al., 2017).21
21Removing these results from the analysis resulted in a homogeneous set (Q = 58.13, df = 45, p
= .091) and a mean effect of d = 0.38 (Z = 0.19).
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Figure 20 . A forest plot showing the effect sizes (Fisher’s Z) and 95% confidence
intervals for each study included in the literature review and the studies discussed in
the previous chapters, based on a random effects model.
Our studies show that it is difficult to produce EC effects with briefly presented
stimuli and suggest that EC effects are absent when stimuli are presented truly
subliminally. The meta-analysis also demonstrates a substantial decrease of the
estimated average effect size when including the set of studies conducted in our lab
(from d = 0.45 to d = 0.32). While we can only speculate, it appears possible that
the small effect of d = 0.32 might be a mixture of studies (or participants) with truly
subliminal stimuli who report no effect and studies (or participants) with slightly
visible stimuli reporting a mean effect observed with supraliminally presented stimuli
(e.g., d = 0.52 as observed in the meta-analysis by Hofmann et al., 2010).
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Theoretical implications
The main goal of this set of studies was to investigate the need for contingency
awareness in evaluative learning. In a series of studies we therefore experimentally
manipulated contingency awareness by means of subliminal stimulus presentation. As
discussed in Chapter 1, the propositional single-process view (Mitchell et al., 2009)
postulates that EC effects depend on contingency awareness of the CS-US pair during
the encoding of the stimuli. Dual-process accounts such as the APE model (Gawronski
& Bodenhausen, 2006), in contrast, postulate that EC effects can occur automatically
and therefore without contingency awareness. Studies demonstrating subliminal EC
effects have been used by theorists to show support for the APE model (Gawronski &
Bodenhausen, 2011). However, as discussed in Chapter 1, the empirical evidence for
subliminal EC effects was not convincing. Therefore, finding an EC effect without
contingency awareness in a methodological solid experiment would lend support to
dual-process models and could not be explained by propositional single-process views.
Our results clearly indicate that EC effects are not possible when stimuli are
presented truly subliminally, which is in line with the prediction of a propositional
single-process model and not in line with the prediction of dual-process models. These
results generally match the results by Stahl and colleagues (2016) who also found
no EC effects with briefly presented stimuli, even if those stimuli were identified
slightly above chance. In contrast to the studies by Stahl et al. (2016), we found some
indications that EC effects can occur with a brief presentation schedule, but only when
stimuli are visible above chance. Both our investigations and the studies by Stahl
et al. (2016) support the claim that evaluative conditioning effects are not possible
when stimuli are presented truly subliminally. Of course, presenting stimuli only for a
brief moment is just one way to experimentally manipulate contingency awareness
and it is therefore difficult to generalize the absence of an EC effect in this paradigm
to all possible experimental manipulations of contingency awareness. However, recent
studies by Högden and colleagues (2018) using continuous flash suppression to prevent
contingency awareness between CS and US did not obtain any evidence for EC effects
in the absence of awareness. Additionally, the findings by Dedonder et al. (2010) are
in line with these results, demonstrating the absence of an EC effect when stimuli
were presented parafoveally and were therefore not consciously perceived. Given these
consistent null findings by a number of different researchers, the possibility should
be taken into consideration that EC might depend on contingency awareness. If
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contingency awareness is indeed a necessary precondition of evaluative conditioning,
the necessity for an additional associative process would be reduced. Specifically,
the possibility of the acquisition of an EC effect without contingency awareness is
one of the key assumptions of the associative process that cannot be explained by
propositional single-process models. If future research would confirm the findings
presented in the previous chapters and the mentioned findings by Högden et al. (2018)
and Dedonder et al. (2014), properties of dual-process models should be revisited and
the possibility should be entertained to combine the dual- and single-process model
into one comprehensive (single-process) model.
If EC effects without contingency awareness, as assumed by the associative
account, are not possible, it might be worth investigating other diverging predictions
of single- and dual-process models. Future research could, for example, address other
proposed differences in associative vs. propositional learning, such as the absence of
extinction and the influence of relational information between US and CS on EC.
Specifically, investigating the influence of information qualifying the relation between
CS and US might give insights into working mechanisms underlying EC. Imagine
for example that a pharmaceutical product serves as the CS and an image of a skin
disease as the US. When telling participants that the CS causes the negative US it
will be evaluated as less positive than when the CS is preventing the negative US
(Hu et al., 2017). These findings are in line with a propositional process. However,
if spontaneous associations can underlie EC one might find that the (negative) US
and the CS are associated, ignoring the relational qualifier. The empirical findings
of studies investigating these effects are mixed (Hu et al., 2017; Moran & Bar-Anan,
2013) and additionally, findings of unqualified associations might also be explained by
(partial) forgetting in a single-process view (De Houwer, 2014a). Future research should
investigate whether effects can be found that can only be explained by associative
processes in which spontaneous associations arise.
To sum up, given the results of the investigations presented in the previous
chapters and given the results of the p-curve analysis of studies claiming to have found
subliminal EC, the claim by Jones and colleagues (2010) that subliminal EC should
be taken as clear evidence for EC effects in the absence of contingency awareness is
challenged. Theorists should be cautious building models on the assumption that EC
effects can form without contingency awareness, especially when building upon studies
using subliminal presentation procedures.
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Practical implications
As summarized above, influencing evaluations by means of subliminal EC appears
to be very difficult and we did not manage to influence participants’ behavior when
they were not aware of the stimuli. It is therefore safe to say that bans of subliminal
advertisement—while not harmful—might not be necessary (Alcohol and Tobacco
Tax and Trade Bureau, 2014). We did, however, find some indications for beneficial
circumstances for EC effects with briefly presented—but visible—CSs (Chapter 4
and 6). Yet, it appears that the increase in the possibility to find an EC effect with
briefly presented CSs was related to an increase in CS-US contingency awareness.
While these findings are not directly relevant when evaluating the predictions of
single- and dual-process models (as both models would predict an EC effect when
contingency awareness is possible), the results might be interesting for marketing
research. Acquiring more knowledge on how changes in preference can be induced
with briefly presented stimuli might give insights into boundary conditions of EC
as a possible application in marketing. To change participants’ preferences using an
EC learning paradigm with briefly presented stimuli, factors that raise contingency
awareness need to be present. These factors might include the (1) simultaneous
presentation of CS and US, (2) absence of distracting tasks such as a visibility test (see
also Pleyers et al., 2009) and (3) CS-US relevance. These possibly beneficial factors
should receive attention in research in marketing and consumer science to confirm
their profitable role.
Outlook
A series of factors that might benefit automatic EC effects were discussed and
empirically tested in the previous chapters. In the next paragraph, I will address each
factor and provide an outlook on the future of research on subliminal EC in general.
One factor that was discussed is the possibility that a choice measure might be
more sensitive than an explicit evaluation. While we did not find empirical support for
this notion in the present studies, the ecological validity should be an important factor
in future studies investigating EC in applied settings. The question whether a change
in preference (that is the result of an EC learning phase) translates to behavioral
changes is an important question that needs to be addressed by future studies (see
Kruglanski et al., 2015).
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A second factor which was hypothesized to play an important role in subliminal
EC is the simultaneous presentation of CS and US. We consistently observed EC
effects in a cross-modal paradigm with IADS sounds (e.g., “a woman crying” or “a
drink being poured in”) as well as with simple harmonic and disharmonic sounds,
when CSs were presented for 1000 ms. If the simultaneous CS-US presentation is
indeed beneficial for (automatic) EC effects the cross-modal paradigm should be
used in further paradigms investigating “automatic” EC effects, such as the process-
dissociation procedure (Hütter & Sweldens, 2013) or the surveillance paradigm (Olson
& Fazio, 2001). The cross-modal approach might be particularly interesting to use in
a surveillance paradigm, in order to disguise actual CS-US pairs. The findings of a
reliable EC effect with CSs presented for 1000 ms in a cross-modal paradigm have
interesting implications for the application of EC in marketing research: The effect
of valent sounds in advertising has been discussed for decades (Gorn, 1982) and the
results of our investigations show that even a repeated brief CS-US presentation of
about one second is sufficient for changes in preferences. Summarizing, the cross-modal
approach appears promising and might prove to be of use in different EC learning
paradigms such as the surveillance paradigm (Olson & Fazio, 2001).
In Chapter 1 characteristics of studies showing subliminal EC were discussed, see
Table 1. Two factors that were almost equally distributed over the discussed studies
concerned the question of the stimulus presentation schedule (i.e., was the CS or US
briefly presented) and the dependent variable used to measure the effect (i.e., implicit
or explicit measure). We therefore tested for subliminal EC in a series of combinations
of these two factors as there appeared to be no clear setting beneficial for EC. In the
seven experiments discussed in the chapters above, we have used briefly presented
USs combined with an implicit measure and briefly presented CSs combined with
explicit measures (and choice as a possible implicit measure). We therefore covered a
series of possible combinations but were not able to find any evidence for automatic
EC effects. The only combination that has not been investigated in the presented
studies are investigations with a briefly presented US and explicit measures. While
this combination might be worth investigating, it bears the problems that are attached
with subliminal US presentation (e.g., valence might not be encoded from briefly
presented USs; Lähteenmäki et al., 2015).
Going beyond the investigated aspects, three additional factors could be consid-
ered in the investigation of subliminal evaluative conditioning in the future: individual
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differences, focus on feelings, and subjective awareness. In the next paragraph, these
three factors are briefly discussed.
First, a factor that has not received much attention in the investigation of
subliminal EC concerns the question of individual differences between participants.
To gain a deeper insight into the working mechanisms of EC and to raise the quality
of the observed data, future studies should focus more on the individual participant.
One observation we made throughout the series of studies was that the visibility
rates of briefly presented stimuli differed greatly between participants. While some
participants appeared to see none of the briefly presented stimuli, other participants
were aware of a number of stimuli. Future research could attempt to use individual
presentation times for briefly presented stimuli so that all participants perceive the
stimuli subliminally. Using monitors with a high refresh rate (which can produce
small differences in the presentation times), stimuli presentation durations could be
adapted individually before the learning phase. Additionally, other individual factors
might be taken into account to test for the possibility of automatic EC effects. The
previously discussed result by Fulcher and Hammerl (2001), which showed that only
participants with low reactance scores showed a subliminal EC effect, might serve as
a good starting point. Thus, future studies could investigate individual presentation
times and additionally investigate possible mediating roles of personality traits (see
Vogel, Hütter, & Gebauer, 2017).
A second factor discussed in the introduction, which was not directly addressed
in the conducted empirical investigations, is the “focus on feeling” instruction used
by Gawronski and LeBel (2008). While we did not explicitly instruct participants to
introspect their feelings, we used the results from the studies of Gawronski and LeBel
(2008) in that we instructed participants to “react spontaneously” and added that
“there are no right or wrong answers” during the evaluation (e.g., in the Experiment
in Chapter 7). Nevertheless, asking participants to introspect on their feelings before
evaluating a stimulus after an EC learning phase might help discover automatic EC
effects, when using explicit measures of preference.
A third important factor relates to the question how subjective awareness of
briefly presented stimuli might relate to the objective visibility criterion we used in
the discussed studies. Were participants actually consciously aware of the CSs they
identified correctly or did they merely guess correctly due to subliminal activation
of the stimulus? Perhaps more interesting is the question how subjective awareness
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relates to the presence or absence of an EC effect: Is the EC effect restricted to
truly consciously visible CSs, or does the EC effect extend to CSs for which correct
identification is based on subjective feelings or guessing? In future research, certainty
of identification of the CS could be used as a proxy for this subjective awareness.
Findings related to subliminal EC. Other findings using subliminal pre-
sentation paradigms and learning phases similar to EC might be informative for future
directions in subliminal EC. In the next paragraph, a series of findings are discussed
that did not investigate EC but showed an influence of subliminally presented stimuli
on behavior. The methods used in these investigations might be informative for future
studies in evaluative conditioning.
One method that could be informative is the (subliminal) approach-avoidance
task (AAT; K. Kawakami, Phills, Steele, & Dovidio, 2007), in which a target (e.g., a
picture of a black or white person) was presented subliminally and followed by the
instruction to make an approach or avoid movement. When images of black people
were paired with approach movements and images of white people with avoidance
movements, implicit and explicit evaluations of black people were more positive
compared to white people (K. Kawakami et al., 2007). Additional research found
empirical support for subliminal AAT effects (Jones, Vilensky, Vasey, & Fazio, 2013)
and Jones et al. (2010) suggest that results showing subliminal AAT results should be
considered as evidence for preference learning in the absence of contingency awareness.
However, a recent investigation did not show any AAT effects with subliminally
presented stimuli in three experiments (with one constituting a direct replication of
the experiment by K. Kawakami et al., 2007; Van Dessel, De Houwer, Roets, & Gast,
2016). It is therefore not clear whether findings of subliminal AAT can serve as an
insight into possible mechanisms in EC.
Another promising study, using subliminal stimuli, was recently published by
Greenwald and De Houwer (2017). In a series of experiments, unpronounceable letter
strings (CSs) were shown briefly and followed by a clearly visible word with either a
positive or negative valence (USs, in other experimental conditions male or female
first names were used instead). Participants had to press one of two keys quickly to
classify the USs as negative or positive during the learning phase (or as male/female).
In an evaluative priming task, the trial sequence and the classification task was the
same with the exception that CSs were randomly paired with positive or negative
words. This resulted in congruent (e.g., a CS previously paired with positive USs
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shown before a positive target word) and incongruent (e.g., a CS previously paired
with negative USs shown before a positive target word) pairs. Analyzing error rates in
this task, Greenwald and De Houwer (2017) found that associations between CSs and
the positive/negative valence categories appeared to exist as participants made more
errors in incongruent compared to congruent trials. Using the data of an extensive
visibility check, it was found that the effect was present when participants were not
aware of the CSs. While the effect is promising, it should be noted that it was found
with positive/negative USs as well as female/male first names as USs. As no evaluative
measure—but a priming task—was used as dependent variable, future research needs
to confirm that the effect extends to evaluative ratings. Until then the effect can also
be explained by (1) a learned motor response, (2) a facilitated identification of the
target stimulus, or (3) a facilitated identification of the semantic category of the target
(see Corneille & Stahl, 2018). While the procedure does not allow for any conclusions
about the possibility of subliminal EC, the method appears promising and should be
adapted for future studies in subliminal EC.
A third line of research that might be informative for future directions in
subliminal EC are investigations diverting participants’ attention away from the briefly
presented stimuli (i.e., preconscious conditioning). In the studies discussed throughout
the last chapters, we always used a weak stimulus and the attention of participants
was directed towards the stimulus. Another possibility is a stimulus presentation of a
longer duration while ensuring that attention of participants is not directed towards
the stimuli. This technique was for example used in the studies by Högden et al.
(2018) where no EC effect was found with continuous flash suppression (see Chapter
1). A recent study investigated inattentional blindness and showed that the decision
whether a number was larger or smaller than 5 was influenced by other numbers that
were not consciously perceived (Schnuerch, Kreitz, Gibbons, & Memmert, 2016). In
the paradigm, participants focused on a cross in the center of the screen which was
surrounded by 118 black characters (“W”, “X”, “Y”). Eight hash symbols surrounded
the square of symbols in a virtual circle. After a brief waiting phase, one of the
eight hash symbol turned red and each black character was randomly reset, sampling
from the same set of characters (“W”, “X”, “Y”). After 300 ms the red hash symbol
was replaced by a number between 1 and 9 and the task of the participant was to
judge whether the number was larger or smaller than 5. Importantly, when the red
hash symbol was replaced by a number the characters were reset again, this time
however in one third of the trials 38 characters were replaced by numbers incongruent
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to the target number (i.e., if the number replacing the hash symbol was larger 5 the
numbers were smaller and vice versa). In two experiments, reaction times towards the
target numbers were increased when incongruent numbers were presented (compared
to congruent numbers). As the studies by Schnuerch et al. (2016) were pre-registered
and a visibility test was conducted (after the test phase), this paradigm appears to
be promising to be adapted for an investigation in subliminal EC. Future studies in
subliminal EC might be well advised to adapt this paradigm for use in EC research.
Limitations of subliminal EC research. One problem inherent in investiga-
tions of subliminal EC is that “subliminal presentation” is not a clearly defined concept
(De Houwer et al., 1997). When investigating the conscious perception of stimuli they
must be presented briefly enough so they cannot be consciously reported. However,
as soon as a stimulus is identified at (or below) chance we do not know whether the
stimulus is (practically) invisible or whether a sub-conscious processing of the stimulus
is possible. Put differently, using a visibility check we can only differentiate between
conscious and not-conscious perception of stimuli, but we cannot differentiate between
sub-conscious processing and no processing nor between sub-conscious and conscious
processing. Specifically, feelings of familiarity arising from subliminal processing of
stimuli might influence the estimation of visibility of the stimuli, which would mean
that an above chance identification might arise from subliminal processing of a stimulus.
For the future of subliminal EC it appears necessary that subliminality is defined on
two levels. First, agreement needs to be reached what (neuronal) processes are active
in subliminal processing and how these processes translate into behavior. Second,
agreement on manipulation and measurement of a subliminal stimulus presentation
needs to be found.
A second problem with subliminal EC is that the learning phases are artificial
and effects might not translate into situations encountered outside of a psychology
laboratory (Bargh & Morsella, 2008). As subliminal EC might therefore not be
considered as ecologically valid, research using a surveillance paradigm might shed
more light on (automatic) associative learning in a setting assembling real world
preference learning more realistically. Future research should pay attention to (1) other
means to manipulate contingency awareness next to subliminal stimulus presentation
and (2) the problem of real-world implications of the research.
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Theories underlying EC
“Good theorizing is more important than anything else. If the theory you’re
testing is weak or logically unwarranted, best designs, methods and statistics
cannot solve the fact that your predictions can’t answer the questions you
are asking.” Fiedler (2018)
Going beyond the role of contingency awareness in theories underlying EC, in
the next paragraph I will briefly discuss dual- and single-process models in general and
possible future directions in the development and improvement of theories explaining
the underlying mechanisms in EC.
Dual-process models. When discussing the additional associative process
proposed by the APE model, one could critically argue that “no approach that needs
two systems can be more parsimonious than an approach that proposes only one of
those systems, no matter how parsimonious the second system might be” (Mitchell
et al., 2009, p. 195). Contrary to that view, De Houwer (2014c) notes that a single-
process model might become less parsimonious than a dual-process model when it
needs auxiliary assumptions to account for effects that were previously not explained
by a single—but only by a dual—process account. As an assumed second process
might not necessarily mean that a model is less parsimonious it is important to
take a closer look at the models in general. I will, therefore, discuss two general
problems of associative processes added to the propositional process in the APE model:
explanatory power and unspecificity.
Explanatory power.
When discussing an additional associative process one should keep in mind that
there is clear and undisputed evidence for propositional learning in EC. In particular,
the finding that the most important predictor of EC effects appears to be awareness
of the CS-US contingency (Hofmann et al., 2010) demonstrates that propositional
learning appears to be dominant in EC. Therefore, an additional associative learning
process can only contribute little to an explanation of the underlying processes in EC
(De Houwer, 2014c). However, if a phenomenon cannot be explained by propositional
single-process models, a dual-process model needs to be adopted even if added value
is limited. Such a phenomenon could be EC without contingency awareness, which
demonstrates why the conducted studies are of great importance in the discussion
between single- and dual-process models. Considering the results of the studies in
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the previous chapters, the explanatory power of an additional associative process
might be even more limited than assumed. While a second process might be necessary,
currently it only has a highly limited contribution explaining the underlying processes
in evaluative conditioning. To ensure that the possibly small contribution of a second—
associative—process can be assessed, the model needs to make specific predictions. In
the next paragraph, I will therefore briefly look at possible problems of predictions of
associative processes in the APE model.
Specificity and constraints.
As discussed in the introduction, only a theory with specific predictions can
facilitate scientific progress as otherwise post-hoc alternative explanations can be given
for any found effect. One general problem with current theories in psychology is that
they are rarely encoded in precise terms and no explicit outcomes are predicted (Fiedler,
2004). The problem of unspecificity can also be identified in dual-process models (De
Houwer, 2014c, 2014a). Gawronski et al. (2017) consider the APE model superior to
single-process models as predictions are made a priori and single-process models can
occasionally only account post-hoc for specific findings. While this statement might be
correct, the ability to explain a variety of effects stems from the flexibility of the APE
model. The following descriptions of the working mechanism of automatic processes
in the associative processes demonstrates the flexibility of the theorized associative
processes:
“In line with this contention, the APE model assumes that the activation of
evaluative associations in memory can indeed occur unintentionally, thereby
meeting the second criterion of automaticity. However, it is important
to note that evaluative associations can also be activated intentionally.”
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014b, p. 195, emphasis added)
“Associative learning can be described as unintentional in the sense that the
learning process itself does not require the goal to form a new association.
However, associative learning can certainly have intentional antecedents”
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014b, p. 196, emphasis added)
“The APE model generally agrees with the contention that associative
processes are highly efficient. However, this efficiency does not imply
that evaluative associations cannot be activated in an effortful manner.”
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014b, p. 196, emphasis added)
168
“According to the APE model, the formation of mental links through asso-
ciative learning is resource-independent, although attentional distraction
may sometimes disrupt associative learning” (Gawronski & Bodenhausen,
2014b, p. 197, emphasis added)
“We argue that the activation of evaluative associations is controllable to
some extent. However, the overall success in controlling the activation of
evaluative associations is assumed to depend on the nature of the adopted
control strategy.” (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014b, p. 197, emphasis
added)
One could say that the associative processes proposed in the APE model subscribe
to the working mechanisms of automaticity (Bargh, 1994), but can also explain when
behavior does not abide by these principles. Additionally, the APE model proposes
that implicit measures of attitude generally capture associative processes, while explicit
measures of attitude capture propositional processes. This duality is challenged by
findings that people can introspect on their “implicit attitudes” and are able to predict
their scores on implicit measures (Hahn et al., 2014). The APE model could therefore
be characterized as a combination of a very flexible associative model on top of a
complex propositional model. Due to this extreme flexibility and lack of constraints
the APE model cannot be falsified in practice (De Houwer, 2014c, 2014a). Only
through constraints of the APE model, specific predictions can be derived and tested.
Adding constraints to the APE model would constitute as an important step towards
better theories in evaluative conditioning.
Single-process views. The studies presented in the previous chapters show
clear support for propositional single-process views as EC was only observed when
contingency awareness was present. The findings are therefore in line with a central
prediction of propositional single-process views (Mitchell et al., 2009). However, similar
to dual-process models, the current single-process models are unspecific and difficult
to falsify, which will be discussed in the next paragraph.
Specificity and constraints.
The largest problem of propositional single-process views—as briefly mentioned
in Chapter 1—is that no specific model has been proposed. Only a series of articles
describe a single-process view in general and make some specific predictions (e.g., De
Houwer, 2009, 2014b, 2014c, 2014a; Mitchell et al., 2009). One of the few specific
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predictions made by Mitchell et al. (2009) is that contingency awareness is necessary
for EC (from a propositional process view), which is the prediction tested in the
previous chapters. Other descriptions of the propositional single-process view are less
constrained and vague and therefore do not allow for a straightforward falsification
(De Houwer, 2014a).
To progress in the understanding of evaluative conditioning, a propositional
single-process model needs to be introduced, that makes specific predictions, above
and beyond contingency awareness. Only when setting boundary conditions and
making restricted a priori predictions, a propositional single-process model can serve
as a strong contender in the investigation of models explaining preference acquisition.
Cognitive models of episodic memory could be one possible starting point to constrain
current single-process views in an effort to create a falsifiable single-process model
(Stahl & Heycke, 2016). A promising first start is the prediction of EC effects using
the formalized memory model MINERVA 2 (Aust et al., 2017).
As current single- and dual-process models are too unspecific and consist merely
of semantic descriptions of assumed processes, both models might, in fact, be highly
similar and could be combined in one overarching model (Gawronski et al., 2017).
Conclusion
In a series of experiments with different settings, we demonstrated that pref-
erences can be acquired towards neutral stimuli through an evaluative conditioning
procedure. However, this finding was restricted to stimuli that were consciously per-
ceived by the participants. We did not obtain any evidence for subliminal EC effects,
even though the aim of the set of experiments was to provide optimal circumstances
for such EC effects. The results therefore clearly suggest that contingency awareness
between CS and US needs to be present for EC effects to form. It appears unlikely that
EC effects can be found when one of the stimuli is presented subliminally. This finding
can be considered very important when evaluating the merits of theories explaining
underlying processes in EC. The findings of our experiments support propositional
single-process models, which postulate that contingency awareness is necessary for
EC effects to occur. The findings contradict dual-process models that postulate that
EC effects can form automatically.
As discussed in the previous sections, both single- and dual-process models need
170
to be improved in order to progress the research in the field of preference learning.
Theories should be specified to predict specific outcomes resulting in a possibility to
falsify them.
A second necessity related to this point is that there needs to be consensus on
definitions and terminology. The field will highly benefit if researchers would agree on
precise definitions of terms such as “associative” and “subliminal”. Only if researchers
can agree on the same terminology and precise definitions, future theories will be less
dependent on individual interpretations of concepts. Even if currently theorists might
not be able to agree on the same model, the field of evaluative learning would benefit
highly from a precise single-process and a precise dual-process theory with clear—and
falsifiable—predictions.
This dissertation opened with a quote by Kant in which he postulated that “our
knowledge begins with sense, proceeds thence to understanding, and ends with reason
[. . . ]”(Kant, 1787, p. 228). While one can be certain that Kant was not describing
evaluative conditioning processes, the quote nicely fits with the empirical findings
presented in this dissertation: The results of the empirical work presented here suggest
that in evaluative learning, only once perceived information is understood (e.g., by
propositional processes), the information will be used in reasoning and evaluations.
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Appendix A
Literature search
Search Terms
The following search terms:
(1) evaluative conditioning
(2) evaluative learning
(3) affective conditioning
(4) affective learning
(5) attitude learning
(6) EC
were combined with these search terms:
(1) subliminal
(2) unconscious
Search approach
1. All combinations of search terms were used in an Ebsco-Host search (spring 2017)
which resulted in 122 results
2. Additional articles were found in the meta-analysis by Hofmann et al., 2010
3. All abstracts were read and articles were removed that clearly did not experimentally
manipulated CS or US visibility or did not use an EC paradigm
4. In total 88 articles were downloaded and 2 additional articles were found by TH
5. Studies were scanned by TH and only studies using experimental manipulation of
subliminality and EC were selected (k = 19)
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Appendix B
Steps data processing meta-analysis
Statistical values were selected from the publications discussed in Chapter 1 only when two
means were compared by a statistical test, which was possible for 37 Experiments reported
in 18 publications.
As all F tests compared two mean values, all F values were transformed to t values:
t =
√
F
For within designs dz values were calculated and for between subject comparisons ds values
were calculated from the t values and the sample size [1]
ds = 2× t√
N
dz =
t√
n
All d values were transformed to correlations [2]
r = d√
d2 + 4
With r being transformed back to d therefore by [3]
d = ± 2r√
1− r2
To acquire values on an interval scale all correlations were Fisher Z transformed [4]
Z = 12 × ln(
1 + r
1− r )
With Z being transformed back to r therefore by
r = e
2Z − 1
e2Z + 1
When more than one measure was taken in a study, a mean score was calculated from the Z
values and a standard error was calculated for each Z value [5]
SE = 1√
N − 3
[1] Lakens, D. (2013). Calculating and reporting effect sizes to facilitate cumulative science:
a practical primer for t-tests and ANOVAs. Frontiers in Psychology, 4.
[2] Hussy, W., & Jain, A. (2002). Experimentelle Hypothesenprüfung in der Psychologie.
Göttingen: Hogrefe, Verlag für Psychologie.
[3] Berkessel, N., Berkessel, N., & Berkessel, J. (2018). Personal Communication.
[4] Bortz, J., & Schuster, C. (2010). Statistik für Human- und Sozialwissenschaftler (7.,
vollständig überarbeitete und erweiterte Auflage). Berlin Heidelberg: Springer.
[5] Hilgard, J., Engelhardt, C. R., & Rouder, J. N. (2017). Overstated evidence for
short-term effects of violent games on affect and behavior: A reanalysis of Anderson et al.
(2010). Psychological Bulletin, 143(7), 757–774.
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Appendix C
Descriptive Statistics of Evaluative Measures and IAT reaction times in Experiment 1
Table C1
Unstandardized explicit ratings of the target character after Block 1 and Block 2 in Experiment
1 with either positive behavior being characteristic of the target character and negative behavior
uncharacteristic (’positive’) or negative behavior being characteristic of the target character and
positive behavior uncharacteristic (’negative’).
Rating 1 Rating 2 Rating 3 Rating 4 Rating 5 Rating 6 Rating 7
Block 1, positive
Mean 7.96 8.21 7.96 7.61 8.29 7.82 84.96
SD 1.29 1.20 2.08 1.81 1.70 2.26 17.41
Block 2, negative
Mean 2.54 2.61 2.25 2.32 2.50 2.57 21.68
SD 2.15 1.93 2.03 1.98 2.22 1.99 24.68
Block 1, negative
Mean 1.43 1.61 1.74 1.65 1.48 2.00 12.04
SD 1.47 1.50 1.81 1.64 1.47 1.73 18.63
Block 2, positive
Mean 7.17 7.48 7.83 7.22 8.00 7.39 78.26
SD 1.99 1.93 1.80 2.00 1.78 1.88 20.60
Note. Rating 1 = ’Unlikable-Very Likable’; Rating 2 = ’Bad-Good’; Rating 3 = ’Mean-Pleasant’;
Rating 4 = ’Disagreeable-Agreeable’; Rating 5 = ’Uncaring-Caring’; Rating 6 = ’Cruel-Kind’ (all
9 point scales); Rating 7 = ’feeling thermometer’ (0 to 100).
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Table C2
Unstandardized and untransformed IAT effects (i.e., Mean RT[target character
and negative] - Mean RT[target character and positive]) in Experiment 1 with
higher values indicating a more positive attitude towards the target character
(in ms).
Time 1 IAT Time 2 IAT Time 1 IAT Time 2 IAT
Valence Behavior positive negative negative positive
Mean 191.94 109.73 -36.39 53.44
SD 188.25 118.96 167.1 111.25
Note. The valence of the primes was always opposite to the valence of the
behavior.
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Appendix D
Descriptive Statistics of Evaluative Measures and IAT reaction times in Experiment 2
Table D1
Unstandardized explicit ratings of the target character after Block 1 and Block 2 in Experiment
2 with either positive behavior being characteristic of the target character and negative behavior
uncharacteristic (’positive’) or negative behavior being characteristic of the target character and
positive behavior uncharacteristic (’negative’).
Rating 1 Rating 2 Rating 3 Rating 4 Rating 5 Rating 6 Rating 7
Block 1, positive
Mean 8.39 8.03 8.10 8.00 8.32 8.39 84.65
SD 1.56 1.70 1.68 1.77 1.56 1.52 23.11
Block 2, negative
Mean 2.06 1.81 1.71 1.71 1.81 1.74 11.13
SD 2.13 1.22 1.40 1.32 1.58 1.37 15.26
Block 1, negative
Mean 1.58 1.58 1.46 1.58 1.50 1.58 8.38
SD 1.24 0.90 0.90 0.95 0.95 0.86 10.95
Block 2, positive
Mean 7.42 7.15 7.31 7.23 7.77 7.69 77.73
SD 1.81 1.99 2.07 2.05 2.12 2.13 22.44
Note. Rating 1 = ’Unlikable-Very Likable’; Rating 2 = ’Bad-Good’; Rating 3 = ’Mean-Pleasant’;
Rating 4 = ’Disagreeable-Agreeable’; Rating 5 = ’Uncaring-Caring’; Rating 6 = ’Cruel-Kind’ (all
9 point scales); Rating 7 = ’feeling thermometer’ (0 to 100).
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Table D2
Unstandardized and untransformed IAT effects (i.e., Mean RT[target character
and negative] - Mean RT[target character and positive]) in Experiment 2 with
higher values indicating a more positive attitude towards the target character
(in ms).
Time 1 IAT Time 2 IAT Time 1 IAT Time 2 IAT
Valence Behavior positive negative negative positive
Mean 227.6 59.98 43.15 94.33
SD 177.63 107.24 158.89 166.33
Note. The valence of the primes was always opposite to the valence of the
behavior.
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Appendix E
Mean evaluative ratings
Table E1
Mean evaluative ratings (and SDs) as a function of CS type (water vs. airline), US type
(neutral, fearful face, disgusted face, disgust-eliciting IAPS picture), and CS visibility (17
ms at chance, 17 ms above chance, 1000 ms).
US type
CS type Visibility Neutral Fearful face Disgusted face Disgust IAPS
Airline 17 ms, at chance 103.69 109.17 109.85 108.65
(38.92) (42.91) (41.18) (41.47)
17 ms, above chance 106.36 101.00 103.78 96.84
(37.31) (40.65) (43.48) (34.77)
1000 ms 116.71 106.81 104.28 102.86
(42.94) (43.78) (38.15) (50.21)
Water 17 ms, at chance 113.67 104.00 119.56 106.03
(40.66) (45.18) (29.30) (32.61)
17 ms, above chance 118.75 124.91 113.26 101.36
(39.22) (41.04) (42.72) (48.05)
1000 ms 116.41 110.84 115.73 97.78
(43.59) (42.15) (42.53) (54.82)
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Appendix F
Sets of IADS sounds used in Experiment 1: Valence Positive, Neutral, Negative
Table F1
Sound-Nr. (Bradley & Lang,
2007)
Positive Neutral Negative
110 109 278
172 171 279
725 206 285
809 221 296
810 270 501
811 365 624
815 367 625
816 368 711
817 375 712
820 722 719
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Appendix G
Priors for the Bayesian logistic mixed effects regression models of two-alternative forced choice responses
p = 0.50
p = 0.66
p = 0.85
Intercept ~ Cauchy(0, 1.28)
p = 0.50
p = 0.61
p = 0.78
p = 1.00
Eﬀects ~ Cauchy(0, 0.91)
p = 0.50p = 0.88
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Cells ~ Cauchy(0, 4)
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Figure G1 . Priors for the Bayesian logistic mixed effects regression models of two-
alternative forced choice responses. Colored lines represent distribution quantiles;
annoted probabilities represent the resulting probability of choosing a positively paired
CS starting from chance level (p = 0.5).
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Appendix H
Mean CS visibility (Experiment 2 and Experiment 3)
Mean Visibility scores of each CS in Experiment 2 (chance level = .250, N = 37)
and pilot of Experiment 3 (chance level = .125, N = 7) and the presentation
time for each stimulus as used in Experiment 3.
Table H1
Mean CS visibility
CS Visibility Study 2 Visibility Pilot Set
03.png .512 .400 1000 ms
08.png .540 .329 1000 ms
14.png .900 .657 1000 ms
22.png .475 .400 1000 ms
04.png .438 .200 20 ms
20.png .400 .271 20 ms
50.png .356 .129 20 ms
51.png .423 .243 20 ms
